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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis identifies apophatic elements in the theory and practice of psychoanalysis 
through an examination of Pseudo-Dionysius and C.G. Jung.  Pseudo-Dionysius 
brought together Greek and Biblical currents of negative theology and the via negativa. 
The apophatic concepts and metaphors which appear in the work of Pseudo-Dionysius 
are identified. The psychology of Jung can be read as a continuation and extension of 
the apophatic tradition. The presence of neoplatonic themes in Jung’s work is discussed, 
as well as his references to Pseudo-Dionysius. There is a thorough examination of 
Jung’s discussion of opposites, including his reception of Nicholas of Cusa’s concept of 
the coincidence of opposites. The role of the transcendent function in Jung’s 
psychology is reviewed. The work of contemporary scholars of religion, philosophers 
and Jungian theorists are compared to Jung’s using the lens of apophasis. There is an 
exploration of ways in which motifs in Pseudo-Dionysius’ Ecclesiatical Hierarchy 
resonate with contemporary psychoanalytic psychotherapy.  This study demonstrates 
that apophatic motifs saturate Jung’s work. It provides a platform for research into 
apophasis in the wider field of psychoanalysis. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
The lonely cells of the recluses of Egypt have been revealed, by the archaeologist, 
to have had well-furnished consulting rooms.1  
 
In former times people went into monasteries. Were they stupid or insensitive 
people? – Well, if people like that found they needed to take such measures in 
order to be able to go on living, the problem cannot be an easy one!2  
 
 
The aim of this study is to identify apophatic elements in the theory and practice of 
psychoanalysis. It will do so by an examination of the works of the 6th century 
philosopher, Dionysius3, and the 20th century psychoanalyst, Carl Gustav Jung.   
 
I am using ‘apophatic elements’ as an umbrella term to cover a range of concepts, 
images, metaphors and behaviour which are characterised by negation or denial. 
Apophasis can be translated literally as un-saying. It is “away from speech” or “saying 
away.” Apo is “from” or “away.” Phasis is “assertion,” from phemi, “assert” or “say.” 
Apophasis, denial, stands in relation to kataphasis, affirmation. The via negativa and 
negative theology are concerned with the apophatic in philosophy and religion. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Brown, Peter (1982), ‘The Rise and Function of the Holy Man in Late Antiquity’, Society and the Holy 
in Late Antiquity, London: Faber and Faber, p. 135 
2 Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1980), Culture and Value, Chicago: Chicago, p. 49, quoted by David M. Hay 
(1998), ‘The Veiled Thoughts of the Therapeutae’, Mediators of the Divine: Horizons of Prophecy, 
Divination, Dreams and Theurgy in Mediterranean Antiquity, Robert M. Berchman (ed.), Atlanta: 
Scholars Press 
3 Dionysius has been variously referred to as Pseudo-Dionysius, Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite, 
Pseudo-Denys, etc. For the sake of simplicity I will refer to him as Dionysius throughout, unless I am 
making a direct quotation from another author. Further comments on his identity can be found in Chapter 
Two. All quotations, unless otherwise indicated, are from Colm Luibheid (trans.) (1987), Pseudo-
Dionysius: The Complete Works, P. Rorem (foreword, notes, trans. collaboration), R. Roques (preface), J. 
Pelikan, J. Leclercq and K. Froehlich (introductions), New York: Paulist Press. They follow established 
convention whereby the name of the work is indicated in initials followed the line number. I will indicate 
the name of the work the first time it appears. Thereafter is will appear as an initial.  (i.e. The Divine 
Names line 893B is DN 839B).  
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‘Unknowing’ as an epistemological problem and as an experience is at the heart of 
apophatic writing.  
 
Freud described psychoanalysis both as a theory for understanding the mind and culture 
and as a therapy for neurosis. This mirrors the debate among the interpreters of the 
writings of Dionysius. Some interpret his work as philosophy, others interpret it as a 
description of personal experience. Lossky, perhaps, embraces both sides when he 
describes apophaticism as “an attitude of mind which refuses to form concepts about 
God.”4 Coakley asserts that this division, while having “some remaining heuristic 
worth, is far too blunt a tool to account for the historic variety of Dionysian influences 
down the centuries.”5 Psychoanalysis has had a similarly varied influence, albeit for a 
much shorter period of time. Grinberg observed that, “In spite of its tremendous impact 
on mankind, paradoxically enough, it has not yet been possible to place and classify 
psychoanalysis within any of the existing fields of knowledge.”6 
 
The problem of unknowing is central to the theory and practice of psychoanalysis. One 
of the motives behind this research is to explore whether or not there are resources 
within the discourse of the via negativa and negative theology to help the 
psychotherapist to think about unknowing in the psychoanalytic setting. Does the 
apophatic literature provide tools for understanding the process of psychoanalysis? Is it 
possible that, in the words of Dionysius, “If one considers these texts [his own and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Lossky, Vladimir (1957), The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s 
Seminary Press, pp. 38-9 
5 Coakley, Sarah (2008), ‘Introduction – Re-Thinking Dionysius the Areopagite,’ Modern Theology, 24:4, 
p. 537 
6 Grinberg, Leon (1969), ‘New Ideas: Conflict and Evolution,’ The International Journal of 
Psychoanalysis, 50: 517 
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those of psychoanalysis] with a reverent eye one will see something that both brings 
about unity and manifests a single empathy?”7 
 
Passing reference to the apophatic tradition has been made in a few histories of 
psychotherapy. Ellenberger8 and Whyte9 identify Dionysius as one of a number of 
philosophers who contributed to pre-Freudian concepts of the unconscious: 
 
Plotin and the neo-Platonic philosophers defined God by means of a negative 
approach: God is not at all what we conceive him to be; he is unimaginable to 
us. The great mystic known as Dionysios the Areopagite, gave to this concept a 
Christian formulation: “The most godly knowledge of God is that which is 
known by unknowing.”10 
 
Burke characterises Freud’s theory as a “secular variant of negative theology”.11 Sells 
and Webb have written a paper about apophatic elements in Lacan and Bion.12  
Goudsmit in a study of the via negativa in psychotherapy compares Merleau-Ponty’s 
“negative philosophy” and Nicholas of Cusa’s “learned ignorance.”13 Anderson used the 
work of Thomas Merton to develop an apophatic approach to psychotherapy.14 Dourley, 
in a chapter entitled ‘Toward an Apophatic Psychology’, explores Jung’s understanding 
of Eckhart.15 Karlsson observes that: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, EH432B.  
8 Ellenberger, Henri (1970), The Discovery of the Unconscious: The History and Evolution of Dynamic 
Psychiatry, New York: Basic Books  
9 Whyte, L.L. (1978), The Unconscious Before Freud, London: Julian Friedmann, p. 80 10	  Ellenberger,	  Henri	  (1957),	  ‘The	  Unconscious	  before	  Freud’,	  Bulletin	  of	  the	  Menninger	  Clinic,	  21	  (1),	  p.	  4	  
11 Burke, Kenneth (1969), A Grammar of Motives, Berkeley: University of California Press, p. 317 
12 Sells, Michael A. and James Webb (1997), ‘Lacan and Bion: Psychoanalysis and the  
Mystical Language of “Un-Saying”’, Journal of Melanie Klein and Object Relations, 15 (2): 243-264 
13 Goudsmit, Arno L. (1998), Towards a negative understanding of psychotherapy, PhD dissertation, 
Rijksuniversiteit Groningen 
14 Anderson, S. Michael (1984), Therapy as Self-Emptying: Doing Pastoral Psychotherapy From an 
Apophatic Perspective, DST dissertation, Emory University 15	  John	  P.	  Dourley,	  John	  P.	  	  (1992),	  A	  Strategy	  for	  a	  Loss	  of	  Faith:	  Jung's	  Proposal,	  Toronto:	  Inner	  City	  Books	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One of the reasons that psychoanalysis as a science struggles with difficult 
epistemological problems is that its subject matter – the unconscious – is 
constituted in terms of negativity. What other science investigates something 
which is defined by the prefix un-?! The only resembling discipline, in this 
sense, may be the so-called “negative theology”, which claims that an 
understanding of God can only be reached by stating what God is not.16 
 
Frank asserts that “all ‘psychology’ which really sees its object and really takes account 
of its peculiar character must be ‘negative psychology’ (by analogy to negative 
theology).”17 If Karlsson and Frank are right, psychoanalysis and negative theology 
share a concern to clarify how to think about negation.  
 
Psychoanalysis has been widely and effectively used as a tool to study religious 
experience and mystical thought. However, Essai sur l’introversion mystique: etude 
psychologique de pseudo-Denys l’areopagite et de quelques autres cas de mysticisme is, 
as far as I am aware, the only sustained psychoanalytic study of Dionysius. It was 
written by Morel in 1918 and dedicated to Flournoy. In his introduction Morel 
references Charcot, Janet, Freud, Jung, Bleuler and Bergson. He concludes that:  
[…] le “systeme” de Denys offre cette double analogie essentielle avec la pensée 
autistique: 1. Il  est égocentrique. 2. Le critère de la vraisemblance est totalment 
exclue et remplacé par le seul critère de la jouissance. […] Or, cette confusion 
de la réalité objective interne et d’un égocentrisme métaphysique est une forme 
particulière et tres répandue de mythomanie: création, réalisation de fictions, et 
confusion pseudo-hallucinatoire de celles-ci avec la réalité.18 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Karlsson, Gunnar (2000), ‘The Question of Truth Claims in Psychoanalysis’, The Scandinavian 
Psychoanalytic Review, 23 (1), p. 4 
17 Frank, S.L. (1983), The Unknowable: An Ontological Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, 
Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, p. 108 
18 Morel, Ferndinand (1918), Essai sur l’introversion mystique: etude psychologique de pseudo-Denys 
l’areopagite et de quelques autres cas de mysticisme, Geneve: Librairie Kundig, pp. 136-7: “[…] the 
‘system’ of Dionysius offers this essentially double analogy with autistic thought: 1st It is egocentric. 2nd 
The criteria of plausibility is totally excluded and replaced by the sole criteria of pleasure. […] Therefore, 
this confusion of objective internal reality with a metaphysical egocentricity is a particular and very 
common form of mythomania: the creation and fulfillment of illusions, and quasi-hallucinatory confusion 
of these with reality.” (my translation) 
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The approach taken here turns the tables on psychoanalysis. It asks what sort of a 
practice and theory is psychoanalysis, and where is it located within the history of the 
European contemplative tradition, by use of the concept of apophasis. It asks in what 
ways, if any, the language of apophatic writing can illuminate the theory and practice of 
psychoanalysis. This process necessarily alters our perceptions of both ancient 
apophasis and modern psychoanalysis.  As Turner observes: 
One understands a tradition when one understands how that past lives in the 
present… to call upon a tradition is always to reread it, that is to say, to access a 
tradition is already to have changed it. Therefore the past is alive as tradition in 
so far as we transform it, so the normativity of the tradition is the product of 
what it yields to us by way of given achievement in the past in conjunction with 
our present strategies of rereading those achievements, that conjunction of past 
and present constituting its character and life as tradition.19 
 
In addition to the theoretical and historical objectives and motives for this study, it has a 
philological dimension. In the section on Dionysius I will describe ways in which 
apophatic themes appear in his texts. This is the first time that these features of his 
writing have been identified in such detail.  In the section on Jung, I can claim to have 
identified his use of the notion of opposites in a more thorough manner than has been 
attempted before. 
 
Chapters 2 & 3 of this study focus on Dionysius, the 6th century Syrian writer whose 
works are often portrayed as the zenith of apophatic thought. He brought together the 
Greek and Biblical currents of negative theology and the via negativa. Apophatic 
elements can be found in the writings of Plato, Philo, the Gnostics, Plotinus, Augustine, 
Gregory of Nyssa and Proclus, all of whom predate Dionysius. Dionysius’ thought has 
been interpreted and made use of in a variety of ways by philosophers and theologians 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Turner, Denys (2005), ‘How to Read the pseudo-Denys Today?’ in International Journal of Systematic 
Theology, 7 (4), pp. 434-5 
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from his own time up to the present, including Eriugena, Aquinas, Cusa, Eckhart and 
the author of the Cloud of Unknowing.  
 
In the last 30 years there has been a resurgence of interest in apophatic literature. 
Mortley,20 McGinn,21 de Certeau,22 Carabine23 and Sells24 have written historical studies 
of apophatic philosophy, theology and mysticism. In debates related to deconstruction 
and postmodernism Derrida25 and Marion26 have written significantly about Dionysius. 
Yannaras27 and Carlson,28 who develops what he calls the “apophatic analogy,” have 
compared Heidegger and Dionysius. Boeve uses the concept of “cultural apophaticism” 
to reflect on contemporary relations between theology and culture.29 Fitzpatrick30 and 
Walker31 have used apophasis within the context of the social sciences. Zembylas32 and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Mortley, Raoul (1986), From Word to Silence: I The rise and fall of logos, II The way of negation, 
Christian and Greek, Bonn: Peter Hanstein 21	  McGinn,	  Bernard	  (1992),	  The	  Foundations	  of	  Mysticism:	  Origins	  to	  the	  Fifth	  Century,	  London:	  SCM	  Press;	  (1995),	  The	  Growth	  of	  Mysticism:	  From	  Gregory	  the	  Great	  to	  the	  Twelfth	  Century,	  London:	  SCM	  Press;	  (1998),	  The	  Flowering	  of	  Mysticism:	  Men	  and	  Women	  in	  the	  New	  Mysticism	  –	  1200-­1350,	  New	  York:	  Crossroads	  
22 de Certeau, Michel (1992), The Mystic Fable, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 23	  Carabine,	  Deirdre	  (1995),	  The	  Unknown	  God:	  Negative	  Theology	  in	  the	  Platonic	  Tradition:	  Plato	  to	  
Eriugena,	  Louvain:	  Peeters	  Press	  
24 Sells, Michael A. (1994), Mystical Languages of Unsaying, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
25 Derrida, Jacques (1992), ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’ and ‘Post-Scriptum: Aporias, Ways and 
Voices’, Derrida and Negative Theology, Howard Coward and Toby Foshay (eds.), Albany: SUNY 
26 Marion, Jean-Luc (2001), The Idol and Distance, New York: Fordham University Press 
27 Yannaras, Christos (2005), On the Absence and Unknowability of God: Heidegger and the Areopagite, 
London: T&T Clark, originally published in Greek in 1967. 
28 Carlson, Thomas, A. (1999), Indiscretion: Finitude and the Naming of God, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press 
29 Boeve, Lieven (2004), ‘Cultural Apophaticism: A Challenge for Contemporary Theology,’ Rethinking 
Ecumenism: Strategies for the 21st Century, Freek L. Bakker, et al (eds.), Zoetermeer: Meinema; (2002), 
‘The Rediscovery of Negative Theology Today: The Narrow Gulf between Theology and Philosophy,’ 
Theologie negative (Biblioteca del’ ‘Archivio di Filosofia’, 59), M. Olivetti (ed.), Rome: CEDAM; 
(2000), ‘Christus Postmodernus: an attempt at apophatic Christology,’ The Myriad Christ: Plurality and 
the Quest for Unity in Contemporary Christology, T. Merrigan and J. Haers (eds.), BETL, 152, Leuven: 
Peeters 30	  Fitzpatrick,	  Sean	  Joseph	  (2000),	  Saying	  and	  unsaying	  mysticism:	  The	  problem	  of	  defining	  
mysticism	  in	  the	  social	  sciences,	  PhD	  dissertation,	  Rice	  University	  31	  Walker,	  Andrew	  George	  (1979),	  Two	  versions	  of	  sociological	  discourse:	  the	  apophatic	  and	  
cataphatic	  grounds	  of	  social	  science,	  PhD	  dissertation,	  Goldsmiths	  College,	  University	  of	  London	  
32 Zembylas, Michalinos (2005), ‘A Pedagogy of Unknowing: Witnessing Unknowability in Teaching and 
Learning,’ Studies in Philosophy and Education, 24 (2) 
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Abunuwara33 argue for the importance of “the unknowable” in education. Wolosky has 
explored apophasis in Eliot, Beckett and Celan.34  Franke has used the theme of 
apophasis to compile an anthology, which includes work from literature and the arts.35 
He observes: 
As a newly emerging logic, or rather a/logic, of language in the humanities, this 
new (though also very old) quasi-epistemic paradigm for criticism, as well as for 
language-based disciplines and practices in general, can help us learn to read in 
hither to unsuspectedly limber and sensitive ways.36 
 
Saward developed the concept of “apophatic anthropology” based on patristic texts, 
especially Gregory of Nyssa, which he links with Wittgenstein’s “silence.”37 
Independently Bernauer described Foucault’s “apophatic anthropology.”38 Carlson39 and 
Otten40 use of notion of “negative anthropology.” Caputo argues for a “generalized 
apophatics”: 
So to the theologia negativa, one could add a anthropologia negativa, an ethica 
negativa, politica negativa, where of the humanity, or the ethics, or the politics, 
or the democracy to come we cannot say a thing, except that they want to twist 
free from the regimes of presence, from the historically restricted concepts of 
humanity, ethics and democracy under which we presently labor.  Humanity, 
ethics, politics – or whatever, n’importe – would belong to a general apophatics 
[…] The effect of this ignorantia is to keep the possibility of the impossible 
open, to keep the future open, to have a future.41  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Abunuwara, Kimberley (1998), ‘Drawing on Levinas to Redefine Education: Making the Unknowable 
the New Priority,’ Education, 119 (1) 
34 Wolosky, Shira (1995), Language Mysticism: The Negative Way of Language in Eliot, Beckett, and 
Celan, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 
35 Franke, William P. (2007), On What Cannot Be Said: Apophatic Discourses in Philosophy, Religion, 
Literature and the Arts: Classic Formulations, Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press; (2007), 
On What Cannot Be Said: Apophatic Discourses in Philosophy, Religion, Literatue and the Arts: Vol. 2, 
Modern and Contemporary Transformations, Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press; see also 
(2004), ‘A Philosophy of the Unsayable: Apophasis and the Experience of Truth and Totality,’ in 
Analecta Husserliana, 83 
36 Franke, personal communication 
37 Saward, John (1974), ‘Towards an Apophatic Anthropology,’ Irish Theological Quarterly, 41 
38 Bernauer, James (1990), Michel Foucault’s Force of Flight: Toward an Ethics for Thought, Atlantic 
Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International 
39 Carlson, Thomas A. (1998), ‘The Poverty and Poetry of Indiscretion: Negative Theology and Negative 
Anthropology in Contemporary and Historical Perspective,’ in Christianity and Literature, 17 (2) 
40 Otten, W. (1999), ‘In the Shadow of the Divine: Negative Theology and Negative Anthropology in 
Augustine, Pseudo-Dionysius and Eriugena,’ in Heythrop Journal, 40: 438-55. 
41 Caputo, John  (1997), The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion without Religion, 
Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, p. 56. 
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While these varied uses of apophasis are not referred to explicitly in what follows, they 
provide part of the wider context of this study.  
 
In the context of his discussion of the relationship between continental philosophy and 
the via negativa Bradley asks whether the relationship is one of kinship or opposition: 
 
Is continental thought… a philosophical continuation and extension of negative 
theology’s critique of language, identity and ontology or is it a rejection or 
reaction against a negative theological tradition that, for all its subversiveness, 
remains deeply indebted to the metaphysical and ontotheological tradition from 
which it departs?42 
 
I am asking a similar question about the relationship between psychoanalysis and 
apophasis. My argument is that psychoanalysis, in this case the psychoanalysis of Jung, 
can be read as a continuation and extension of the apophatic tradition.  
 
Chapter 4 examines apophatic elements in the work of Jung. The limits of 
consciousness, reason and language are ubiquitous themes in Jung’s writings. In his 
view the unconscious is simply “the unknown.” The inner and the outer worlds are 
ultimately both unknowable. Subjectivity and matter are both mysteries: 
 
The relation of a psychic content to the ego forms the criterion of its 
consciousness, for no content can be conscious unless it is represented to a 
subject. With this definition we have described and delimited the scope of the 
subject. Theoretically, no limits can be set to the field of consciousness, since it 
is capable of indefinite extension. Empirically, however, it always finds its limit 
when it comes up against the unknown. This consists of everything we do not 
know, which, therefore, is not related to the ego as the centre of the field of 
consciousness. The unknown falls into two groups of objects: those which are 
outside and can be experienced by the senses, and those which are inside and are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Bradley, Arthur (2004), Negative Theology and Modern French Philosophy, London: Routledge, p. 20 
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experienced immediately. The first group comprises the unknown in the outer 
world; the second the unknown in the inner world. We call this latter territory 
the unconscious.43 
 
The symbol is the most appropriate way of expressing a content that is ultimately 
unknowable. Jung felt that the writings of the Gnostics and the alchemists prefigured 
the paradoxical findings of psychoanalysis: 
 
Paradox is a characteristic of the Gnostic writings. It does more justice to the 
unknowable than clarity can do, for uniformity of meaning robs the mystery of 
its darkness and sets it up as something that is known. That is a usurpation, and it 
leads the human intellect into hybris by pretending that it, the intellect, has got 
hold of the transcendent mystery by a cognitive act and has “grasped” it. The 
paradox therefore reflects a higher level of intellect and, by not forcibly 
representing the unknowable as known, gives a more faithful picture of the real 
state of affairs.44 
 
Fear of the unknown inhibits personality development and is a source of resistance in 
psychotherapy: 
In studying the history of the human mind one is impressed again and again by 
the fact that its growth keeps pace with a widening range of consciousness, and 
that each step forward is an extremely painful and laborious achievement. One 
could almost say that nothing is more hateful to man than to give up the smallest 
particle of unconsciousness. He has a profound fear of the unknown. Ask 
anybody who has ever tried to introduce new ideas! If even the allegedly mature 
man is afraid of the unknown, why shouldn’t the child hesitate also? The horror 
novi is one of the most striking qualities of primitive man. This is a natural 
enough obstacle, as obstacles go; but excessive attachment to the parents is 
unnatural and pathological, because a too great fear of the unknown is itself 
pathological.45  
 
The unknown within the context of psychoanalytic therapy is not solely the result of 
repression. The attitude of not knowing is an important element of analytic technique: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 CW9ii 1-2. Quotations from Jung’s Collected Works follow the convention of listing the volume and 
paragraph (i.e. Collected Works volume 9ii, paragraphs 1-2: CW9ii 1-2). The titles of particular essays 
appear in the main body of the text where they are integral to the argument. The Collected Works of C.G. 
Jung, 20 vols., Sir Herbert Read, Michael Fordham, and Gerhard Adler (eds.), William McGuire (exec. 
ed), R.F.C. Hull (trans.), Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 
44 CW11 417 
45 CW17 146 
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There are naturally cases where the doctor sees something which is undoubtedly 
there, but which the patient will not or cannot admit. As the truth is often hidden 
as much from the doctor as from the patient, various methods have been evolved 
for gaining access to the unknown contents. I purposely say “unknown” and not 
“repressed” because I think it altogether wrong to assume that whenever a 
content is unknown it is necessarily repressed. The doctor who really thinks that 
way gives the appearance of knowing everything beforehand. Such a pretence 
stymies the patient and will most likely make it impossible for him to confess 
the truth.46 
 
 
Jung argues that “there are four methods for investigating the unknown in the patient.”47 
–  the association method, symptom-analysis, anamnestic analysis and analysis of the 
unconscious. 
 
These quotations from Jung, which I have cited at length, exhaust the explicit references 
to the “unknowable” and the “unknown” in the Collected Works Volume 20. However, 
I will demonstrate that apophatic motifs saturate Jung’s theory and practice. I examine 
references in the Collected Works to writers and concepts from the Platonic tradition, 
with special attention to their apophatic elements. There is a systematic review of all 
references to Dionysius in Jung’s work. There is a detailed analysis of Jung’s writing on 
opposites, including coincidentia oppositorum, complexio oppositorum, coniunctio 
oppositorum and the union of opposites. I examine Jung’s appropriation of Nicholas of 
Cusa’s concept of the coincidence of opposites. Jung’s concept of the transcendent 
function is discussed.  
 
I have already made reference to the contemporary discussions within a number of 
fields about the status and role of apophatic discourse. In Chapter 5 I use the work of a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 CW17 173 
47 CW17 174 
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number of contemporary writers to reflect on apophatic themes in Jung. Aside from the 
intrinsic interest this may hold, it functions here to dispel the suspicion that Jung’s 
preoccupation with the unknown is anachronistic or that it represents a regressive 
feature in his theory. 
 
A first group of writers, Sells, Milem and Rorem, have provided interpretive 
frameworks with which to understand negative theology. I will identify elements of 
Jung’s work which resonate with these schemas.  A second pair of writers, Deleuze and 
Derrida, is of interest because aspects of their work can be read with an apophatic lens 
and compared with Jung’s. Finally the discussions about unknowing in two 
contemporary Jungian theorists, Dourley and Tacey, are examined.  
 
In Chapter 6 there is an extended and impressionistic comparison of the process of 
psychotherapy and the liturgical practices described by Dionysius in the Ecclesistical 
Hierarchy. While it is not unusual to discuss psychotherapy in light of ritual processes 
described in anthropological literature, I hope to demonstrate that bringing to bear on 
the psychoanalytic process images and concepts from liturgical studies offers an 
additional insight into the nature of psychoanalysis. This highlights the performative 
and social dimensions of apophasis in the texts of Dionysius and Jung. 
 
Philo of Alexandria, 2000 years ago in On the Contemplative Life, described a 
community of men and women who lived in solitude: 
 
They are called therapeutae and therapeutrides, either because they process an 
art of medicine more excellent than that in general use in cities (for that only 
heals bodies, but the other heals souls which are under the mastery of terrible 
and almost incurable diseases, which pleasures and appetites, fears and griefs, 
and covetousness, and follies, and injustice, and all the rest of the innumerable 
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multitude of other passions and vices, have inflicted upon them), or else because 
they have been instructed by nature and the sacred laws to serve the living God, 
who is superior to the good, and more simple than the one, and more ancient 
than the unit.48  
 
Analysts could be considered contemporary hermits. They dwell within the solitude of 
their consulting rooms and meet their clients in a liminal space.49  
 
Hans Jonas comments ironically that the Gnostic writer of the Apocryphon of John 
displays: 
the kind of emphatic and pathetic verbosity which the “ineffable” seems to have 
incited in many of its professors… [the] effusive description devoted to the very 
indescribability of the divine Absolute – expatiating on the theme of His purity, 
boundlessness, perfection, etc. being beyond measure, quality, quantity, and 
time; beyond comprehension, description, name, distinction; beyond life, 
beatitude, divinity, and even existence – are a typical example of the rising 
“negative theology”, whose spokesmen did not tire for centuries of the self-
defeating nature of their task.50  
 
Despite this warning about “the self-defeating nature” of my task, I hope to show that 
there are significant parallels between the apophatic thought of Dionysius and the work 
of Jung.51 Indeed, perhaps the very “self-defeating nature” of apophatic discourse 
provides us with another parallel with psychoanalysis, “the impossible profession.” 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Philo, http://www.earlychristianwritings.com/yonge/book34.html  
49 Henderson, David (1998),'Solitude and Solidarity: A philosophy of supervision', Psychoanalytic and  
Jungian Supervision, Petruska Clarkson (ed), London, Whurr; (1999), 'From Shaman to Therapist', 
Therapy on the Couch, Susan Greenberg (ed), David Henderson (Consulting Editor), London, Camden 
Press 
50 Jonas, Hans (1963), The Gnostic Religion, Boston: Beacon Press, p. 199 
51 While the sense in which he uses the term, negative theology, is different, it is amusing to note another 
warning, which was delivered in 1857 by the Rev. Josiah Bateman. He preached a sermon in Manchester 
in which he said, “One great cause of sin is the secret lurking hope of escaping with impunity from its 
consequences. This is a strong delusion; and upon it NEGATIVE THEOLOGY rears its superstructure, 
teaching that Holy Scripture does not mean what it has always been understood to mean – that God will 
not execute the threatenings He has pronounced, and that the punishment of the wicked will not be final 
nor eternal. Let us, then, attempt to illustrate this delusion, to trace its source, and to shew its fallacy.”  
‘Negative Theology’, in Things That Accompany Salvation: Nineteen Sermons, Preached in St. Anns 
Church , Manchester, London: James Nisbet and Co., p. 193 
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Turner uses the concept of “recursive contradictoriness” to describe “a structure of an 
individual or social practice within which there is a built-in and systemic conflict 
between the elements which constitute it; a conflict which is not resolvable within the 
practice itself, for it is from its structural features as such that the conflict arises.”52 
Reflecting on the dilemmas of teaching Dionysius within the academy, he describes the 
conflict between an accurate appreciation of the ecclesial experience presupposed in the 
CD and the requirements of the secular academic “doctrine of decontextualisation.” 
 
Within psychoanalysis there is a similar conflict between the experiential knowledge of 
psychoanalysis available to the patient or the therapist, and the academic disciplines of 
psychoanalytic studies. These tensions contain an apophatic dynamic as the language 
and practices of the experiential and the academic constantly challenge, undermine and 
amplify each other. I attempt to be alive to these tensions throughout this study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Turner, p. 437. 
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Chapter Two 
 
The Corpus Dionysiacum (CD) 
 
 
Dionysius’ potent set of writings have had an influence that belies their size. The works 
that survive are The Divine Names (DN), The Celestial Hierarchy (CH), The 
Ecclesiastical Hierarchy (EH), The Mystical Theology  (MT) and ten letters. He refers 
to several other works: The Symbolic Theology, The Theological Representations, 
Divine Hymns, Concerning Justice and the Judgement of God, The Soul and The 
Conceptual and the Perceptual. There is no settled scholarly opinion as to whether 
these works are missing or are fictions. The Corpus Dionysiacum (CD) offers a rich 
tapestry of philosophical, theological, scriptural and liturgical references. As a rule 
these references are not cited directly, but have been identified by textual analysis. The 
author demonstrates a breadth and depth of reading and an acute sensitivity to 
contemporary debates. He stands at the confluence of Greek philosophy and Biblical 
tradition.  
 
No original manuscripts of the CD survive. Dionysius wrote sometime between the 
death of Proclus in 485 AD and the death of Sergius of Reshaina in 536 AD. His work 
incorporates important ideas and even verbatum extracts from Proclus. The earliest 
known manuscript is a Syriac translation by Sergius of Reshaina, which is at St. 
Catherine’s monastery at Mt. Sinai. This particular manuscript dates from the end of the 
6th century. There are several distinct manuscript traditions in Greek, Syriac and Arabic. 
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Scholars are working to clarify the relationship between these manuscript traditions and 
to establish a reliable history of the translations.53  
 
The earliest datable references to the CD are in the writing of Severus of Antioch (d. 
536 AD). Severus refers to the works of Dionysius three times in writings, which can be 
dated between 518 and 528.54 References by other writers proliferate throughout the 6th 
century. John of Scythopolis wrote his Prologue and Scholia to the CD probably 
between 537 and 543.55  The status of the work has been controversial from the 
beginning. The writings were used to bolster the arguments of different factions in 
theological disputes of the time. It is not always clear how much this was because of the 
apostolic authority claimed by the author and how much it was because of the cogency 
of his arguments. It has been observed however that given the supposed apostolic 
authority of the writings it is surprising that they were not quoted more often. “The few 
appeals to Dionysius are almost inconsequential in comparison with the many 
thousands of times Athanasius, the Gregories, Cyril of Alexandria, or Basil the Great 
were introduced into the controversies of the first half of the sixth century.”56   
 
Nevertheless after an initial period of dispute he was accepted as reliable and during the 
middle ages became accepted as an authority. “The fact must, indeed, appear 
remarkable that these very writings, though rejected outright by such an authority as 
Hypatius, were within little more than a century looked upon as genuine by Catholics, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Lilla, Salvatore (2001), ‘Brief Notes on the Greek Corpus Areopagiticum in Rome during the Early 
Middle Ages,’ Dionysius, Vol. XIX, 201-214; Treiger, Alexander (2004), On the Arabic Version of Ps.-
Dionysius the Areopagite’s “Mystical Theology,” MA dissertation, Hebrew Union University, Jerusalem 
54 Rorem and Lamoreaux, p. 11 
55 Rorem and Lamoreaux, p. 39 
56 Rorem and Lamoreaux, p. 21 
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so that they could be used against the heretics during the Lateran Council in 649.”57  In 
the West the CD is fundamental to the work of Eriugena, Hugh of Saint-Victor, 
Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventure, Dante, Grossteste, Thomas Gallus, 
the author of the Cloud of Unknowing, Eckhardt and John of the Cross. In the East 
Maximus the Confessor, John Damascene, Germanus of Constantinople, Nicetas 
Stethatos, Gregory Palamas, Barlaam the Calabrian and Nicolas Cabasilas developed 
and extended the Dionysian project in various directions.  Remarkably the CD continues 
in our own time to feature in philosophical and theological arguments by writers such as 
Bataille, Voegelin, Derrida, Marion, Caputo, Carlson and de Vries, as well as the 
expanding literature on mysticism. According to Mortley, “It is difficult to overestimate 
the importance of pseudo-Dionysius for the history of European culture, particularly for 
the Latin segment of it. The French in particular look back to the Areopagite for the 
explanation of much that is in their culture, in respect of theology and philosophy, but 
also in respect of political institutions. The notion of hierarchy in the Areopagite was to 
play a role in establishing and ordering the social structure of the middle Ages.”58 
 
The search for the identity of Dionysius is one of the great detective games of late 
antique studies. He presents himself as a contemporary of the Apostles, however the 
fact that he quotes extensively from neoplatonic and patristic writers shows that he 
cannot have been a contemporary of Paul. I wonder, however, whether readers in late 
antiquity were all duped by his alleged fraud. Was it not a common practice to hide 
one’s identity behind a pseudonym or to attribute one’s work to a master or patron?  
Surely there were many sophisticated readers who recognised the crafted nature of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Stigmayer, p. 5 
58 Mortley, Raoul (1986), From Word to Silence II: The way of negation, Christian and Greek, Bonn: 
Peter Hanstein, p. 221 
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CD. “Adopting the persona of an ancient figure was a long established rhetorical 
device… less a forgery in the modern sense than an acknowledgement of reception and 
transmission.”59   
 
The perilous political situation may also have contributed to his adoption of a 
pseudonym. Segius of Reshaina at the end of his translation of the CD writes of 
Dionysius: 
Everything that one is not permitted to say, and that which a man is prohibited 
from speaking about with elevation, in a marveling manner, and in public, he 
has consigned to his holy books, because there he might speak divinely.60 
 
Hathaway wonders whether given the closure of the academy the “everything” that was 
not permitted was the philosophy of Proclus and Damascius. Dionysius presents himself 
standing within a tradition as a channel, rather than as a creative originator of a doctrine. 
 
Hypatius responded to Severus’ citation of Dionysius with the retort, “Those quotations 
you claim to have come from the Blessed Dionysius the Areopagite – how can you 
prove that they are authentic, as you maintain? For if they do come from him, they 
could not have been unknown to Blessed Cyril?”61  The authenticity of the writing was 
questioned in the 15th century by Lorenzo Valla.62 In the 19th century Koch and 
Stiglmayr separately established beyond doubt the connection between the CD and 
Proclus.63  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Corrigan & Harrington, p. 2 
60 Hathaway, Ronald F. (1969), Hierarchy and the Definition of Order in the Letters of Pseudo-
Dionysius: A Study in the Form and meaning of the Pseudo-Dionysian Writings, The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, p. 25 
61 Coles, p. 14 
62 Coles, p. 15 
63 Koch, H. (1895), ‘Der pseudo-epigraphische Character der dionysischen Schriften,’ Theologische 
quartalschrift, 77; Stiglmayr, J. (1895), ‘Der Neuplatoniker Proclus als Vorlage des sogen. Dionysius 
Areopagiten in der Laehre vom Ubel,’ Historisches Jahrbuch, 16 
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E.R. Dodds described him simply as “an unknown eccentric.”64  According to Goltizin, 
“Over the past fifty years Dionysius had been variously identified as Ammonius 
Sakkas, Dionysius the Great of Alexandria, a disciple of Basil of Caesrea in 
Cappodocia, Severus of Antioch, Peter the Iberian, Damascius last of the diadochoi, and 
Sergius of Reshaina,”65 Golitzin himself argues for Peter the Iberian. Arthur supports 
Sergius of Reshaina.66 Stiglmayr proposed Severus of Antioch.67 Perczel contends that 
“Dionysius could be either a personal disciple or a (former) friend of Proclus.”68 He also 
argues that the pseudonym was adopted to protect the writer from powerful political 
opponents. It would have been dangerous to publish his writings under his own name. 
According to Burns, “perhaps we should not exclude the possibility that the name is a 
pseudonym for a nun, or Byzantine empress.”69 Noutsoubidze and Honigman claimed 
that Dionysius “was Petre Iberi, the fifth century Georgian theologian, and Bishop of 
Mayum.”70 Gersh believes that Dionysius was a student at the Academy.71 According to 
Kojeve, “Damascius wrote the Corpus Areopagiticum as a retort against Christian 
criticisms of pagan philosophy.”72 While not formally supporting his candidature, 
Hathaway outlines how Heraiscus the Egyptian, a student of Damascius and Proclus, 
fits the profile.73 Mortley, while declining to offer a name, feels that “the author seems 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Dodds,E.R. (1963), ‘Introduction’ in Proclus (1963), The Elements of Theology, translated by E.R. 
Dodds, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. xxvi  
65 Golitzin, p. 24 
66 Arthur, p. 204 
67 Stiglmayr (1928), ‘Der sogennant Dionysios A. und Severus von Antiochen,’ Scholastik, 3, 1-27, 161-
89, cited in Campbell, Thomas L. (1981), Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite: The Ecclesiatical Hierarchy, 
Lanham, MD: University Press of America 
68 Perczel, p. 530 
69 Personal communication 
70 Chkheidze, Paata (1994), ‘Morality and Ethics according to Shota Rustaveli’s Epic “The Knight in the 
Panther’s Skin,”’ National Identity as an Issue of Knowledge and Morality: Georgian Philosophical 
Studies I, N.V. Chavchavdze, G. Nodia and P. Peachey (eds.), Washington, DC: The Council for 
Research in Values and Philosophy, p. 301 
71 Gersh, p. 1 
72 Gersh, p. 4 
73 Hathaway, pp. 28-9 
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to be working in a non-Arian, somewhat Gnostic, Christian, Athenian Neoplatonist 
tradition.”74 As Golitzin observes, the choice of which candidate to champion often says 
as much about the agenda of the proposer as it does about Dionysius. The most common 
attribution is to an unknown Syrian monk. 
 
The aspect of the CD which is significant for this study is the triad: kataphasis, 
apophasis, ekstasis. (affirmation, negation, ecstasy) This is one of a number of triads 
that can be identified within the writings. They are all based ultimately on the 
neoplatonic structure of emanation and return: monos, proodos, epistrophe (remaining, 
proceeding, returning). For Dionysius eros is the engine of this dynamic.  
 
In the literature about the relationship between Dionysius’ neoplatonism and his 
Christianity, there is a considerable body of opinion that holds that he has used 
neoplatonism to subvert Christianity. Others believe that neoplatonism is subsumed by 
Christianity in his synthesis. It is not the purpose of this study to determine Dionysius’ 
orthodoxy; to take sides in a struggle which has been raging since the work first 
appeared. Its aim is rather to use some concepts, images and metaphors which appear in 
the CD to expand our understanding of the psychotherapeutic process and to reframe 
some elements of psychoanalytic theory. Nonetheless, in my view in his own mind 
Dionysius was using Christianity to expand and transform the neoplatonic concept of 
providence. Divine providence embraces and permeates all aspects of the triadic 
structures of the CD. The concept of providence can be compared to the concept of 
meaning in psychotherapy. 
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Dionysius was not writing from a position that assumed the eternity of the world, a 
position that would have been a given if he were defending neoplatonism against 
Christianity. The sense of creation permeates all his work. In addition, if his intention 
were to subvert Christianity is seems hard to imagine why the work would be so steeped 
in biblical, liturgical and patristic references. It is a Christian project rather than pagan 
project. However one characterizes the work it seems clear from his style that it was 
undertaken in good faith. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Apophasis in Dionysius 
 
The CD is a blend of late neoplatonic philosophy75 and Syrian Christian theology.76 In 
Proclus’ version of the neoplatonic theory of emanation and return, “every effect 
remains (mone) in its cause, proceeds (prodos) from it, and returns (epistrophe) to it.”77 
In the CD emanation represents the outpouring of the thearchia (divine source)78. The 
return is described by Dionysius as the movement from the perceptual to the conceptual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 See, Stephen Gersh (1978), From Iamblichus to Eriugena: An Investigation of the Prehistory and 
Evolution of the Pseudo-Dionysisan Tradition, Leiden: Brill; Lisa Marie Esposito (1997), Pseudo-
Dionysius: A Philosophical Study of Certain Hellenic Sources, PhD dissertation, University of Toronto; 
Henri-Dominique Saffrey (1982), ‘New Objective Links Between the Pseudo-Dionysius and Proclus’, 
Neoplatonism and Christian Thought, E.J. O’Meara (ed.); Wayne J. Hankey  (1997), ‘”Ad intellectum 
rationcinatio”: Three Procline logics, The Divine Names of Pseudo-Dionysius, Eriugena’s Periphyseon 
and Boethius’ Consolatio philosophiae’, Patristic Studies, Vol. 24 
76 “The Eastern and especially Syrian ascetico-mystical tradition offers us a kind of royal path to the            
comprehension of the Areopagitica as a coherent and even emphatically Christian vision.” Golitzin, 
Alexander (2003), ‘”Suddenly, Christ”: The Place of Negative Theology in the Mystagogy of Dionysius 
Areopagites’, in Mystics: Presence and Aporia, Michael Kessler and Christian Sheppard (eds.), Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, (p. 8); also, “The holy men who minted the ideal of the saint in society came 
from Syria.”, Brown, Peter (1982), ‘The Rise and Function of the Holy Man in Late Antiquity’, Society 
and the Holy in Late Antiquity, London: Faber and Faber, p. 109; see also, Barnard, Leslie W. (1991), 
‘Asceticism in Early Syriac Christianity’, Monastic Studies II: The Continuity of Tradition, Judith Loades 
(ed.), Bangor: Headstart History; and Beggiani, Chorbishop Seely (1991), Introduction to Eastern 
Christian Spirituality: The Syriac Tradition, London: University of Scranton Press. 
77 Proclus, (1963) The Elements of Theology, E.R. Dodds (trans.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 38. 
According to Peters, “The ‘return’ of the Platonic tradition is distinct from, but connected with, the 
epistemological problem of knowing God (for the connection, see Proclus, Elem. theol., prop. 39). It 
differs in that it is a function of desire (orexis). Its ontological ground is the identification of the 
transcendent One with the Good (Plato, Rep. 509b, Phil. 20d; Plotinus, Enn. V, 5, 13; Proclus, Elem. 
theol., prop.8) that is necessarily an object of desire, and the identity of the efficient and final cause, the 
effect, in Middle Platonism, of combining Plato’s demiourgos with Aristotle’s nous. The dialectic of the 
epistrophe is the reverse of that of procession (proodos), and is worked out in Proclus, Elem theol., props. 
31-39.” Peters, F.E. (1967), Greek Philosophical Terms: A Historical Lexicon, New York: New York 
University Press, pp. 60-1; According to Mortley, “This is the Greek view of the generation of reality 
which underpins the development of negative theology. Material reality is an accumulation of 
characteristics, attached like barnacles to the hull of essential reality… The ‘descent’ of essence into 
material reality eventually leads to its concealment: the knowledge of essence, whether it be the one or 
substance, thus becomes a matter of difficulty. Reality could be said to be conceived by addition and it 
follows that essence could be said to be discovered by subtraction.” Mortley, R. (1982), ‘The 
Fundamentals of the Via Negativa”, The American Journal of Philology, Vol. 103, No. 4, p. 436. 
78 “Emanation in general is expressed mainly by the Greek verb hrein (‘flow’ or ‘stream’)… ideas of 
‘pouring’… Closely connected with these terms are others expressing ‘boiling’ or ‘seething’… Ps. 
Dionysius uses ‘bubbling over’ and ‘bubbling forth’ (ekblurein) extensively in a Christianized version of 
the same theory.” Gersh, Stephen (1978), From Iamblichus to Eriugena: An Investigation of the 
Prehistory and Evolution of the Pseudo-Dionysian Tradition, Leiden: Brill, pp. 18-9. The theme of 
emanation and return is described in the CD in the following passages: CH120B-121C, CH141B, 
CH260B, EH428D-429C, DN712A, MT1033C. 
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and, finally, beyond the conceptual to unknowing and silence. This journey of return is 
accomplished by negations (apophaseis). Dionysius presents a distinctive vision of the 
mutual ecstasy of the thearchia, the Christian community gathered in liturgical 
celebration, and the whole of the cosmos. The thearchia flows out of itself, so to speak, 
to be united with the community and the community turns toward the One. “Emanation 
and return describe, respectively, divine and human ecstasy.”79 Eros powers this 
dynamic union.80 It “is the ‘motor’ of Providence… The movement of love brings about 
love’s diffusion… He moves into creation because, simply, he desires it.”81  
 
In addition to its distinctive approach, the CD has features in common with other 
apophatic texts, which are part of the “implicit logic and conventions of apophasis as a 
mode of discourse.”82  Apophatic texts are commonly interpreted either as philosophical 
statements or as descriptions of mystical experience. To some extent this reflects the 
difference between the Greek, theoria, and the Latin, contemplatio.83 Interpretations of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Rorem, Paul (1987), ‘note 266, p. 130’, in Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works, C. Luibheid 
(trans.), Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press 
80 DN708C-716A. In this lengthy passage Dionysius argues that eros, or ‘yearning’ as it is translated by 
Luibheid, is as legitimate a term for divine love as agape. See also Lisa Marie Esposito Buckley, ‘Ecstatic 
and Emanating, Providential and Unifying: A Study of Pseudo-Dionysian and Plotinian Concepts of 
Eros,’ in The Journal of Neoplatonic Studies, Vol. I, No. 1, Fall 1992; Eric D. Perl, ‘The Metaphysics of 
Love in Dionysius the Areopagite,’ in The Journal of Neoplatonic Studies, Vol VI, No. 1, Fall 1997. 
There is a discussion of eros and hierarchy in Ronald F. Hathaway, Hierarchy and the Definitions of 
Order in the Letters of Pseudo-Dionysius,  The Hague: Martinus, Nijhoff, pp. 51-60. For the relationship 
between eros and agape, see John M. Rist (1966), ‘A note on Eros and Agape in Pseudo-Dionysius’,  
Virgiliae Christianae, 20, Amsterdam. See also Hathaway, p. 51, “Each member of the hierarchy, as 
shown above, has an inherent logos which is the same as some higher logos. What makes a thing 
beautiful, for example, is the agreement between its logos and the logos of Beauty itself. Ps.-Dionysius 
therefore often speaks as if each member of the hierarchy contained within itself this analogical relation 
to higher principles. But this ‘symmetry’ or ‘proportion’ would not exist if they did not ‘share’ it or 
‘participate’ in it. Eros is the pervasive force or motion which provides this rapport with higher principles 
in Ps.-Dionysius.” 
81 Golitzin, Alexander (1994), Et Introibo Ad Altare Dei: The Mystagogy of Dionysius Areopagita, with 
Special Reference to its Predecessors in the Eastern Christian Tradtion, Thessaloniki: Analecta 
Vlatadon, p. 66 
82 Sells, Michael (1994), Mystical Languages of Unsaying, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 6 
83 “While theoria is a concept of philosophical origin, keeping a certain ambiguous ground between 
theology and philosophy, contemplatio is a concept bound to Latin Christian theology and, more 
specifically, to one of its subdivisions, spiritual theology. From Augustine to Teresa of Avila, by way of 
Bernard of Clairvaux and the Carthusian Spiritual School, the concept of contemplatio historically 
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the apophatic elements in the CD tend to emphasize either a 
philosophical/epistemological or an experiential/mystagogical approach. Writers who 
emphasize an epistemological interpretation  include Tomasic84, Mortley85 and Gersh.86 
The most comprehensive argument for interpreting the CD from an experiential 
perspective is made by Blum and Golitzin.87 Counet,88 Yannaras89 and Aberth,90 also 
highlight an experiential understanding of the CD.  
 
In this chapter I will review the use of some important concepts (including kataphasis, 
anagou, apophasis, aphairesis,) that characterise Dionysian apophatic discourse. These 
features have not been so extensively documented before. 
 
kataphasis 
The effects of divine providence are described in a profusion of images and propositions 
drawn from scripture and philosophy. “The cataphatic is, we might say, the verbose 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
underwent a gradual deviation toward psychology, drawing on Augustinianism, where it had already 
come to designate a ‘spiritual state of mind.’” Nef, Frederic (2005), ‘Contemplation’, in Encyclopedia of 
Christian Theology, Jean-Yves Lacoste (ed.), London: Routledge, p. 353. 
84 Tomasic, Thomas Michael (1969), ‘Negative Theology and Subjectivity: An Approach to the Tradition 
of the Pseudo-Dionysius’, International Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. IX; (1988), ‘The Logical Function 
of Metaphor and Oppositional Coincidence in the Pseudo-Dionysius and Johannes Scottus Eriugena’, The 
Journal of Religion, Vol. 68, No. 3 85	  Mortley,	  Raoul	  (1986),	  From	  Word	  to	  Silence	  II:	  The	  way	  of	  negation,	  Christian	  and	  Greek,	  Bonn:	  Hanstein	  86	   Gersh,	   Stephen	   (1978),	   From	   Iamblichus	   to	   Eriugena:	   An	   Investigaton	   of	   the	   Prehistory	   and	  
Evolution	  of	  the	  Pseudo-­‐Dionysian	  Tradition,	  Leiden:	  Brill	  
87 Blum, Richard and Alexander Golitzin (1991), The Sacred Athlete: On the Mystical Experience and 
Dionysios, Its Westernworld Fountainhead, London: University Press of America 
88 Counet, Jean-Michel, (2004), ‘The Meaning of Apology and Reconciliation for an Apophatic 
Theology’, Conflict and Reconciliation: Perspectives on Nicholas of Cusa, Inigo Bocken (ed.),  Leiden: 
Brill, p. 198  89	   Yannaras,	   Christos	   (2005),	   On	   the	   Absence	   and	   Unknowability	   of	   God:	   Heidegger	   and	   the	  
Areopagite,	  Edinburgh:	  T&T	  Clark	  
90 Aberth, John (1996), ‘Pseudo-Dionysius as Liberator: The Influence of the Negative Tradition on Late 
Medieval Female Mystics’, Downside Review, Vol. 114, No. 395, Bath: Downside Abbey 
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element in theology, it is the Christian mind deploying all the resources of language in 
the effort to express something about God.”91 According to Dionysius: 
 
There are too those other sacred pictures used to represent God, so that what is 
hidden may be brought out into the open and multiplied, what is unique and 
undivided may be divided up, and multiple shapes and forms be given to what 
has neither shape nor form. All this is to enable the one capable of seeing the 
beauty hidden within these images to find that they are truly mysterious, 
appropriate to God and filled with a great theological light.92 
 
Kataphasis  (affirmation) and apophasis  (negation) are not distinct moments in time, or 
two aspects of a linear process. In line with neoplatonic philosophy, in the CD they are 
simultaneous. According to Fisher, this language “serves an epistemological-semiotic 
rather than ontological function.”93 It was Eriugena who adapted these aspects of the CD 
to fit an historical model of creation (kataphasis) and salvation (apophasis) and merged 
“the Greek language of ‘procession and return’ with the Latin language of ‘nature and 
grace.’”94  It is this Latinized CD which was used by Thomas Aquinas. Despite the fact 
that he cited Dionysius explicitly more than 1700 times, “Thomas does not make use of 
Dionysius’ emphasis on God as beyond or above being, nor of union as our final 
goal.”95 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Turner, Denys (1995), The Darkness of God: Negativity in Christian Mysticism, Cambridge: 
Cambridge, p. 20 
92 EP9 1105B-C 
93 Fisher, Jeffrey (2001), ‘The Theology of Dis/similarity: Negation in Pseudo-Dionysius’, The Journal of 
Religion, 81(4), p. 532 
94 Rorem, Paul (1986), ‘The Uplifting Spirituality of Pseudo-Dionysius’, in Christian Spirituality: 
Origins to the Twelfth Century, B. McGinn and J. Meyendorff (eds.), London: Routledge, p. 147 
95 “In rough and over-simplified fashion one may say that all the commentators, and even some of the 
translators, take Dionysius out of his own context and place him within a medieval philosophy of being, 
whether Augustinian or Aristotelian..” F. Edward Cranz (2000), ‘The (Concept of the) Beyond in Proclus, 
Pseudo-Dionysius, and Cusanus,’ Nicholas of Cusa and the Renaissance, T. Izbici and G. Christianson 
(eds.), Aldershot: Ashgate,  pp. 102-3 
	   30	  
Apophasis is often presented as a simple denial of kataphasis. This is the case in 
Aristotle where apophasis is the denial of a proposition (kataphasis).96 Within the CD 
however apophasis has the effect of transcending the kataphatic not just cancelling it 
out. Negation is not the opposite of affirmation: 
 
Since it is the Cause of all beings, we should posit and ascribe to it all the 
affirmations we make in regard to beings, and, more appropriately, we should 
negate (apophaskein) all these affirmations, since it surpasses all being. Now we 
should not conclude that the negations (apophaseis) are simply the opposites of 
the affirmations, but rather that the cause of all is considerably prior to this, 
beyond privations, beyond every denial (aphairesin), beyond every assertion.97  
 
 
Apophasis is at work at the heart of Dionysius’ kataphatic celebrations of the divine:  
 
The very same things are both similar and dissimilar to God. They are similar to 
him to the extent that they share what cannot be shared. They are dissimilar to 
him in that as effects they fall so very short of their Cause and are infinitely and 
incomparably subordinate to Him.98 
 
The anagogic interpretation of perceptible symbols negates their literal meanings and 
raises the meanings up to the conceptual level. “It is the power of the divine similarity 
which returns all created things toward their Cause.”99  
 
anagou , anagoge  
 
Within the CD the terms anagou 100 and anagoge 101 are translated by Luibheid as  
‘uplifting.’ They describe the apophatic element in the interpretation of symbols. “The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Aristotle, On Interpretation 17a 31-33, in Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works, Colm  Luibheid 
(trans.), 1987, New York: Paulist Press, p. 136, note 6 
97 MT1000B 
98 DN916A 
99 DN 913C; see Proclus, Elements of Theology, prop. 32 
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uplifting is not accomplished by the symbols in themselves, as if they possess any 
magical efficacy; it occurs in the process of interpreting them, in the contemplative 
movement from the perceptible ‘up’ to the conceptual.”102  
 
Iamblichus claims that theurgy “connects the soul with the self-begotten and self-moved 
God, and with the all-sustaining, intellectual, and all-adorning powers of the God, and 
likewise with that power of him which elevates to truth."103 Rorem observes that “by 
interchanging anogoge with epistrophe he [Iamblichus] fully harmonized this Chaldean 
rite with the late Neoplatonic doctrine of procession and return.”104  
 
The movement of return starts in the realm of the perceptual with the most dissimilar 
and inappropriate symbols of the divine:  
 
Now you may wonder why it is that, after starting out from the highest category 
when our method involved assertions, we begin now from the lowest category 
when it involves a denial. The reason is this. When we assert what is beyond 
every assertion, we must then proceed from what is most akin to it, and as we do 
so we make the affirmation on which everything else depends. But when we 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 There are some evocative uses of the term in ancient Greek. “I. Lead up from a lower place to a higher 
place. 2. Lead up to the high sea, carry by sea. 3. Take up from the coast into the interior. 4. Bring up, 
esp. from the dead. 5. Conduct the choir. 6. Lift up, raise. 7. Lift up a paean, a song of lamentation. 8. 
Raise to honour. 9. Cut teeth, bring up blood, chew the cud, draw a line, erect as an ordinate, carry a line 
of works to a point, paid them into a treasury. 11 Bring up a prisoner for examination. 12. Train, rear, i.e. 
plants. II bring back. 2 carry back, refer to its principles. 3 refer him to a contract. 4. Reduce syllogism to 
another figure, reduce and argument to syllogism. 5. Return a slave sold with an undisclosed defect. 6. 
Refer a claimant. 7. Rebuild. 8. Restore to its original shape. 9. Reckon, calculate. 10. Withdraw, retreat, 
put back again.B. put out to sea, set sail, put to sea, make ready, prepare oneself. 3. In thought ascend to 
higher unity.” Liddell and Scott (1940), Greek-English Lexicon, Oxford: Clarendon, p. 102 
101 “Leading up, esp. taking a ship into the high sea, putting to sea, bringing up-stream of a ship. 2. 
Bringing up from the stomach or lungs, vomiting. 3. Bringing up, rearing. 4. Lifting up of the soul to 
God, Iamb. Myst. 3.7. 5. Evocation. 6. Sublimation. 7. Distillation. II referring to a principle. 2. 
Resolution of definitions into syllogisms. 3. Reference to a principle. 4 return of a defective slave to a 
vendor. 5. Reference of a calimant ot a third party. 6. Delivery, payment. 7. Offerings made on 
embarkation, a feast of Aphrodite at Eryx.” Liddell and Scott, p. 102 
102 Rorem, Paul (1986), p. 134 
103 Iamblichus, On the Mysteries, X.VI, Thomas Taylor (trans.), Frome: Prometheus Trust, p. 152 
104 Rorem, Paul (1982), ‘Iamblichus and the Anagogical Method in Pseudo-Dionysian Liturgical 
Theology,’ in Studia Patristica, Vol. XVII, Part One, Elizabeth A Livingstone (ed.), Oxford: Pergamon 
Press, p. 455 
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deny that which is beyond every denial, we have to start by denying those 
qualities which differ most from the goal we hope to attain. Is it not closer to 
reality to say that God is life and goodness rather than that he is air or stone? Is 
it not more accurate to deny that drunkenness and rage can be attributed to him 
than to deny that we can apply to him the terms of speech and thought?105 
 
The process of interpretation then moves “up” from the most inappropriate images to 
those that seem to be more appropriate symbols of the work of providence, which 
nonetheless must in their turn be negated:106 
He modeled it on the hierarchies of heaven, and clothed these immaterial 
hierarchies in numerous material figures and forms so that, in a way appropriate 
to our nature, we might be uplifted (anagou) from these most venerable images 
to interpretations and assimilations which are simple and inexpressible.107 
 
 
aphairesis 
 
Aphairesis (abstraction) plays an important role in the CD. “Denial (aphairesis) of all 
beings” is a way of praising or celebrating “the Light beyond all deity.”108 “The negative 
(aphairesios) expresses excess.”109  In some places aphairesis appears in relation to 
thesis (affirmation, proposition, position): “the assertion (thesis) of all things, the denial 
(aphairesis) of all things, that which is beyond every assertion (thesin) and denial 
(aphairesin).”110  According to Golitizin, “aphairesis is a fundamental aspect of the 
creature’s appropriation of the divine from the very beginnings of its ascent. It is 
therefore present at every stage of the Dionysian anagogy.”111 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 MT1033C 
106 See Fisher for a discussion of dis/similarity in Dionysius. “Precisely the dissimilarity of everything to 
God enables everything to be similar to God.” p. 536 
107 CH121C-D 
108 DN593C 
109 DN640B Rolt 
110 DN641A 
111 Golitzin, p. 112 
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Even nonbeing by its denial (aphairesis) of being or, in Luibheid’s translation, 
“repelling being,” unwittingly shows its longing for the Good: 
And if it is reverent to say, even that which is not desires the all-transcendent 
Good and struggles, by its denial (aphairesin) of all things, to find its rest in the 
Good which verily transcends all being.112 
 
Through its participation in aphairesis, nonbeing has a share not only in the Good, but 
also in the Beautiful:  
And I would even be so bold as to claim that nonbeing also shares in the 
Beautiful and the Good, because nonbeing, when applied transcendently to God 
in the sense of a denial (aphairesin) of all things is itself beautiful and good.113 
 
At the other end of the spectrum, at the most simple conceptual level, aphairesis  plays 
a part in the movement into unknowing (agnosia). Something about God can be known 
“from the arrangement of everything,” but “we pass by the way of denial (aphairesei)” 
to unknowing.114  
 
In Chapter Two of Mystical Theology Dionysius offers a paradoxical prayer:  
 
If only we lacked sight and knowledge so as to see, so as to know, unseeing and 
unknowing, that which lies beyond all vision and knowledge. For this would be 
really to see and to know: to praise the Transcendent One in a transcending way, 
namely through the denial (aphaireseos) of all things.115  
 
He closes Mystical Theology with a flurry of apophatic intensity (what Kenny calls “the 
shock of aphairesis”116) by invoking the negation of negation: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 DN697A Rolt 
113 DN704B 
114 DN872A. See also Rolt: “advancing through the Negation (aphairesei) and Transcendence of all 
things.” 
115 MT1025A 
116 Kenny, John Peter (1993), ‘The Critical Value of Negative Theology’, Harvard Theological Review, 
86(4), p. 448. 
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It is beyond assertion (thesis) and denial (aphairesis). We make assertions 
(theseis) and denials (aphaireseis) of what is next to it, but never of it, for it is 
both beyond every assertion, being the perfect and unique cause of all things, 
and by virtue of its preeminently simple and absolute nature, free of every 
limitation beyond every limitation; it is also beyond every denial (aphairesin).117 
 
 
 
 
apophasis 
 
There is a range of definitions of apophasis. It was used as a legal term from the 4th 
century BC.118 Before this it had been used by Demothenes.119  Aristotle uses the term in 
his Categories. It started to be used in negative theology in the sense of denial or 
negation from the 5th century AD.120 It appears in an English text in 1550.121 Definitions 
in 1657 and 1753 bring out the aspect of irony.122  Contemporary definitions include the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 MT1048B; Rolt’s translation conveys the order of the Greek text more plainly. “… nor can any 
affirmation or negation apply to it; for while applying affirmations or negations to those orders of being 
that come next to It, we apply not unto It either affirmation or negation, inasmuch as It transcends all 
affirmation by being the perfect and unique Cause of all things, and transcends all negation by the pre-
eminence of Its simple and absolute nature – free from every limitation and beyond them all.” (p. 201) 
118 “Apophasis refers to an investigation into serious threats to the Athenian democracy, especially 
treason and bribery… This procedure, an innovation of the later 4th century BCE, began with an 
investigation conducted by the Areopagus, which would issue a report. This report was called an 
apophasis. Eventually, the whole procedure – investigation, report, prosecution – came to be known by 
this term.” Blackwell, ‘Apophasis’, http://www.stoa.org/projects/demos/home. See also Cartledge, Paul, 
Paul Millett and Stephen Todd (2002), Nomos: Essays in Athenian Law, Politics and Society, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, p. 217. Some patristic writers use the word in the sense of a decree, 
judgement (i.e. of God) or opinion (i.e. of another). See G.W.H. Lampe (1961), Patristic Greek Lexicon, 
Oxford: Clarendon, p. 219. See also Liddell and Scott, (1940), A Greek-English Lexicon, Oxford: 
Clarendon, p. 226.	  
119 “Demosthenes uses the term several times, but in each case he seems to use the word generically, ‘an 
account’, such as someone might give when returning from a voyage, or (often) when itemizing an estate 
so the inheritance can be settled.” Blackwell, http://www.stoa.org/projects/demos/home 
120 Carabine, Deirdre, (1995), The Unknown God: Negative Theology in the Platonic Tradition: Plato to 
Eriugena, Louvain: Peeters Press, p. 184 
121 “The rejection of several reasons why a thing should or should not be done and affirming a single one, 
considered most valid,” Richard Sherry, (1550) A Treatise of Schemes and Tropes,. See Warren Taylor in 
‘A Note on English Figures of Speech’, in Modern Language Notes, 53(7) (Nov., 1938), p. 514; see also 
http://humanities.byu.edu/rhetoric/silva.htm 
122 1657 J. Smith Myst. Rhet. 164 Apophasis..a kind of an Irony, whereby we deny that we say or doe that 
which we especially say or doe. 1753 Chambers Cycl. Supp., Apophasis..whereby we really say or 
advise; a thing under a feigned show of passing over, or dissuading it. OED 
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following: “The mention of something in disclaiming intention of mentioning it.”123; 
“Denying one’s intention to talk or write about a subject, but making the denial in such 
a way that the subject is actually discussed. Apophasis asserts or emphasizes something 
by pointedly seeming to pass over, ignore, or deny it.”124; “Make an assertion while 
disproving it at the same time.”125; “The rhetorical figure in which one states something 
while seeming to deny it.”126; “Rhetorical device of emphasizing a fact, by pretending to 
ignore or deny it.”127; “To say no.”128 “To `speak off,' deny.”129 
 
 
Sells translates apophasis as unsaying. He distinguishes between apophatic theory and 
apophatic discourse. “Apophatic theory affirms the ultimate ineffability of the 
transcendent.” Apophatic discourse describes those “writings in which unnameability is 
not only asserted but performed.”130 It seems to me that the CD could be described, in 
Sells’ terms, as apophatic discourse, because the text is trying to propel the reader 
towards unknowing. The CD is not a simple statement of the proposition that the 
thearchia is ineffable. 
 
Sells identifies three elements of apophatic writing: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 "Mary Matlin, the Bush campaign's political director, made the point with ruthless venom at a press 
briefing in Washington, saying,  'The larger issue is that Clinton is evasive and slick. We have never said 
to the press that he is a philandering, pot-smoking, draft-dodger. There's nothing nefarious or subliminal 
going on.'”(Manchester Guardian, 1992) http://www.nt.armstrong.edu/term1.htm	  
124 “Some useful phrases for apophasis: nothing need be said about, I pass over, it need not be said (or 
mentioned), I will not mention (or dwell on or bring up), we will overlook, I do not mean to suggest (or 
imply), you need not be reminded, it is unnecessary to bring up, we can forget about, no one would 
suggest.” http://guweb2.gonzaga.edu/faculty/wheeler/lit_terms_A.html 
125 http://www.stanford.edu/-csewell/culture/litterms.htm 
126 “The phrases ‘not to mention such and such’ and ‘to make a long story short’ are apophases” 
http://www.arts.ouc.bc.ca/fina/glossary/a_list.html 
127 The Hutchinson Dictionary of Difficult Words, 1998, Oxford: Helicon Publishing, p. 
128 The American Heritage¨ Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition, 2000, Houghton Mifflin 
Company, p. 84 
129 OED 
130 Sells, p. 3 
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Classical Western apophasis shares three key features: (1) the metaphor of 
overflowing or ‘emanation’ which is often in creative tension with the language 
of intentional, demiurgic creation; (2) dis-ontological discursive effort to avoid 
reifying the transcendent as an ‘entity’ or ‘being’ or ‘thing’; (3) a distinctive  
dialectic of transcendence and immanence in which the utterly transcendent is 
revealed as the utterly immanent.131 
 
Citing Gersh, McGinn describes two types of apophatic theology – the subjective and 
objective. In the subjective form it is the limitations of the human that render the first 
principle unknowable and ineffable. (McGinn subdivides Gersh’s category into three 
varieties of subjective apophaticism.) In the objective type the first principle is 
unknowable “without reference to our mode of conceiving”.132  
 
Another approach sees “human self-ignorance as a reflection of divine 
unknowability.”133 According to Gregory of Nyssa, “Since the nature of our mind, 
which is according to the icon of the Creator, evades our knowledge, it keeps an 
accurate resemblance to the superior nature, retaining the imprint of the 
incomprehensible [fixed] by the unknown within it.”134 Marion argues that the inability 
of man to conceive of the One is not a failure but that it links the incomprehensibility of 
man with the incomprehensibility of God in what he describes as the “privilege of 
unknowing.”135 Just as the One cannot be reduced to an object of thought, neither can 
the human. Hence apophatic thought is a guarantor of the dignity of the human. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 Sells, p. 6 
132 McGinn, Bernard (1991), The Foundations of Mysticism, London: SCM, p. 31 133	  Duclow,	  Donald	  (1994),	  ‘Isaiah	  Meets	  the	  Seraph:	  Breaking	  Ranks	  in	  Dionysius	  and	  Eriugena?’,	  
Eriugena:	  East	   and	  West,	   Bernard	  McGinn	  and	  Willemien	  Otten	   (eds.),	  Notre	  Dame:	  University	   of	  Notre	  Dame	  Press	  
134 Gregory of Nyssa (1965), ‘On the Making of Man’, Gregory of Nyssa: Dogmatic Treatises, etc., W. 
Moore and H.A. Wilson (trans.), vol. 5 of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, 
Series II, P. Schaff and H. Wace (eds.), Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, p. 397 
135 Marion, Jean-Luc (2005), ‘Mihi magna quaestio factus sum: The Privilege of Unknowing’, The 
Journal of Religion, 85 (1), p. 1 
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Dionysius asserts that the “preference is for the way up through negations 
(apophaseon), since this stands the soul outside everything which is correlative with its 
own finite nature.”136 This resonates with Marion’s statement that, “only the infinite and 
incomprehensible can comprehend man, and thus tell him of and show him to 
himself.”137 
 
While it is appropriate, when describing the One to name all the beings which it has 
created, it is necessary to unsay these positive statements. For Dionysius apophasis is 
not merely a denial of a proposition (kataphasis), as it is in the case of Aristotle. A 
properly apophatic approach requires the negation of negation: 
Since it is the Cause of all beings, we should posit and ascribe to it all the 
affirmations we make in regard to beings, and, more appropriately, we should 
negate (apophaskein) all these affirmations, since it surpasses all being. Now we 
should not conclude that the negations (apophaseis) are simply the opposites of 
the affirmations, but rather that the cause of all is considerably prior to this, 
beyond privations, beyond every denial (aphairesin), beyond every assertion.138 
 
There is a link between love and negation. “Every affirmation regarding Jesus’ love for 
humanity has the force of a negation (apophaseous) pointing toward transcendence.”139 
The power of love simplifies and uplifts by negating all that is not the One. 
 
 
hoion 
 
According to Sells, “Plotinus uses the term hoion (as it were) to indicate that a name or 
predicate should not be taken at face value.”140 The frequency of Plotinus’ use of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 DN981B 
137 Marion, p. 18 
138 MT1000B 
139 EP4 1072B 
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term increases the higher the level of ascent he is describing. It is what Sells calls an 
“apophatic marker.” Where this term appears in the CD Rorem argues that it is a 
“disclaimer”, and that the “qualification seems to apologize for Neoplatonic 
language.”141 Luibheid translates is as “if one may put it so,”142 “so to speak,”143 “if I 
may express it this way,”144 and “if one must put it this way.”145 Sells is highlighting the 
positive use of this literary device to heighten the “apophatic intensity” of the text, 
whereas Rorem is drawing attention to the context in which Dionysius was writing and 
his need to defend himself against accusations of heresy. 
 
hyper-  
 
The prefix hyper-  (above, beyond, super) is used well over 500 times in the CD.146 The 
most frequent use is in hyperousios, (beyond all being, supra-essential, above being), 
which appears at least 116 times.147 Other terms which occur frequently are 
hypercosmos (above the world, transcendent, supernatural, celestial), hyperexou 
(transcend), hyperkeimai (lie above, be placed above, transcend, excel) and hyperphys 
(transcending nature, supernatural).148 This litany of hyper-s gives the entire CD a 
peculiar intensity, which can disorient, overwhelm or repulse the reader. However, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 Sells, pp. 16-17. Hoios, is “such as, of what sort… what a man for valour… hois is an independent 
sentence as an exclam. of astonishment… hoios, hoia, hoion freq. introduce an ‘indirect exclamation’, 
giving the reason for what precedes… hoion, as for instance…as for example… in numerical estimates, 
about… as it were, so to speak… that is to say.” Liddell & Scott, p. 1209 
141 Rorem, Paul in Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works, C. Luibheid (trans.), p. 61. The term appears 
in DN 641A, 645B, 648B and 697B. 
142 DN 641A 
143 DN 645B 
144 DN 648B 
145 DN 697B 
146 Van Den Daele, Albert (1941), Indices Pseudo-Dionysiani, Louvain: Bibliotheque de l’Universite, pp. 
138-41 
147 69 times in the DN; 23 in CH; 8 in MT; 6 in EH; and 10 in the Letters. 
148 Lampe, G.W.H., (1961), A Patristic Greek Lexicon, Oxford: Clarendon, pp. 1436-43 
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concept of God beyond being is not original to Dionysius, since “in many texts of the 
period, Platonic, Christian and Neopythagorean, God is formally beyond existence.”149 
 
exaireou 
 
Exaireou (to be removed from, transcend)150 is used over 40 times in the CD.151  Its 
primary use is to describe the transcendence of the One, which “surpasses by far 
(exairemene) every sacred thing.”152 The emanation of the One proceeds from “his 
transcendent (exeremenou) dwelling place… [and] his own transcendent (exeremenes) 
unity.”153 The transcendence of the One appears to the human eye like sleep. “The sleep 
of God refers to the divine transcendence (exeremenon) and to the inability of the 
objects of his providential care to communicate directly with him.”154 
 
Given “the fact that the Godhead transcends (exeretai) and surpasses every real and 
every conceivable power” Dionysius asks, “in what sense do the theologians praise it as 
power when it is in fact superior to (exeremeneu) power?”155 
 
The divine transcendence defines the limits of knowledge. “Transcendently 
(exeremenen) it contains within itself the boundaries of every natural knowledge and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 Mortley, Raoul (1982), ‘The Fundamentals of the Via Negative’, The American Journal of Philology, 
103 (4), p. 438; “Negative theology is rendered more or less radical a method depending on whether God 
is said to be within being or outside being. The way of abstraction is already an instrument of 
metaphysics in Aristotle, but it becomes an instrument of transcendental theology in Clement.” p. 439 
150 “Remove; pass., be removed from; hence transcend;… transcendent… transcendence… detachment; 
from things of this life… set free, deliver, from eternal punishment,” Lampe, p. 491; 
151 CH165C, 205D, 237C, 293B, 301A2, 304C2, 305BD, 329A, 332D/ EH481B/ DN588C, 592D, 
593AC, 597C, 645BC3, 648C, 649C, 649B, 712BC, 720B, 721B, 825AB, 869A, 889C2, 972A, 981AB/ 
MT1025B/ EP8 1088D/ EP9 1109C, 1112C, 1113B. 
152 CH165C 
153 DN712BC 
154 EP9 1113B; Liddell & Scott offer “profound sleep” as an example for apeiron, p. 184 
155 DN889C 
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energy.”156 “And if all knowledge is of that which is and is limited to the realm of the 
existent, then whatever transcends being must also transcend (exeremene) knowledge… 
although it is the cause of everything, it is not a thing since it transcends (exeremenon) 
all things in a manner beyond being.”157 
 
Exaireou can be used to define difference. “Evil will only be and be seen by contrast 
with what it opposes, for it will be distinct from (exertetai) them, since they are 
good.”158 The seraphim are “transcendent (exeremene) beings”159 
 
Dionysius calls upon the familiar neoplatonic theme of the sculptor to describe one 
aspect of negation. “We would be like sculptors who set out to carve a statue. They 
remove (exairountes) every obstacle to the pure view of the hidden image, and simply 
by this act of clearing aside they show up the beauty which is hidden.”160 In the process 
of the sculpting the human hierarchy by the action of providence, “not every participant 
is simply removed (exeretai) from the Holy of Holies.”161 
 
epekeina 
 
Epekeina,162 usually translated by Luibheid as transcendent or beyond, appears 
primarily in The Divine Names.163  The One is the “cause of existence, and therefore 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 DN592D 
157 DN593AC 
158 DN721B 
159 EH481B 
160 MT1025B 
161 EP8 1088D 
162 On yonder side, beyond… farther than… the part beyond, the far side… beyond it… the times beyond 
or beforre, earlier times… henceforth. Liddell & Scott, p. 616 
163 DN588B, 593A, 641A2, 697C, 713C, 716C, 865C, 869D, 913A, 949B, 956B. Also in EH373D; 
MT1000C, 1001A, 1048B; EP2 1068A, 1069A; EP4 1072AC; EP5 1076A; EP9 1112C. 
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itself transcending (epekeina) existence.”164 “Its supremely individual identity beyond 
(epekeina) all that is, its oneness beyond (epekeina) the source of oneness.”165 
 
Knowledge of the One is beyond the capacity of human beings to express. “We 
therefore approach that which is beyond (epekeina) all as far as our capacities allow 
us,”166 because “whatever transcends (epekeina) being must also transcend (exeremene) 
knowledge.”167 “Therefore when talking of that peace which transcends (epekeina) all 
things, let it be spoken of as ineffable and unknowable.”168 
 
For Plato, Plotinus and Proclus the beyond (epekeina) was outside of being.  Cranz 
argues that “Plotinus takes Plato’s beyond (epekeina) and applies it extensively,”169 but 
that it is Proclus who pushes the concept to new limits. The One is “the not being which 
is beyond being (epekeina tou ontos).”170 Dionysius adopts Proclus’ development of 
epekeina, but combines it with the Jewish sense of the beyond as “the relation of 
Yahweh to His creature, within the symbolic structure itself.”171 This simultaneous 
reference to the outside and the inside is, according to Sells, a feature of apophatic 
writing. 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 DN588B 
165 DN641A 
166 DN869D 
167 DN593A 
168 DN949B 
169 Cranz, p. 97 
170 Proclus, Parm. 1073, 11 
171 Cranz, p. 96 
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exaiphnes 
 
 
While exaiphnes (sudden or suddenly)172 appears only twice in the CD, it has profound 
resonance within Greek philosophy,173 and, Christian scripture174 and spiritual writing.175 
Mortley dismisses the importance of the scriptural references, but claims that 
Dionysius’ use of the concept “strikes a new note in the philosophy of classical 
antiquity,” because it abolishes “the cornerstone of Western philosophy… the famous 
principle of non-contradiction, or the excluded middle.”176 While Golitzin acknowledges 
the significance of the philosophical dimension, he argues that the scriptural references 
are essential to a full understanding of what Dionysius means by exaiphnes. He also 
observes that in Syriac exaiphnes is translated as “out of silence.” 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 On a sudden… the moment that he is dead; at first hearing… the instantaneous, that which is between 
motion and rest, and not in the time-series. Liddell & Scott, p. 582 
173 See Plato, Parmendes 156de; Epistle VII 341cd; Symposium 210c; and Plotinus, Enneads V.3.17; 5.7; 
VI.7.36. See Beierwaltes, W. (1966), "Exaiphnes oder die Paradoxie des Augenblicks", Philosophisches 
Jahrbuch 74, pp. 272-82; Stang, Colin (1974), ‘Plato and the Instant’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society, Suppli. Vol.48, pp. 63-79; Bostock, David (1978), ‘Plato on Change and Time in the 
“Parmenides”’, Phronesis, 23, pp. 229-242. For a comprehensive treatment see Niko Stobach (1998), The 
Moment of Change: A Systematic History in the Philosophy of Space and Time, Dordrecht: Kluwer 
174 Malachi 3:1; Luke 2:13; Mark 13:36; Acts 9:3; 22:6. 
175 “The earliest example comes from the Syriac work of the third century, the Acts of Judas Thomas, 
where, in the "Hymn of the Pearl", the Apostle "suddenly" encounters the "robe of glory" woven for him 
in heaven… In Athanasius' Life of Anthony, the father of monks is rescued from demonic assault by the 
"sudden" beam of light from heaven which then comforts him with the voice of Christ. In Ephrem Syrus, 
the "sudden" occurs at least three times. In his Hymns on Nature, Christ is the "star of light Who shone 
forth suddenly" at the Incarnation, while in the Hymns on Paradise, the "sudden" is linked, first, with the 
trisagion of the Seraphim breaking the silence before the Presence in Eden and, second, with the 
recognition of the Risen Christ at the clearly eucharistic "breaking of the bread" in the Emmaus story of 
Luke 24: "Bread was the key", says Ephrem, "whereby their eyes were opened... darkened eyes beheld a 
vision of joy and were suddenly [men shelya] filled with happiness". Thus, again, we find the term linked 
with the mystical vision, Christ, light, and the liturgies of both heaven and earth… The men of the Syriac 
translation of exaiphnes is merely the equivalent of the Greek ek, "from", "out of". Shelya, however, 
denotes "rest", "silence", and "stillness", and in Christian Syriac is usually connected with eremetic 
ascetics, as is hesychia in Christian Greek.” Golitzin, Alexander (2003), ‘”Suddenly”, Christ: The Place 
of Negative Theology in the Mystagogy of Dionysius Areopagite,’ Mystics: Presence and Aporia, 
Michael Kessler and Christian Shepherd (eds.), Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 23-5 
176 Mortley, Raoul (1986), From Word to Silence II: The way of negation, Christian and Greek, Bonn: 
Hanstein, p. 237 
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In The Celestial Hierarchy, Dionysius compares the divine nature with fire. One 
attribute of fire is its sudden appearance: 
If ignored it does not seem to be there, but when friction occurs, it will seek out 
something; it appears suddenly (exaiphnes), naturally and of itself, and soon it 
rises up irresistibly and losing nothing of itself, it communes joyfully with 
everything.177 
 
In the Third Letter he describes the revelation of Christ as “sudden.” “What comes into 
view, contrary to hope, from previous obscurity, is described as ‘sudden’ 
(exaiphnes).”178 It has been seen, but it cannot be known. Despite having come into 
view Christ is “hidden even amid the revelation… What is to be said of it remains 
unsayable; what is to be understood of it remains unknowable.”179 
 
According to Hathaway, the order and subject matter of Dionysius’ nine letters mirror 
the nine hypotheses in Plato’s Parmenides, thus the use of exaiphnes in the Third Letter 
echoes its appearance in the third hypothesis of the Parmenides.180 
 
Golitzin links the use of exaiphnes in the Third Letter with discussion of the chrism in 
the EH, “where Christ is both the way and the goal”, and with Moses’ ascent into the 
darkness at the summit of the mountain in the MT. He describes the Third Letter as, 
“Dionysius in a nutshell: christological, liturgical, and – yes – mystical.”181  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 CH329C 
178 EP3 1069B 
179 EP3 1069B 180	  Hathaway,	  p.	  80	  
181 Golitzin, Alexander (2001), ‘Revisiting the “Sudden”: Epistle III in the Corpus Dionysiacum’, Studia 
Patristica 37, p. 491 
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ekstasis 
 
The One is ecstatic (ekstasis182or ekstatikos183) both because it is beyond being and 
because it flows out of itself toward being. Human ecstasy consists in correctly 
interpreting the manifestations of the divine and rising above through the means of 
negations.  
 
In the Ninth Letter Dionysius has an extended passage in which he uses the metaphor of 
drunkenness to describe the ecstasy of the One. “Quite simply, as ‘drunk’ God stands 
outside of all good things, being the superfullness of all these things. He surpasses all 
that is measureless and his abode is above and beyond all that exists.”184 It is the ecstatic 
eros of the One that creates and sustains the universe: 
 
This divine yearning (eros) brings ecstasy (ekstatikos) so that the lover belongs 
not to self but to the beloved… And, in truth, it must be said too that the very 
cause of the universe in the beautiful, good superabundance of his benign 
yearning (eros) for all is also carried outside (ekstatikes) of himself in the loving 
care he has for everything. He is, as it were, beguiled by goodness, by love, and 
by yearning (eros) and is enticed away from his transcendent dwelling place and 
comes to abide within all things, and he does so by virtue of his supernatural and 
ecstatic (ekstatiken) capacity to remain, nevertheless within himself. 185 
 
This capacity to “abide within all things” and yet “to remain… within himself” is a 
further example of the simultaneity of transcendence and immanence which Sells 
describes as a feature of apophatic writing. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 “Displacement… change… movement outwards… differentiation… standing aside… distraction of 
mind, from terror, astonishment, anger…entrancement, astonishment… ecstasy… drunken excitement.” 
Liddell & Scott, p. 520 
183 “Inclined to depart from… excitable… out of one’s senses…able to displace or remove… causing 
mental derangement.” Liddell & Scott, p. 520 
184 EP112C 
185 DN712AB 
	   45	  
By interpreting scripture correctly, “we should be taken wholly out of ourselves.”186 
Interpretation through negations leads from sense perceptions, to concepts and, finally, 
to union with the One. Each level of interpretation is ecstatically transcended: 
 
The human mind has a capacity to think, through which it looks on conceptual 
things, and a unity which transcends the nature of the mind, through which it is 
joined to things beyond itself. And this transcending characteristic must be given 
to the words we use about God. They must not be given the human sense. We 
should be taken wholly out of ourselves and become wholly of God.187 
 
The Mystical Theology begins with a call to ecstasy. “By an undivided and absolute 
abandonment (ekstasei) of yourself and everything, shedding all and freed from all, you 
will be uplifted to the ray of the divine shadow which is above everything that is.”188 
Jones’ translation brings out a rather different flavour. “By the irrepressible and 
absolving ecstasis of yourself and of all, absolved from all, and going away from 
all…”189 The sense of absolution does not come through in Luibheid’s translation. The 
word “irrepressible” evokes the dynamism of the return. 
 
Rist observes that Dionysius uses a Christianized version of Proclean triads to describe 
divine providence operating in a three-fold ecstasy. Providential eros flows from the 
higher to the lower, between equals and upliftingly from the lower to the higher. 190 
 
Perczel maintains that there are significant differences between the mysticism of 
Proclus and of Dionysius. For Proclus union is a prelude to knowledge, while for 
Dionysius it is the beginning of unknowing: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 DN865D 
187 DN865CD 
188 MT1000A;  
189 Jones, MT1000A 
190 Rist, J.M. (1966), ‘A Note on Eros and Agape in Pseudo-Dionysius’, Vigiliae Christianae, 20, pp. 235-
43 
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Another difference between the two mystical doctrines is that for Proclus, 
reaching the summit – which means reaching the Principle of all things – is just 
a prelude and a necessary precondition for the unfolding of the metaphysical 
science. For Dionysius, reaching the summit is just a prelude for an ecstasis, in 
which the Principle still remains in a certain sense unreachable. Since this is so, 
it is perhaps logical that the ecstasis is not followed in the Mystical Theology by 
any kind of positive knowledge. Quite the contrary, all positive knowledge (the 
height of which is the vision of the “hypothetical reasons”) is merely a prelude 
for this experience.191 
 
Golitzin claims that the Mystical Theology and the Divine Names are the least original 
of Dionysius’ writing, not because they reflect Neoplatonic philosophy, as others have 
observed, but because they are consistent with the patristic tradition.  In the Mystical 
Theology the knowledge of God is described as the result of reciprocal ecstasies. “It is 
an out-going from self, a departure of ‘a union which exceeds the creaturely powers of 
intellect and intuition’.”192 Golitzin sees Dionysius’ approach to ecstasy as “one of 
Dionysius’ fundamental, and Christian-inspired, adjustments of pagan thought”:193  
 
We recall that the divine and creaturely exstaseis are reciprocal, and understand 
thus that the activity or energeia of the divine exstasis is the same divine love 
working in the creature to bring about the exstasis of the latter. God pours 
himself into immanence in order that the realm of contingent being may 
transcend itself in and through him. The circle imagery is indeed apt, suggesting 
both the process of divine activity proceeding outwards to bring all back to 
itself, and the principle of the double exstasis having its beginning and end in 
God.194  
 
 
Corrigan agrees that Dionysius developments a distinctive view of ecstasis, but where 
Louth sees a “radical opposition between the Platonic vision and Christian mystical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 Perczel, Istvan (2000), ‘Pseudo-Dionysius and the Platonic Theology: A Preliminary Study’, in 
Proclus et la Theologie Platonicienne, Segonds and Steel (eds.) Leuven: University Press, p. 525 
192 Golitzin, Alexander (1994), Et Introibo Ad Altere Dei: The Mystagogy of Dionysius Areopagita, with 
Special Reference to its Predecessors in the Eastern Christian Tradition, Thessaloniki: Analecta 
Vlatadon, p. 47 
193 Golitzin, p. 48 
194 Golitzin, p. 67 
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theology,”195 Corrigan maintains that Dionysius “transforms precisely the Platonic 
tradition… in the spirit of a shared philosophic enterprise.”196 
 
Buckley clarifies the difference between Plotinian and Dionysian ecstasy. For Plotinus 
emanation is a by-product of the One’s self-contemplation or self-desiring (eros auton). 
For Dionysius, however, “it is from his excess of erotic goodness that God is moved to 
create. The explicit and essential connection between God himself as divine Eros and 
the Good’s self-diffusion, therefore, a connection not made by Plato and Plotinus, is, 
under the influence of Proclus, established by Dionysius.”197  
 
apeiria 
 
Apeiria198 and apeiron199 are translated variously as infinite, infinity, unlimited or 
unbounded in the CD. Dionysius describes the One as “at a total remove from every 
condition, movement, being, rest, dwelling, unity, limit, infinity (apeirias), the totality 
of existence.”200  
 
Lilla identifies three different ways in which Dionysius uses the concept of the infinity 
of the One.201 Firstly, “the ‘one’ comprehends all things in itself potentially.” For 
example in the Divine Names Dionysius writes, “Even to speak of it as “present in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195 Louth, Andrew (1992), The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition from Plato to Denys, p. 51 
196 Corrrigan, Kevin (1996), ‘”Solitary” Mysticism in Plotinus, Proclus, Gregory of Nyssa, and Pseudo-
Dionysius’, The Journal of Religion, 76(1), pp. 41-2 
197 Buckley, Lisa Marie Esposito (1992), ‘Ecstatic and Emanating, Providential and Unifying: A Study of 
the Pseudo-Dionysian and Plotinian Concepts of Eros’, The Journal of Neoplatonic Studies, 1 (1), p. 55 
198 Infinity, infinitude… eternity. See also apeiritos, boundless, immense. Liddell & Scott, p. 184 
199 Boundless, endless… countless people… profound sleep… vast concourse… without end or escape… 
of persons standing in a circle. Liddell & Scott, p. 184 
200 DN593C. See DN980C 
201 Lilla, Salvatore R.C. (1980), ‘The Notion of Infinitude in Ps.-Dionysius Areopagita’, The Journal of 
Theological Studies, Vol. 31(1), p. 98 
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everything” is inaccurate since this does not convey the fact that it infinitely (apeirias) 
transcends everything and yet gathers everything within it”:202 
 
In its total simplicity it shakes off all duplication and it embraces everything in 
its transcendent infinity (apeirian)… He is the boundary to all things and is the 
unbounded infinity  (apeiria) about them in a fashion which rises above the 
contradiction between finite and infinite (apeirias).203  
 
The One’s infinitude is also expressed by the fact that its generativity is endless: 
His power is infinite because all power comes from him and because he 
transcends all power, even absolute power.  He possesses a superabundance of 
power which endlessly produces an endless number of other powers.204 
 
A third sense of infinity is found in the statement that the One is totally unknowable. 
While the first two senses in which Dionysius uses apeiria/apeiron have roots in Plato, 
Plotinus, Proclus and Damascius, this third use follows Gregory of Nyssa and 
Aristotle:205  
 
Just as the senses can neither grasp nor perceive the things of the mind, just as 
representation and shape cannot take in the simple and the shapeless, just as 
corporal form cannot lay hold of the intangible and incorporeal, by the same 
standard of truth beings are surpassed by the infinity (apeiria) beyond being, 
intelligences by that oneness which is beyond intelligence.206 
  
Hager traces the theme of divine infinity in Plotinus, Proclus and Dionysius. Plotinus 
and Proclus “argue to infinity from simplicity”, while Dionysius bases his argument on 
revelation.207 However, for all three “the infinity of God is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202 DN680B 
203 DN825AB. Also used in the same sense in DN705C, 909C and 912B. 
204 DN889D-892A 
205 Lilla cites Gregory, Contra Eunom. II (I 246); Contra Eunom. III (II 58); Quod non sit tres dii (52); 
and Aristotle, Phys. I 187b 7; Phys. III 207a 25-6; Rhet. III 1048b 27-8. Lilla, pp. 102-3 
206 DN588B.  
207 See DN588C 
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metaphysically/philosophically grounded position, and not at all an expression of a late 
antique or oriental, irrational conception of God.”208 
 
In line with Plotinus, Dionysius asserts that “the ascent from the realm of the Intellect 
and Reason up to the absolute Simplicity of the perfect One as the highest principle is 
more difficult than the climb from the corporeal world perceivable through the senses 
on up to the Intellectual World of Ideas… Mere human abilities of thought and 
comprehension – which are capable of dealing initially with that which has limits, form 
and finiteness in the visible world, and then with that which has intelligible form – 
shrink back from the One in Its Infinity.”209 
 
agnousia 
 
Agnousia,210 agnoustos,211  agnoustous212 and hyperagnoustos are used in the CD to 
describe a simple lack of knowledge, an aspect of the relationship with the One or a 
feature of the One itself.  
 
In the First Letter Dionysius gradually transforms the concept. He starts with the 
common sense statement that “knowledge makes unknowing (agnousian) disappear”. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 Hager, F.-P. (1993), ‘Infinity and Simplicity of God in Plotinus, Proclus and Pseudo-Dionysius’, The 
Journal of Neoplatonic Studies, 2(1), pp. 68-9. See DN588C. 
209 Hager, pp. 67-8 
210 “Ignorance… lack of acquintance… being unknown, obscurity.” Liddell & Scott, p. 12; see also 
Lampe, “Ignorance… ordinary state of man in this life… special feature of paganism… moral evil… 
caused by sin… liable to punishment… healed by Christ… destroyed by H. Ghost… suprarational, 
mystical, knowledge of God, if compared with rational knowledge, being and ‘unknowing,’” Lampe, p. 
22 
211 “Unknown…. unheard of, forgotten… unfamiliar… most unintelligible…. Not an object of knowledge, 
unknowable… harder to know… not knowing, ignorant of.” Liddell & Scott, p. 12; see also Lampe, 
“unknown…unknowable… ineffable… unintelligible… ignorant.” Lampe, p. 22  
212 “Without the knowledge of other, secretly… in a marvellous manner… without using the normal 
means to knowledge, i.e. without discursive reasoning,” Lampe, p. 22 
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Then he posits “the unknowing (agnousia) regarding God.” This is unknowing about 
God. Finally he claims that “complete unknowing (agnousia) is knowledge:”  
 
Darkness disappears in the light, the more so as there is more light. Knowledge 
makes unknowing (agnousian) disappear, the more so as there is more 
knowledge. However, think of this not in terms of deprivation but rather in 
terms of transcendence and then you will be able to say something truer than all 
truth, namely, that the unknowing (agnousia) regarding God escapes anyone 
possessing physical light and knowledge of beings: His transcendent darkness 
remains hidden from all light and concealed from all knowledge. Someone 
beholding God and understanding what he saw has not actually seen God 
himself but rather something of his which has being which is knowable. For he 
himself solidly transcends mind and being. He is completely unknown and 
nonexistent. He exists beyond being and he is known beyond the mind. And this 
quite positively complete unknowing (agnousia) is knowledge of him who is 
above everything that is known.213 
 
In the Third Letter, he reiterates the failure of speech and knowledge in relation to the 
One. “What is to be said of it remains unsayable; what is to be understood of it remains 
unknowable (agnouston).”214  
 
Interestingly, in the EH agnousia is only used in the conventional sense of lack of 
knowledge to describe the uninitiated who are unprepared to participate in the 
sacraments. Their “lack of knowledge (agnousian)”215 leaves them in “the dark pits of 
ignorance (agnousias)”.216 “Those who do not participate in and know (agnous)217 the 
divine things do not join in the thanksgiving.”218  
 
In the CH Dionysius observes that symbolic imagery provides “pictures [that] have to 
do with beings so simple that we can neither know (agnoustoun) nor contemplate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
213 EP1 1065AB 
214 EP3 1069B 
215 EH393D 
216 EH400C 
217 217 “Unknown… obscure, unintelligible… dark, vague… obscure, ignoble… unknown to fame… 
ignorant.” Liddell & Scott, p. 12 
218 EH445B 
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them.”219 The One is compared to fire, which “in itself it is undetectable (agnouston 
auto),”220 and with wind, which is “unknowable (agnouston) and invisible.”221 In the 
section of the CH dealing with Isaiah’s encounter with an angel, Luibheid’s translation 
reads, “As for the powers of the second and last rank, together with our own intelligent 
powers, he concentrates his clear enlightenment for the unknown (agnouston) union 
with his own hiddenness, in proportion to the degree of distance from conformity to 
God.”222 It is unclear whether the “he” in this passage refers to the angel, Isaiah or God. 
Consequently it is unclear whether “the unknown union with his own hiddenness” is the 
angel’s, Isaiah’s or God’s. Perhaps it applies through analogy to all three.223  
 
In the DN Dionysius aspires to write about the divine names “in a manner surpassing 
speech and knowledge (agnoustois aphthegktus kai agnoustous synaptometha),”224 
because “the unknowing of what is beyond being (hyperousiotetos agnousia) is 
something above and beyond speech, mind, or being itself.”225 Eventually, “in a way we 
cannot know (agnoustois),”226 the reader will share with the disciples the experience of 
the transfiguration. Meanwhile “with these analogies we are raised upward toward the 
truth,”227 which is “apart from all, beyond unknowing (hyperagnouston).”228 The One is 
known through the divine names, but the names must be transcended. “He is known 
through knowledge and through unknowing (agnousias)… the most divine knowledge 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219 CH137B 
220 CH329A 
221 CH336A 
222 CH305B 
223 In a discussion about Gregory of Nyssa, Saward argues that “corresponding to Deus absconditus there 
is homo absconditus.” Saward, p. 229 
224 DN585B; for a clearer translation see Jones, “Hereby, will you be ineffably and unknowingly joined to 
what is ineffable and unknowable,” and Rolt, “in a manner surpassing speech and knowledge, we 
embrace those truths which in like manner, surpass them.” 
225 DN588A 
226 DN592C; see Jones, “We shall share in the unity beyond intellect in the unknown and blessed 
radiations.” 
227 DN592C 
228 DN592D Jones 
	   52	  
of God, that which comes through unknowing (agnousias), is achieved in a union far 
beyond the mind.”229 
 
 
The One is “the unknown (agnouston)… beyond all unknowing (hyperagnoustou) 
and… unknowable (agnoustoi).230 The idea of the incarnation “cannot be enclosed in 
words nor grasped by any mind (agnoustos).”231 The power,232 the depth233 and the 
peace234 of the One are unknowable. The One is unknowable in itself.235 
 
The MT opens with a prayer to God to “lead us up beyond unknowing 
(hyperagnouston) and light”236 and an exhortation to “strive upward as much as you can 
toward union with him who is beyond all being and knowledge (agnoustous).”237 Moses 
is portrayed as the exemplar because “he plunges into the truly mysterious darkness of 
unknowing (agnousias). Here, being neither oneself nor someone else, one is supremely 
united to the completely unknown (agnoustou) by an inactivity of all knowledge, and 
know beyond the mind by knowing nothing.”238 Dionysius encourages the reader to 
aspire to the “unknowing (agnousias) which lies beyond all vision and knowledge”239 
and “that unknowing (agnousian) which itself is hidden from all those possessed of 
knowing.”240 
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Hathaway observes that although Dionysius presents himself as Paul’s disciple, present 
at Paul’s attack on the Athenian “unknown god”241, in the CD he “defends, with the help 
of an Athenian philosopher [Proclus], the claim that God is the unknown.”242  According 
to Rolt it is “possible that the word ‘Unknowing’ was a technical term of the Mysteries 
or a later Greek Philosophy, and that this is the real explanation and interpretation of the 
inscription of the Athenian altar: ‘To the Unknown God.’”243 
 
Rolt compares Dionysius with Bergson in their approach to the “transcendence of 
knowledge,” but cautions that the concept of unknowing in Dionysius should not be 
confused with Spencer’s concept of the unknowable. “[Spencer] teaches that Ultimate 
Reality is, and must always be, beyond our reach; [Dionysius] that the Ultimate Reality 
at last becomes so near as utterly to sweep away (in a sense) the distinction which 
separates us for It.”244  
 
henousis 
 
Henousis245 is used in a variety of ways in the CD to describe unity or union. It refers to 
an attribute of the One, the relationship between a being, or beings, and the One, a 
quality of relationship between elements of a hierarchy, an aspect of mind or, finally, 
the process of unification.  
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242 Hathaway, p. 70 
243 Rolt, p. 33 
244 Rolt, p. 32; for discussions of Spencer see, Jordan, Elijah (1911), ‘The Unknowable of Herbert 
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The “simplified unity (henousin)”246 of the One empowers beings to rise toward union 
with itself. The unity of creation is a reflection of the “absolute similarity” of the One.247 
Creatures are drawn into “a unity reflecting God (theomimeton henousin).”248 Creation 
is “the good procession of his own transcendent unity (henouseous).”249 The One is also 
“something above unity itself (auten hyperairon ten henousin).”250                             
 
The hierarchies provide a means through which to “strive upward as much as you can 
toward union (henousin)”251 with the One. They enable beings “to be at one with him 
(henousis auton).”252 They allow for the return of creation “to be united (henousin)”253 
with the One. Union with the One is accomplished through likeness.254  Union with the 
One is “like a fire”255 and “a blazing light.”256  
 
“Communion and union (koinounia kai henousis)”257 are the result of proper order 
between beings or between levels of hierarchy. In the eucharist the participants “are 
made perfectly one (henousei)”258 and it “grants us… union (henousin) with the One.”259 
The catechumen while not yet “initiated into complete union with (henouseous) and 
participation in God,” can rely on the support of others to carry him in the right 
direction.260  
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Under the influence of the One, minds are unified within themselves and with other 
minds. The “untroubled mind” has “a suitability for union (henousin) with God.”261 
“Godlike unified (hypertheon phous henousis) minds who imitate angels” are 
“enlightened after this blessed union (makarioutates henouseous).”262 The mind can 
“concentrate sightlessly and through an unknowing union (henouseous agnoustou)”263 
on the divine light. Beyond conceptual thought the mind has access to intuitive or 
empathic knowledge. “The human mind has a capacity to think, through which it looks 
on conceptual things, and a unity (henousin) which transcends the nature of mind, 
through this it is joined to things beyond itself.”264 Through this “sympathy” Hierotheus, 
Dionysius’ teacher, had a “mysterious union (henousin)” with “the divine things.”265 
The power of the spirit enables “a union (henousin)” beyond “the realm of discourse or 
of intellect.”266 Knowledge of the One is “achieved in a union (henousin) far beyond 
mind.”267 
 
In Chapter Two of the Divine Names (DN) Dionysius explains “divine unity (theias 
henouseous) and differentiation”268 in the Trinity and in creation. In the “divine unity 
(henouseis) beyond being,” there are no differentiations.269 “The divine unities 
(henouseis) are the hidden and permanent, supreme foundations of a steadfastness 
which is more than ineffable and more than unknowable.”270 The differentiations which 
do exist in the divine are benign. Divine unities and differentiations as higher terms 	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within the hierarchical process of emanation contain “certain specific unities 
(heouseous) and differentiatiations.”271    In Chapter Four Dionysius observes that the 
intelligible beings, the angels, “have their own orders beyond the cosmos, their own 
unities (henouseis), their mutual relationships, their unconfused distinctions.”272 
 
He uses the example of the light in a house coming from several lamps to demonstrate 
the notion of “distinction in unity (henoumena) and … unity (henousei) in 
distinction.”273 The “total union (henousis) of light” from the individual lamps cannot be 
differentiated.274 The “unity beyond being (hyperousion henousin)” surpasses “not only 
the union (henouseoun) of things corporeal, but also the union275 of souls, and even that 
of minds themselves.” Minds are in union to the degree in which they participate in “the 
unity which transcends all things (pantoun hyperermenes henouseous).”276 Dionysius 
uses the images of the circle and the seal to illustrate the relationship between unity and 
differentiation. In a circle all the radii share the centre point.277 All the substances that 
receive the impression of a seal share the one seal: 
 
There are numerous impressions of the seal and these all have a share in the 
original prototype; it is the same whole seal in each of the impressions and none 
participates only in a part… The substances which receive a share of the seal are 
different. Hence, the impressions of the one entire identical archetype are 
different.278 
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Participation is described in the DN, not only as a means to achieve unity but as 
founded on the divine unity, because “in the divine realm unities (henouseis) hold a 
higher place than differentiations.”279 All beings owe their existence to their 
participation in the Good: 
 
From it derives the existence of everything as beings, what they have in 
common (hai henouseis)280 and what differentiates them (hai diakriseis), their 
identicalness (hai tautotetes) and differences (hai heterotetes), their similarities 
and dissimilarities, their sharing of opposites, the way in which their ingredients 
maintain identity.281 
 
The Good is “the unity underlying everything (hai pantos plethous henouseis).”282 Even 
those who pursue illusory goals participate in “a distorted echo of real love and real 
unity (henouseous).”283  
 
The integrity of individual beings is assured by the unity of the One, which gives “to all 
things their definitions, their limits, and their guarantee, allowing nothing to be pulled 
apart or scattered in some endlessly disordered chaos… away from their own unity 
(henouseous) and in some total jumbled confusion.”284  
 
In Chapter Five of DN on the divine name, being, Dionysius claims that “the laws 
governing each individual are gathered together in one unity (henousin) with which 
there is no confusion”285 and that “the exemplars of everything preexist as a 
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transcendent unity (henousin),286 in the One. Therefore all things are “joined together in 
one transcendental unity (henousin).”287 
 
In Chapter Nine of the DN the One is called “same” because “he is totally, uniquely, 
and individually like himself.”288 It is also called “similar.” “All the similarity in the 
world is similar to a trace of the divine similarity so that all creation is thereby made a 
unity (henousin).”289 
 
In Chapter Eleven of DN Dionysius discusses the divine name, peace. The One “is still 
and tranquil … in an absolutely transcendent unity (henousin) of self, turning in upon 
himself and multiplying himself without ever leaving his own unity (henouseous).”290 It 
draws creation together in “a unity (henousin) without confusion.”291 Dionysius invites 
his reader to “contemplate the one simple nature of that peaceful unity (heouseous) 
which joins all things to itself and to each other,”292 ultimately in “a unity (henousin) 
beyond all conceptions.”293  
 
Golitzin describes henousis as “the capacity or openness of the creature to being filled 
with the divine dynameis.”294 It is an “infinite ascent… our true ‘correspondence’ to the 
divine infinity.”295 Vanneste argues that the triad aphairesis-agnousia-henousis 
(negation-unknowing-union) dominates the MT.296   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
286 DN824C 
287 DN825A 
288 DN913C 
289 DN916A 
290 DN949B 
291 DN949C 
292 DN949C 
293 DN949D 
294 Golitzin, p. 115 
295 Goltizin, p. 116 
296 Golitzin, pp. 109. Henousis appears only once in the MT. 
	   59	  
 
theosis 
 
Theousis297, also theosis and theôsis, is translated variously as deification, divinization 
or becoming godlike. The One “is the source of all divinization (theouseous).”298 
According to Dionysius, “divinization (theousis) consists of being as much as possible 
like and in union with God.”299 The One has provided the “symbolic mode (symbolikous 
paradedotai)… because he wanted us to be godlike (analogou theouseous).”300  
 
In innumerating the attributes of the first order of angels, the seraphim, cherubim and 
thrones, in the CH, Dionysius observes: 
 
They are “perfect,” then, not because of an enlightened understanding which 
enables them to analyze the many sacred things, but rather because of a primary 
and supreme deification (hyperechoyses theouseous), a transcendent and angelic 
understanding of God’s work.301  
 
The most frequent references to theousis are in the EH, where he describes “our 
hierarchy” as a means of deification. “We see our human hierarchy, on the other hand, 
as our nature allows, pluralized in a great variety of perceptible symbols lifting us 
upward hierarchically until we are brought as far as we can be into the unity of 
divinization (theousin).”302 
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Participation in the human hierarchy “consists of a feast upon that sacred vision which 
nourishes the intellect and divinizes everything (theousa panta) rising up to it.”303 The 
generosity of the One “has bestowed hierarchy as a gift to ensure the salvation and 
divinization (theousei) on every being endowed with reason and intelligence.”304 This 
divine generosity is mirrored in the generosity of the leaders of the human hierarchy 
who “made human what was divine.” “Like gods, they had a burning and generous urge 
to secure uplifting and divinization (theouseous) for their subordinates.”305 The leaders 
explain that “like a fire, [the One] has made one with himself all those capable of being 
divinized (theousin).”306 
 
In his discussion of baptism, “the rite of illumination” and “the divine birth,” in the EH, 
Dionysius uses the imagery of an athletic contest to describe the process of deification. 
The reader is exhorted to “do battle with every activity and with every being which 
stand in the way of his divinization (theousin).”307 
 
The synaxis, or communion rite, “draws our fragmented lives together into a one-like 
divinization (theousin). It forges a divine unity out of the divisions within us.”308  
Through participation in the synaxis some humans are lifted up to “perfecting 
divinization (theousesin)” and “arrive at the highest possible measure of divinization 
(theousei) and will be both the temple and the companion of the Spirit of the Deity.”309 
During the communion there are hymns of praise to “that source… who has established 
for us those saving sacraments by means of which the participants are divinized 	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(theousin).”310 In his discussion of the consecration of “therapeutae” or monks, 
Dionysius notes that the monastic initiation is followed by communion. The monk is 
“uplifted and are more or less made godlike (theouseous)”311 through his/her monastic 
profession, but participation in the synaxis brings that vocation into fuller union with 
the community and with God.  
 
In his argument about unity and differentiation in the DN, Dionysius states that, when 
the mind struggles to comprehend the hiddenness of the One, “we find ourselves 
witnessing no divinization (theousin), no life, no being which bears any real likeness to 
the absolutely transcendent Cause of all things.”312 Any understanding of God, that is 
achieved by the mind, is the work of the spirit, “which is located beyond all conceptual 
immateriality and all divinization (theousin).”313 The fact however that many are 
uplifted “to divinization (theousei)… [shows] that there is not only differentiation but 
actual replication of the one God.”314 
 
In Chapter Eight of the DN on divine power, Dionysius states that the divinizing power 
of the One is transmitted throughout the hierarchies. “To those made godlike it grants 
the power for deification itself (theousin auten).”315 
 
Gross identifies two distinct approaches to divinization in the CD. On the one hand 
there is direct contact between the One and the soul. This contact is made possible by a 
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particular faculty of the soul, the one (hen) of the soul. This is reminiscent of Proclus’ 
“flower of the soul.” Gross characterizes this form of theousis as mystical: 
 
Unlike the great majority of the fathers, our mystic does not seem to place the 
principal element of deification in the immortalization of humankind. For him, 
as we have seen, it is above all the unification of the soul, its reduction to the 
hen that is in it, which renders it like the divine Hen and thereby deiform.316 
 
On the other hand the liturgical, ecclesiastical path to theousis described in the EH, 
represents for Gross a less problematic approach.  He says that Dionysius does not make 
any effort to reconcile these two approaches. Gross does not appear to appreciate 
Dionysius’ view that beings are simultaneously embedded within a context and in 
contact with the One. As Spearritt notes, “in creation God gives himself, there being 
nothing else he could give… all recipients who share in the gift must share in the whole 
gift.”317 
 
Hudson observes that, according to Maximus the Confessor, one of the first 
commentators on the CD, theousis is “not a retrieval of a state that should never have 
been lost, but the fulfillment of a process that originated in God,”318 and that “there is no 
gap between the God of creation and the God of redemption.”319 In Letter Four 
Dionysius refers to “the new theandric energy” or “the activity of the God-man”:320  
 
 
Theandricity is precipitated by the tension between the divine immanence in 
creation and the divine transcendence above it and is expressed in cataphatic and 	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apophatic theology. The theandric aspect of the divine-human relation is 
fulfilled through the link established between these two movements by 
theosis.’321  
 
Here Hudson identifies immanence with kataphasis, transcendence with apophasis and 
the link between the two as theousis. This view would reflect the triad, kataphasis-
apophasis-ekstasis. She might however to be at odds with Sells’ contention that 
“apophatic intensity” is the result of the simultaneity of immanence and transcendence.  
 
In this chapter I have unearthed from the Corpus dionysiacum a wide range of concepts 
that contribute to the apophatic intensity of Dionysius’ work. This is evidence that 
apophasis is deployed to a variety of purposes and acts in a number of directions within 
his thought and imagination. It would suggest that if we are to locate apophatic elements 
in the work of Jung that we should expect to find a similarly dynamic kaleidoscope of 
concepts and images. 
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Chapter Four 
 
 
Jung, Neoplatonism and Dionysius 
 
From an early age Jung read widely in philosophy and theology. He “was fascinated by 
all forms of Platonism and neo-Platonism.”322  “Between the ages of sixteen and 
nineteen, he began to read both early Greek philosophy – Heraclitus, Pythagoras, and 
Empedocles, as well as Plato – and such medieval thinkers as Thomas Aquinas and 
Meister Eckhart.”323 
 
The problem of apophasis is central to this tradition. The persistence of Jung’s 
preoccupation with the problem of unknowing is evident from two statements written 
forty years apart. In 1912, in a comparison of symbolic thinking and directed thinking in 
Symbols of Transformation, he observed: 
The fact that these problems could be posed at all – the stock metaphysical 
problem of how to know the unknowable comes into this category – proves how 
peculiar the medieval mind must have been, that it could contrive questions 
which for us are the height of absurdity.324  
 
The final sentence of Answer to Job, published in 1952, reads: 
That is to say even the enlightened person remains what he is, and is never more 
than his own limited ego before the One who dwells within him, whose form has 
no knowable boundaries, who encompasses him on all sides, fathomless as the 
abysms of the earth and as vast as the sky.325 
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Ultimately the question of influence in Jung’s thought is difficult to decide. What is not 
in doubt is that Jung plundered the religious and philosophical literatures of the world to 
find the language with which to express his thoughts and intuitions: 
 
From Jung’s point of view, to say he borrowed ideas from other philosophers in 
the sense that his ideas originated in the study of philosophy would be a mistake. 
Instead, Jung’s inner experiences, his dreams, his intuitions, and his reflections 
were the ultimate sources of his thought. However in his study of philosophy, as 
he tells us in his autobiography, he found the confirmation of his intuitions and, 
one might add, the verbal structures through which he gave them form.326 
 
The issue of how one is to understand Jung’s adoption of any particular religious and 
philosophical concept for his psychological thought must be faced anew in each 
instance. 
 
Given the importance of the Platonic strain in Jung’s thought it is surprising that there 
are only just over 120 citations of Plato and his writings, 10 references to Plotinus, six 
to Proclus, three to Iamblichus, and a mere 16 to neoplatonism/-ists. (Aristotle merits 21 
mentions.) Many of these are embedded in quotations from other writers, as well as in 
Jung’s own words, in which a neoplatonic philosopher, text or theme is mentioned in 
passing. For example, “Thomas Tyler, who was strongly influenced by Proclus, 
says…”327 This compares with a special section in the index to the Collected Works of 
27 pages containing many hundreds of references to alchemy and alchemical writings.  
 
Jung held some aspects of the Platonic tradition to be potential remedies for what he 
considered to be the cultural malaise of modern man: 
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The development of Western philosophy during the last two centuries has 
succeeded in isolating the mind in its own sphere and in severing it from its 
primordial oneness with the universe. Man himself has ceased to be the 
microcosm and eidolon of the cosmos, and his “anima” is no longer the 
consubstantial scintilla, or spark of the Anima Mundi, the World Soul.328 
 
The concept of the macrocosm/microcosm is fundamental to Jung’s concept of the self 
and his cultural project of the recovery of meaning. In his view, Western man had 
become disconnected from nature. He argued that the self was a part of nature, while the 
Western ego had developed into an alienated, unrooted construct. In his view the 
collective unconscious, of which the self is a part, is natural. The individual is linked to 
the cosmos through his inner experience because the experience of the unconscious is 
an experience of the microcosm which reflects and is reflected by the macrocosm. 
 
Bishop traces Jung’s interest in the macrocosm/microcosm:  
Indeed, Jung’s theory of synchronicity turns out to be based upon the idea of 
macrocosm-microcosm. The terminology of the macrocosm and the microcosm 
was introduced in the fifth century by Democritus (c. 460-c.360 BC), and its 
primary philosophical source is Plato’s dialogue Philebus. As Jung was well 
aware, elements of the notion of a systematic analogy between large-scale 
phenomena (or the world as a whole) and small-scale phenomena (or part of the 
world) can be found in numerous thinkers in both Eastern and Western 
traditions. The thinkers discussed in Jung’s monograph include Lao-Tse’s Tao 
Te Ching (JGW/JCW 8: 907-913), the classical idea of the sympathy of all 
things, the medieval doctrine of correspondentia (905/915, 914/924), the 
Hellenistic philosopher and main representative of Alexandrian eclecticism 
Philo of Alexandra (c.20 BC-c. AD 50) (915-916/925-926), the third century 
writer Zosimos of Panopolis, the Mithraic liturgy (919/929), the Aristotelian 
philosopher Theophrastus (c.371-287 BC), the founder of Neoplatonism 
Plotinus (204/5-270) (917/927), the Renaissance scholar and philosopher Pico 
della Mirandola (1463-1494 (917-918/927-928), the occult doctor and….etc.329 
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Jung felt that he had discovered a liberating truth in the fact, as he saw it, that the 
microcosm which was projected at various times in history onto the body or matter, 
could be observed within human psychology: 
 
The ancient and long obsolete idea of man as a microcosm contains a supreme 
psychological truth that has yet to be discovered. In former times this truth was 
projected upon the body, just as alchemy projected the unconscious psyche upon 
chemical substances. But it is altogether different when the microcosm is 
understood as that interior world whose inward nature is fleetingly glimpsed in 
the unconscious.330 
 
The process of the “birth of the self” which can be empirically observed corresponds to 
the creation of the world. He claimed that it was possible to know “what it is in man 
that corresponds to the cosmos.” He felt there was urgent need for this knowledge 
because neurosis was produced by lack of meaning: 
 
For the alchemists the process of individuation represented by the opus was an 
analogy of the creation of the world, and the opus itself an analogy of God’s 
work of creation. Man was seen as a microcosm, a complete equivalent of the 
world in miniature. In our picture, we see what it is in man that corresponds to 
the cosmos, and what kind of evolutionary process is compared with the creation 
of the world and the heavenly bodies: it is the birth of the self, the latter 
appearing as a microcosm. It is not the empirical man that forms the 
“correspondentia” to the world, as the medievalists thought, but rather the 
indescribable totality of the psychic or spiritual man, who cannot be described 
because he is compounded of consciousness as well as of the indeterminable 
extent of the unconscious. The term microcosm proves the existence of a 
common intuition (also present in my patient) that the “total” man is as big as 
the world, like an Anthropos.331 
 
The process of individuation is the process of the unfolding of the microcosm. The 
relationship between this “objective” unfolding process and the individual ego is 
complex and the subject of psychopathology and psychoanalysis. Psychotherapy is a 
form of “alchemical research”: 	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The alchemist, however, had at the very least an indirect inkling of it: knew 
definitely that as part of the whole he had an image of the whole in himself, the 
“firmament” or “Olympus,” as Paracelsus calls it. This interior microcosm was 
the unwitting object of alchemical research. Today we would call it the 
collective unconscious, and we would describe it as “objective” because it is 
identical in all individuals and is therefore one. Out of this universal One there is 
produced in every individual a subjective consciousness, ie., the ego. This is 
roughly, how we today would understand Dorn’s “formerly one” and “separated 
by a divine act of creation.”332 
 
The motif of the microcosm/macrocosm is widespread in Jung’s work and provides him 
with a useful concept to think about the place of the individual in the cosmos. He 
insisted throughout that he approached these studies as an empiricist. For the modern 
reader there is the constant question of his use of metaphysical language to describe 
psychology. Nagy argues that Jung’s theory of archetypes does in the end amount to 
metaphysics rather than metapsychology: 
 
Jung suggests that while we may never know more than what the psyche itself 
presents to us, we must assume a transcendental reality – a thing-in-itself – 
which lies in back of and causes the phenomena which we experience. “One 
must assume that the… ideas… rest on something actual.” “The reactions of the 
psychic system… [reflect] the behavior of a metaphysic reality.” Though he 
cannot hope to know it, Jung assumes that his dreams and feelings do give 
evidence of an invisible, that is non-material reality undergirding his subjective 
experience. Yet he claims not to be a metaphysician.333 
 
This tension between metaphysical and psychological language is a recurring issue in 
Jung’s psychological interpretations of religious and philosophical writings. According 
to Altizer, “The chief problems posed by Jung’s methodology are derived from his 
ambiguous attempt to bring together the language and method of scientific-rational 
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analysis and the mythical symbolism of the romantics and mystics.”334 In Altizer’s view 
Jung fails because although his stated intention is to bridge the gaps between conscious 
and unconscious and between history and nature he cannot reconcile “the truth which is 
reached by scientific-objective analysis with the truth that is grasped by unconscious 
intuition. Jung’s thought dwells in two worlds and he has not found a genuine way to 
bring them together.”335 Altizer contends that Jung, in his late work in particular, 
emphasized the unconscious to the detriment of the conscious, thereby in effect 
collapsing the opposites rather than reconciling them as he claimed to be doing. Jung of 
course believed that his analytical psychology did in fact provide, for the individual and 
for culture, genuine theoretical and practical solutions to the problem of opposites. 
 
Barnes in her essay ‘Neo-Platonism and Jung’ compares Plotinus and Jung. In spite of 
their many differences, she finds that there are striking similarities in their interpretation 
of religious experience and “in urging the importance of a certain spiritual faculty other 
than the intellect.” She describes the relationship between the individual and the All-
Soul in Plotinus and the relationship between the ego and the collective unconscious in 
Jung. They both stress the importance of “the conscious realization of the power of a 
greater than the conscious psyche.”336 
 
She sees important differences between Plotinus and Jung in three areas. Firstly, that 
while the All-Soul and the collective unconscious can be viewed as analogous, “the 
supra-individual, as Plotinus sees it, is not limited to the All-Soul, which is actually but 
the lowest of the three realms of true being.” Secondly, the collective unconscious has 	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developed and will continue to develop, whereas the All-Soul is unchanging. And, 
thirdly where Jung asserts the value of the individual and the importance of attaining an 
embodied balance between consciousness and the collective unconscious, Plotinus 
argues for “a flight away from the body”:337 
 
Whatever the similarities between the conceptions, it should be evident, I 
believe, that the individual’s hope of salvation or adjustment in this world is the 
effecting of harmonious contact between his individual psyche and the world of 
greater scope of which he at best usually only dimly perceives himself to be 
apart. Plotinus refers to this process as an ascent into higher spheres; Jung 
speaks of it as the descent into deeper realms of consciousness. Each expression 
is, of course, metaphorical and is, I think, substantially the same in meaning. 
Plotinus’ method is primarily intellectual and contemplative in the traditional 
philosophical sense. Jung’s is based on the scientific and intellectual 
interpretation of dreams. Both involve at the end a power that is non-rational, at 
least so far as human understanding can at present take us.338 
 
In Plotinus’ system there are four steps for the soul to take to attain reality: “the pursuit 
of the virtues, attainment of self-knowledge, dialectic, and the final vision wherein one 
passes beyond intellect.”339 While Jung did not describe his approach in this language, 
there are, according to Barnes, similar stages in his concept of individuation. 
 
The philosopher’s pursuit of virtue is analogous to the psychotherapist’s resolution of 
problems at the level of the personal unconscious. “The personal unconscious must 
always be disposed of first, i.e., made conscious; otherwise the entrance to the collective 
unconscious cannot be opened.”340 For both, self-knowledge involves loss of self. One’s 
personal sense of individuality is thrown into relief by encounter with the impersonal or 
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the divine. “The loss of self is really self-expansion…[for Jung] when one encounters 
the unconscious he becomes the known as opposed to the knower”:341 
 
Self-knowledge with Jung then results in the perception of the divine by a study 
of oneself, but this realization is not an objective observation of an identifiable 
part of one’s thought and motives but rather a discovery of oneself in relation to 
a power greater than that of ordinary conscious being. This is exactly the result 
to be attained in Neo-Platonism.342 
 
The next two steps, dialectic and “the final act of vision”, raise the problem of the role 
of the intellect. “The One can never be actually grasped by intellect alone nor without 
intellect.”343 For Jung therapy is a dialectical process between two individuals as well as 
a dialectical process between the conscious and unconscious. “Jung finds that 
consciousness may have to rise to higher intellectual levels to keep up with the 
unconscious.”344 The final ecstasy in Plotinus or the transformative experience in Jung 
occur after prolonged and strenuous intellectual effort: 
 
In the final analysis one is brought by both the system of Plotinus and the 
interpretation of Jung to the somewhat paradoxical conclusion that the 
individual receives a mystic or at least non-rational sense of the power and 
peace, transferable into future living and coming from insight into an abstraction 
so complete as to have no meaning in terms of any human ethical ideal or divine 
personality. The One comes close to Nothingness in all save its power over him 
who experiences it.345 
 
Robertson in his paper ‘Stairway to Heaven: Jung & Neoplatonism’ includes 
Iamblichus and Proclus in his reading of neoplatonism. He sees Proclus as the supreme 
representative of neoplatonic philosophy. Perhaps this explains his significantly 
different representation of the neoplatonic view of the body, compared to Barnes’ 	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account. Robertson points out that the neoplatonists did not see Plato and Aristotle as 
representatives of two irreconcilable traditions. “They didn’t see any dramatic split 
between the ideas of Plato, with his world of ideal forms, and Aristotle, with his 
emphasis on the actual forms we encounter in nature…[they] were talking about the 
same thing. It is in the Neoplatonist’s ability to see a unity” that they remind us of 
Jung.346 
 
There is a correspondence between the neoplatonic capacity to hold mind and matter 
together through the mechanism of emanation and Jung’s theory that archetypes have 
both spiritual and material manifestations. Neoplatonism and Jung’s psychology stand 
out within the western tradition as the only systems of thought that have successfully 
resolved the mind/body split. Philosophically this is achieved in neoplatonism by the 
doctrine of emanation. “Each emanation, since it comes from the One and partakes of 
the One, must in some way also contain the One. Therefore, the instincts can’t be totally 
evil, since somehow they must also contain the divine.”347 Robertson highlights the 
similarity between the neoplatonic practice of theurgy and Jung’s approach to dream 
interpretation and active imagination. He observes that theurgy means god work. 
Theurgy enabled the embodied human to participate in the divine energy by opening 
communication between the human and divine which went beyond thought. The rituals 
included the body in the relationship with the One. According to Jung for many people 
traditional symbols and rituals no longer carry the numinous. Through engaging with 
material from their unconscious in active imagination and dream interpretation, 
however, it is possible for these individuals to discover “living symbols”: 
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Precisely because the new symbol is born of man’s highest spiritual aspirations 
and must at the same time spring from the deepest roots of his being, it cannot 
be a one-sided product of the most highly differentiated mental functions, but 
must derive equally from the lowest and most primitive levels of the psyche.348 
 
Robertson also contends that “Neoplatonism originated the concept of a progressive, 
evolutionary path” toward union with the One. This is a “holographic concept that at 
each step of the journey, we have the potential to experience the One that is the goal of 
the journey”.349 This resonates with Jung’s concept of individuation in which the path 
and the goal are both expressions of the archetype of the self. 
 
Robertson discusses, in an earlier book, the fundamental importance of number in 
Platonic and neoplatonic concepts of archetypes. Jung did not neglect this aspect of the 
problem. “He speculated that number itself – as expressed most basically in the small 
integers – was the most primitive archetype of order…Jung felt that number might be 
the primary archetype of order in the unus mundus itself; i.e., the most basic building 
blocks of either psyche or matter are the integers.”350 
 
MacLennan explores the relationship between Neoplatonism, Jungian psychology, and 
evolutionary neuroethology. He argues that the genome is “the unified archetypal Form 
or Idea from which all other archetypal Ideas derive, the eidos eidon (Form of Forms) in 
Proclus’ terms.”351 He relates this to the noetic or intelligible order. “In the genome the 
archetypal Ideas are ‘all in all, but each in its own way’ (panta en pasin, oikeious de en 	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ekastou), which is how Proclus described the Henads (e.g., El. Th. pr. 118), which exist 
in an undifferentiated unity in the One.”352  
 
The relationship between the human genome, the gene sequence of a particular 
individual and the phenotype, “the resulting individual, whose traits have been 
conditioned, but not determined by the genotype”353, is described, by MacLennan, as 
being analogous to the relationship the collective unconscious, the archetypal image and 
the individual personality, on the one hand, and the relationship between the henads, the 
world soul and the individual soul, on the other. 
 
He discusses the neoplatonic debate about the complete descent of the soul. Although 
the “genome, and even the individual genotype, remains ‘above’ in the noetic sphere… 
the articulated noeric images of the archetypal Ideas are represented in our brains in the 
structures subserving the archetypal behavior.”354 He does not resolve the debate, but 
shows that it resonates with debates in analytical psychology and neuroethology. He 
also compares Jung’s idea that the collective unconscious develops with the fact that 
“the genome is not a fixed essence, but a time-varying form.”355 “The human genome at 
a given time is defined over a population existing at that time… the genome is defined 
by the set of participated genotypes.”356 New DNA is created from the DNA of the 
parents and one manifestation of DNA goes out of existence when someone dies. “Thus 
the evolution of the genome, as statistical average, is mediated by processes in the 
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natural world.”357 Similarly there is an evolution of archetypes that is mediated through 
the material world. 
 
MacLennan compares a number of theurgical operations with the practice of analysis. 
Theurgy uses sunthemata and sumbola (signs and symbols) and practices dream 
incubation. Telestike is the process of ensouling or animating a statue “by placing in or 
on the image appropriate sunthemata, including stones, plants, animals, scents, and 
figures.”358 He compares this to finding the appropriate archetypal image to make the 
presence of the archetype known. In desmos (binding) “a kletour (caller) invokes a god 
or daimon to possess another person, called the doxeus (recipient), theates (seer), or 
kataxos (held-down one).”359 Although MacLennan does not indicate as much, this is 
clearly similar to transference/countertransference dynamics.  Eustasis, “liaison with a 
god or daimon in order to establish an alliance with it,”360 he compares with active 
imagination, a way of dialoguing with aspects of the unconscious. And finally he 
observes that “in the preceding, the divinity is experienced as ‘other,’ but in the 
anagoge the theurgist ascends so that their soul, so far a possible, unites with the god; 
that is, they experience deification.”361 MacLennan associates this with wholeness, 
“integrating the conscious, personal unconscious, and collective unconscious minds.”362  
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
357 MacLennan, p. 15 
358 MacLennan, p. 19 
359 MacLennan, p. 19 
360 MacLennan, p. 20 
361 MacLennan, p. 20 
362 MacLennan, p. 20 
	   76	  
Dionysius 
 
In his library Jung had two manuscripts of the Corpus Dionysiacum - Strassburg (1502-
3) and Paris (1644).363 He cites Dionysius twelve times in the Collected Works,364 
usually referencing the English translations of Rolt and Parker. On one occasion he also 
quotes a paraphrase of Dionysius in a work by Pachymeres from Migne.365 
 
The references to Dionysius fall into two main categories. He cites Dionysius as an 
important link in the genealogy of the concept of the archetype and Dionysius is among 
the main targets of his invective against the doctrine of the privatio boni. He also 
mentions Dionysius with reference to statues and to symbolism. 
 
Jung observes, “the actual term ‘archetype’… is to be found in Dionysius the 
Areopagite and in the Corpus Hermeticum”: 366 
The term “archetype” occurs as early as Philo Judaeus, with the reference to the 
Imago Dei (God-image) in man. It can also be found in Irenaeus, who says: 
“The creator of the world did not fashion these things directly from himself but 
copied them from archetypes outside himself.” In the Corpus Hermeticum, God 
is called to archetypon phoos (archetypal light). The term occurs several times in 
Dionysius the Areopagite, as for instance in De caelesti hierarchia, II, 4: 
“immaterial Archetypes,” and in De divinis nominibus, I, 6: “Archetypal stone.” 
[note 6. In Migne, P.G., vol. 3, col. 144. 7. Ibid., col. 595. Cf. The Divine 
Names, (trans. By Rolt), pp. 62, 72.]367 
 
He enlists the late antique discussion of archetypes to support his theory of the 
unconscious. In his essay, ‘On the psychology of the unconscious,’ he writes: 
The primordial images are the most ancient and the most universal `’thought-
forms” of humanity. They are as much feelings as thoughts; indeed, they lead 	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their own independent life rather in the manner of part-souls, as can easily be 
seen in those philosophical or Gnostic systems which rely on perceptions of the 
unconscious as the source of knowledge. The idea of angels, archangels, 
“principalities and powers” in St. Paul, the archons of the Gnostics, the heavenly 
hierarchy of Dionysius the Areopagite, all come from the perception of the 
relative autonomy of the archetypes.368 
 
In Psychological Types Jung notes that Dionysius whose “writings exercised a 
considerable influence on early medieval philosophy, distinguished the categories entia 
rationalia, intellectualia, sensibilia, simpliciter existentia.”369 Jung includes Dionysius 
among those who value the use of symbols: 
The timid defensiveness certain moderns display when it comes to thinking 
about symbols was certainly not shared by St. Paul or by many of the venerable 
Church Fathers. [note 2. Of the older ones I refer chiefly to Clement of 
Alexandria (d. c. 216), Origen (d. 253) and Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (d. 
end of 5th cent.).]370 
 
In Mysterium Coniunctionis, Jung describes symbolic thinking in neoplatonic, hermetic 
and alchemical ideas about statues:  
The idea of a precious substance in the “statue” is an old tradition and is 
particularly true of the statues of Hermes or Mercurius. Pseudo-Dionysius says 
that the pagans made statues of Mercurius and hid in them a simulacrum of the 
god. In this way they worshipped not the unseemly herm but the image hidden 
inside. [note 60. Dionysius is cited in the alchemical literature. See Theatr. 
chem., VI, p. 91.] [note 61. “They made in them [the statues] both doors and 
hollows, in which they placed images of the gods they worshipped. And so 
statues of Mercury after this kind appeared of little worth, but contained within 
them ornaments of gods” (Pachymeres’ paraphrase of Dionysius the Areopagite, 
De caelesti hierarchia, in Migne, P.G., vol. 3, col. 162)]371 
 
In Mysterium Coniunctionis Jung also refers to Dionysius’ schema of “mystical ascent”:  
 
It seems to me that Eleazar’s text conveys some idea of this, as the 
transformation of the black Shulamite take place in three stages, which were 
mentioned by Dionysius the Areopagite as characterizing the mystical ascent: 
emundatio (katharsis, ‘purification’), illuminatio (phoutismos), perfectio 
(telesmos). Dionysius refers the purification to Psalm 51: 7: “Wash me, and I 
shall be whiter than snow”; and the illumination to Psalm 13: 3: “Lighten mine 
eyes.” (The two heavenly luminaries, sun and moon, correspond on the old view 	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to the two eyes.) The perfection he refers to Matthew 5: 48: “Be ye therefore 
perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect.” Here we have one 
aspect of the approximation to divinity: the other aspect is exemplified by the 
image of the Apocalyptic Son of Man, described earlier. (354 The Celestial 
Hierarchies, III, 3 [Eng. Trans., p. 18])372 
 
The most significant references to Dionysius in Jung’s work, however, are in relation to 
the problem of evil. In Jung’s opinion, Dionysius was one of the prime culprits in the 
development of the concept of the privatio boni. This doctrine “nullifies the reality of 
evil and can be found as early as Basil the Great (33-79) and Dionysius the Areopagite 
(2nd half of the 4th century), and is fully developed in Augustine.”373 Jung explains 
Dionysius’ view of the relationship between good and evil and then supplies a quotation 
from Parker’s translation of The Divine Names: 
 
Dionysius the Areopagite gives a detailed explanation of evil in the fourth 
chapter of De divinis nominbus. Evil, he says, cannot come from good, because 
if it came from good it would not be evil. But since everything that exists comes 
from good, everything is in some way good, but ‘evil does not exist at all.’ 
 
“Evil in its nature is neither a thing nor does it bring anything forth. 
Evil does not exist at all and is neither good nor productive of good. 
All things which are, by the very fact that they are, are good, and come from 
good; but in so far as they are deprived of good they are neither good nor do 
they exist. 
 
“That which has no existence is not altogether evil, for the absolutely non-
existent will be nothing, unless it be thought of as subsisting in the good 
superessentially. Good, then as absolutely existing and as absolutely non-
existing, will stand in the foremost and highest place, while evil is neither in that 
which exists nor in that which does not exist.”374 
 
Jung cites references from Augustine and quotes a lengthy commentary from Aquinas 
on this passage from Dionysius. “These quotations clearly exemplify the standpoint of 
Dionysius and Augustine: evil has no substance or existence in itself, since it is merely 
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a diminution of good, which alone has substance. Evil is a vitium, a bad use of things as 
a result of erroneous decisions of the will (blindness due to evil desire, etc.)”375 
 
In a note in ‘A study in the process of individuation,’ Jung says he is “ purposely 
disregarding… the heavenly hierarchies of Dionysius the Areopagite,” along with a 
number of other symbolic systems, because “these all ignore the reality of evil, because 
they regard it as a mere privatio boni and thereby dismiss it with a euphemism.” 376 
 
 
In this discussion Jung selects texts which serve his polemical purpose. There is some 
question in my mind whether he does justice to the complexity of Dionysius’ view of 
evil. This problem however is beyond the scope of this study. In any case, this is one of 
many instances in Jung’s work where there appears to be confusion and lack of clarity 
in his attempt to move between of the language of metaphysics and the language of 
psychology.  
 
Jung’s reading of Dionysius, as well as other Platonic and Neoplatonic texts, placed him 
close to the source of important currents of apophatic discourse. It is likely, however, 
that he was looking for material to bolster his own ideas rather than to study and 
appropriate the thoughts of these writers on their own terms.  
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Chapter Five 
The Opposites 
 
The theme of the relations between opposites is central to Jung’s thought. Looking back 
on his life he recalled reading Goethe when he was a teenager. “Faust struck a chord in 
me and pierced me through in a way that I could not but regard as personal. Most of all, 
it awakened in me the problem of opposites, of good and evil, of mind and matter, of 
light and darkness.”377 While initially he experienced this as a personal problem he 
came to see that it had wider resonances. “The fact, therefore, that a polarity underlies 
the dynamics of the psyche means that the whole problem of opposites in its broadest 
sense, with all its concomitant religious and philosophical aspects, is drawn into the 
psychological discussion.”378 As we shall see however this theme did not emerge 
explicitly in his work until well after his break with Freud. 
 
In his writings Jung discusses the union of opposites, the coincidence of opposites 
(coincidentia oppositorum), complexio oppositorum, conjunction of opposites 
(coniunctio oppositorum), the tension of opposites, compensation, complimentarity, 
enantriodromia and psychic balance. Jung is not systematic in his use of these terms. I 
will discuss in some detail his use of the following concepts: coincidence of opposites, 
complexio oppositorum, coniunctio oppositorum, and union of opposites.  
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Coincidence of opposites 
 
The coincidence of opposites (coincidentia oppositorum) is one of the fundamental 
organising principles in Jung’s thought. Key concepts such as the self, the god image, 
the collective unconscious, wholeness and synchronicity are instances of the 
coincidence of opposites. In 1931, in his first use of the term, Jung describes the 
practice of psychology as a kind of performance of the coincidence of opposites:379 
 
The modern psychologist occupies neither the one position nor the other, but 
finds himself between the two, dangerously committed to “this as well as that” – 
situation which seductively opens the way to a shallow opportunism. This is 
undoubtedly the great danger of the coincidentia oppositorum – of intellectual 
freedom from the opposites. How should anything but a formless and aimless 
uncertainty result from giving equal value to two contradictory hypotheses? In 
contrast to this we can readily appreciate the advantage of an explanatory 
principle that is unequivocal: it allows of a standpoint that can serve as a point 
of reference. We must be able to appeal to an explanatory principle founded on 
reality, and yet it is no longer possible for the modern psychologist to take his 
stand exclusively on the physical aspect of reality once he has given the spiritual 
aspect its due.380 
 
Here Jung is holding the physical and spiritual to be a coincidence of opposites and is 
arguing that a modern psychology must accommodate both. Pietkainen writes: 
 
Like Cassirer, Jung holds that the conditions of cultural evolution are 
determined by the “law” of coincidentia oppositorum, which he interprets as the 
dynamic equilibrium between conscious and the unconscious. The idea of this 
“dynamic equilibrium” was one of Jung’s most fundamental tenets. With good 
reason he could be called a psychologist of coincidentia oppositorum. He was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
379 The version of Symbols of Transformation published in the Collected Works (CW5) contains the 
following: “The self, as a symbol of wholeness, is a coincidentia oppositorum, and therefore contains 
light and darkness simultaneously.” (576) This might give the impression that Jung had begun to use the 
notion of the coincidence of opposites as early as 1912, the date when this text was first published in 
German. However the version of this work, translated by Hinkle and published in six printings between 
1916 and 1951, as Psychology of the Unconscious, does not contain this term. The revision, which 
appears in the Collected Works as Symbols of Transformation, was published in 1952. The paragraphs 
where this phrase was added are on pages 402-3 of the original 1916 translation and page 222 of the sixth 
printing in 1951. [Psychology of the Unconscious (1916), (Beatrice Hinkle, trans.), New York: Moffat, 
Yard and Company and (1951), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.] Consequently the argument that Jung 
acquired the concept from his reading Cusa in the 1920’s is not undermined. 
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well aware that this term was devised (or rather reawakened) by Cusanus, and in 
his psychology it is closely related to his energetic conception of the psyche as a 
self-regulating system.381 
 
 
As McCort observes, one “peculiarly modern, underground ‘hideout’ in the West for the 
coincidentia is the psychotherapist’s office… [Jung’s] entire vast enterprise is a tireless 
working-out of the idea of conjunctio, theoretically in his writings and practically in his 
efforts to guide his patients toward ‘individuation’.”382 Eliade links Heraclitus, 
Dionysius, Cusa and Jung, and states that, for Jung, “the coincidentia oppositorum [is] 
the ultimate aim of the whole psychic activity.”383  
 
Coincidence here refers to simultaneity, not to chance or randomness. Two phenomena 
coincide when they occupy the same space, be it logical, imaginative or material space. 
In popular usage this notion of coincidence is often missed: 
 
To call something a coincidence implies that it should not really happen and 
thus allows us to dismiss the coincidence as an unexpected, unusual anomaly 
that, according to probability, will not happen again. The history of the word in 
English, as chronicled in the Oxford English Dictionary, reveals that this 
dismissive meaning gradually creeps in, as the word is linked with “casual” and 
“undesigned.” The root meaning of the Latin word, which was used in the 
seventeenth century as a verb in English in its Latin form, “coincidere,” is 
simply “to occur together.”384 
 
Even as important a commentator on Jung as Bishop misconstrues the true nature of 
coincidence by settling for the most colloquial usage. He suggests that Jung was 
“misleading” when he defined synchronicity as meaningful coincidence. “This 
expression is somewhat misleading, for the whole point, as far as Jung was concerned, 
was that more than mere chance was involved.”385  
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Jung’s lifelong preoccupation with the coincidence of opposites is a preoccupation with 
trying to understand the simultaneous appearance of apparently incompatible 
phenomena, events or situations. We are reminded here of Sells’ description of 
apophatic discourse: 
Classical Western apophasis shares three key features: (1) the metaphor of 
overflowing or ‘emanation’ which is often in creative tension with the language 
of intentional, demiurgic creation; (2) dis-ontological discursive effort to avoid 
reifying the transcendent as an ‘entity’ or ‘being’ or ‘thing’; (3) a distinctive 
dialectic of transcendence and immanence in which the utterly transcendent is 
revealed as the utterly immanent.386 
 
Sells seems to be describing three instances of the coincidence of opposites: 
overflowing/intentional (emanation/creation), dis-ontological/reifying, and 
transcendence/immanence. 
 
This link between the coincidence of opposites and apophasis is strengthened by the fact 
that Jung cites Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) as his source for the term.387 Jung asserts 
that the often “tortuous language” associated with the discussion of the union of 
opposites “cannot be called abstruse since it has universal validity, from the tao of Lao-
tzu to the coincidentia oppositorum of Cusanus.”388 
 
Cusa is a major figure in the tradition of apophatic discourse in the West389 and 
Dionysius was an important influence on Cusa.390 Along with the infinite disproportion 
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between the finite and the infinite, and learned ignorance, the coincidence of opposites 
is one of the three central doctrines of Cusa’s thought.391 Ideas of the coincidence of 
opposites predate Cusa, but he is the first to develop the concept systematically and to 
make it a lynchpin of his philosophy and theology. For Cusa the coincidence of 
opposites is a methodology: 
 
At infinity thoroughgoing coincidence occurs… at true infinity there is one only 
and all are one. The coincidence of opposites provides a method that resolves 
contradictions without violating the integrity of the contrary elements and 
without diminishing the reality or the force of their contradiction. It is not a 
question of seeing unity where there is no real contrariety, nor is it a question of 
forcing harmony by synthesizing resistant parties. Coincidence as a method 
issues from coincidence as a fact or condition of opposition that is resolved in 
and by infinity.392 
 
Cusa used the idea of the coincidence of opposites to accomplish a range of tasks: 	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In every case by applying the logic of infinitude, coincidence, as Cusa intends it, 
accomplishes certain common tasks: (1) It unites opposites; (2) it transcends 
analogy and comparison; (3) it overcomes the limits of discursive reasoning; (4) 
it exceeds composition and synthesis; (5) it surpasses both affirmative and 
negative language; (6) it frees the mind from quantitative concepts and enables it 
to achieve a comparatively pure abstraction; and (7) whether operating from 
theology, philosophy, mathematics, or geometry, it renders infinite concepts 
understandable and describable without violating their incomprehensibility or 
illimitability.393 
 
Jung simultaneously appealed to Cusa’s thought and denigrated it. He described it as an 
expression of the influence of the collective unconscious on the development of ideas in 
the fourteenth century. He claims that Cusa’s coincidence of opposites is a staging post 
on the way to developing a more balanced God image. Under compensatory pressure 
from the collective unconscious the idea of the summum bonum was being undermined. 
According to Jung, Cusa did not, and could not, grasp the import of this aspect of his 
thought, because he did not have the necessary psychological concepts at his disposal. 
Jung writes, “It should not be forgotten, however, that the opposites which Nicholas had 
in mind were very different from the psychological ones.”394 In fact, Cusa’s use of the 
concept of coincidence of opposites was more complex than Jung appears to 
acknowledge. Cusa uses it not only as a theological tool but applies it to all aspects of 
reality, including to the natural world. 
 
Beyond the polemical strategy of playing off psychological language against 
metaphysical language and his tendency to sometimes pick up concepts and make use of 
them with minimal attention to how they were used by the author he is citing, the fact 
that Jung appears to have relied on two very early works by Cusa probably contributes 
to his narrow understanding of Cusa’s use of the coincidence of opposites. For the 
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purposes of this discussion I suggest that there are three distinct phases of Cusa’s 
thought about the coincidence of opposites. The first occurs in the two works cited by 
Jung, On Learned Ignorance (1440) and De coniectruis (1442). The second in On the 
Vision of God (1453) and the third in On the Summit of Contemplation (1464), 
completed shortly before Cusa’s death. Cusa’s understanding of the coincidence of 
opposites continued to develop after the versions that Jung cites.  
 
In On Learned Ignorance the coincidence of opposites is described as one type of union 
of opposites. It is a “unity in convergence, that is, a ‘falling together’… a unity 
geometrically conceived, but without quantity… It is a unity of substance without 
mingling and without obliteration of either party or substance.”395 Other types of union 
of opposites include instances where one opposite supersedes the other, where the two 
opposites are superseded by creation of a third, and where the elements of the opposites 
are mingled. The coincidence of opposites is beyond the reach of discursive reasoning. 
The coincidence of opposites is a “unity to which neither otherness nor plurality nor 
multiplicity is opposed.”396 
 
 
Moving beyond the discussion in On Learned Ignorance, in On the Vision of God 
“Cusa takes the notion of coincidence to its limits, beyond itself.”397 In On the Vision of 
God, which Jung does not cite, the term coincidence occurs forty-six times. It is “the 
device by which finite knowing and saying can grasp the incomprehensible and speak 
the ineffable… It is a fact or principle and therefore discoverable, but no merely 
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invented or contrived as we might use comparisons, metaphors, or analogies in ordinary 
language… it sets forth the way God works, the order of things in relation to God and to 
each other, and the manner by which humans may approach and abide in God.”398 The 
idea that coincidence is discoverable would chime with Jung’s assertion that his 
psychology is empirical. The fact that it applies to relations in nature as well as those 
between nature and God and beyond nature, contradicts Jung’s assertion that Cusa’s 
coincidence of opposites is a purely metaphysical idea.  
 
In On the Vision of God Cusa describes the coincidence of opposites as the wall of 
paradise, beyond which is God. “God is beyond the realm of contradictories… there 
exists an impenetrable barrier to human vision and reason… he intends that the reader 
understand not so much that God is the coincidence of opposites, but rather that 
opposites coincide in God… the notion of opposites coinciding requires a transcendent 
vision – seeing beyond particularity and sensibility, a seeing through and beyond the 
image or symbol, and an antecedent seeing, considering problems in their infinitely 
simple principle prior to contradiction.”399 
 
 
“To see coincidence is still not to see God. God, the object of human’s effort to see, 
however, acts on our seeing as subject so that the searcher and observer discovers 
oneself searched out, observed, measure, defined. This is one of the more interesting 
features of Cusa’s treatise – the human as figura, the theologian discovering oneself as 
symbol; the searcher after the meaning behind symbols becomes oneself a symbol”:400 
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Mystical theology makes special demands on the theologian, both affective and 
didactic. The ministry of such a theology requires a coincident method and an 
iconographic language, acknowledging the utter transcendence and mystery of 
god and communicating the paradoxical truth that God is known, and seen, as 
made known… The coincident method in service to mystical theology, therefore 
performs both an evocative and a descriptive function.401 
 
The idea that “the searcher after meaning behind symbols becomes oneself a symbol,” 
resonates with Jung’s observations at the end of Memories, Dreams, Reflections: 
 
When Lao-tzu says: “All are clear, I alone am clouded,” he is expressing what I 
now feel in advanced old age. Lao-tzu is the example of a man with superior 
insight who has seen and experienced worth and worthlessness, and who at the 
end of his life desires to return into his own being, into the eternal unknowable 
meaning. The archetype of the old man who has seen enough is eternally true. 
At every level of intelligence this type appears, and its lineaments are always the 
same, whether it be an old peasant or a great philosopher like Lao-tzu. This is 
old age, and a limitation. Yet there is so much that fills me: plants, animals, 
clouds, day and night, and the eternal in man. The more uncertain I have felt 
about myself, the more there has grown up in me a feeling of kinship with all 
things. In fact it seems to me as if that alienation which so long separated me 
from the world has become transferred into my own inner world, and has 
revealed to me an unexpected unfamiliarity with myself.402 
 
There are some parallels between Jung’s late reflections and Cusa’s last work, On the 
Summit of Contemplation, published in 1464. Earlier, in 1460 Cusa had used the term 
possest to name God. It is “a play on words, a coincidence of posse (‘can’) and est 
(‘is’), the Can, the Possibility that at the same time Is, the Can-Is, which only God can 
be.”403 In On the Summit of Contemplation Cusa calls God Posse Itself. According to 
Bond, Cusa is “superseding not only negation and affirmation but also the coincidence 
of opposites.”404 This echoes Dionysius schema of kataphasis, apophasis, ekstasis. 
Posse Itself is “that without which nothing whatsoever can be, or live, or understand… 
without posse nothing whatsoever can be or can have, can do or can undergo… if it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
401 Bond, 48-9 
402 MDR, p. 359 
403 Bond, p. 58 
404 Bond, p. 59 
	   89	  
were not presupposed, nothing whatever could be… In its power are necessarily 
contained those things that are as well as those that are not.”405 Seeing the Posse Itself 
involves neither comprehension nor cognition. Cusa “embraces the negation of knowing 
and at the same time the affirmation of sight.”406 The mind’s capacity to see Posse Itself 
lies in its own posse. In this sense the posse of the mind is the image of God, Posse 
Itself: 
This posse of the mind to see beyond all comprehensible faculty and power is 
the mind’s supreme posse. In it Posse Itself manifests itself maximally, and the 
mind’s supreme posse is not brought to its limit this side of Posse Itself. For the 
posse to see is directed only to Posse Itself so that the mind can foresee that 
toward which it tends, just as a traveller foresees one’s journey’s end so that one 
can direct one’s steps toward the desired goal… For Posse Itself, when it will 
appear in the glory of majesty, is alone able to satisfy the mind’s longing. For it 
is that what which is sought.407 
 
Jung and Cusa share a view that there is a bridge between the human and a greater 
reality. For Jung this bridge is the self and for Cusa it is the posse of the mind. 
 
When Herbert links Jung and Cusa, he quotes from On the Vision of God, which, as we 
have seen, Jung does not refer to in his own work and which, I would conjecture, Jung 
had not read: 
The psychologist C.G. Jung reinforces this linkage in his volume of the collected 
works entitled Alchemical Studies when he asserts that in the first so-called 
negredo stage of alchemical transformation associated with ‘the dark Mercury’, 
and the god himself plus the spirit he represents ‘is the uroborus, the One and 
All, the union of opposites accomplished during the alchemical process’. Jung’s 
statement here highlights not only the connection between the ouroboros and the 
Eins und Alles theme but also ‘the union of opposites’ each embodies, thereby 
establishing them as an illustration and a formulation respectively of the idea of 
universal complementarity enclosed within the unified wholeness of either a 
circle or a conceptual Oneness (Eins). In German terms this is highly expressive 
of Nikolaus Cusanus’s theory and goal of the coincidentia oppositorum (the 
concurrence of opposites) which culminate in an ultimate order that is God, who 	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‘is Himself the Absolute Ground, in which all otherness is unity, and all 
diversity is identity’ (De Visione Dei).408 
 
 
McCort has a restricted view of how the coincidence of opposites operates in Jung’s 
thought. He sees the coincidence of opposites as an aspect of the self archetype, as “an 
idea embodying man’s ineradicable yearning for ultimate reconciliation… that reveals 
to us the impossible, yet necessary, congruence of transcendence and immanence… the 
metamyth of the overcoming of difference.”409 He asks whether the coincidence of 
opposites is an archetype: 
 
Precisely put, the question would seem to be whether the coincidentia is 
equitable with Jung’s self archetype which, as it manifests in myths and certain 
dreams, is characterized by Jung as “the eidos behind the supreme ideas of unity 
and totality that are inherent in all monotheistic and monistic systems” [Aion 
34]. My answer to this is a reluctant yes, reluctant for the following reason. 
Strictly speaking, the coincidentia is prior to all manifestation, being rather the 
eternal, dynamic threshold of manifestation, while yet comprehending anything 
through manifestation as an archetypal image, however lofty or powerful, it of 
necessity takes on a certain kind of bipolarity, becoming, so to speak, one vis-à-
vis others (call it the one superior versus the many inferior archetypes) and thus 
is already less than the pleroma. I know Jung was well aware of this “paradox of 
manifestation”, yet on occasion he forgets himself and writes carelessly of the 
self as if it were a prima causa and thus merely the primus inter pares of a 
descending order of archetypal causes: “Wholeness is thus an objective factor 
that confronts the subject independently of him, like anima or animus; and just 
as the later have a higher position in the hierarchy [of archetypes] than the 
shadow, so wholeness lays claim to a position and a value superior to those of 
the syzygy… Unity and totality stand at the highest point on the scale of 
objective values.” [Aion 31]… My own sense is that the coincidentia, or what 
Jung calls the self, is not itself a cause, even a first cause, but rather the 
condition of all causation, as of all other principles of relative existence. It is 
beyond causation even while comprehending causation – indeed, how else could 
it be a true coincidentia oppositorum? Perhaps calling it a meta-archetype, 
ontologically beyond the order of archetypes yet remaining “close” to them, 
would help to keep this important distinction in mind. In the end, it is the Great 
Abyss, in whose proximity even poles of archetypal power yearn to lose 
themselves in one another.410 	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The coincidence of opposites as a limit or door to paradise, described in Cusa’s On the 
Vision of God, brings to mind Paper’s distinction between functional and non-functional 
ecstasies. 411 Functional ecstasies include, visions, lucid dreams, and problem-solving; 
dreams; shamanism; mediumism; and prophecy. Non-functional ecstasies include: 
unitive experiences; pure consciousness; and mystic experience. Jung uses coincidence 
of opposites in a functional way to describe a psychological, therapeutic process. Since 
Jung’s aim is to develop a psychology based on a teleological view of psychic 
phenomena it is not clear what place he allows for non-functional states. It is unclear 
whether or not Jung can accommodate “mystic experience”, in Paper’s sense, because it 
goes beyond psychology, much as God is beyond the coincidence of opposites in On the 
Vision of God. 
 
Jungs earliest reference to Cusa is in his paper of 1942, ‘A Psychological Approach to 
the Trinity.’ He writes, “Thus the spirit as a complexio oppositorum has the same 
formula as the ‘Father,’ the auctor rerum, who is also, according to Nicholas of Cusa, a 
union of opposites,” and adds a footnote: “It should not be forgotten, however, that the 
opposites which Nicholas had in mind were very different from the psychological 
ones.” 412 In 1951 in Aion he asserts that complexio oppositorum is “a definition of God 
in Nicholas of Cusa.”413  
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A major problem arises because Jung repeatedly attributes the term complexio 
oppositorum to Cusa, rather than coincidentia oppositorum. In seven places Jung links 
complexio oppositorum with Cusa and in three places he uses coincidentia oppositorum. 
It is not until 1946 in ‘The psychology of the transference’ that Jung links Cusa with the 
coincidentia oppositorum.414 Jung seems to treat the two terms as interchangeable. In 
fact complexio oppositorum does not appear in Cusa. Perhaps Jung has projected his 
own concept of the complex onto Cusa’s concept of coincidence. Beyond the clear 
factual error of misattribution, there is the conceptual error of confusing coincidentia 
and complexio.  
 
In ‘The psychology of the transference’ Jung references De docta ignorantia, without 
citing a particular edition,415 and a second quotation is presumably from the same 
source,416 though this is not clear. A third reference in the same paragraph is attributed 
to Heron’s 1954 English translation of Rotta’s 1923 edition of De docta ignorantia.417 
Koch’s 1936/7 edition of Cusa texts is cited in the bibliography of CW16, but does not 
appear in any footnotes. Jung’s text of De conjectures novissimorum temporum is from 
1565 and presumably in Latin.418 A further source, cited once in 1946, is 
Vansteenberghe’s 1920 work on Cusa.419 From this evidence I think that we can assume 
that Jung became familiar with Cusa after 1920, and most likely not until the 1930’s. In 
any case it is not until the 1940’s that Jung begins to use the coincidence of opposites to 
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describe the self and/or God. Most of his references to the coincidence of opposites 
occur in the 1950’s. 
 
Jung uses the term coincidence of opposites on a number of occasions without explicit 
reference to Cusa.420 The earliest of these is the one cited above in ‘Basic postulates of 
analytical psychology,’ published in 1931. The next occurrence of the term in the 
Collected Works is in a quotation from Rudolf Otto in 1939.421  
 
In 1943 in ‘The spirit Mercurius’, it seems to me that Jung is painting a picture of 
Mercurius as an apophatic symbol. Mercurius “consists of the most extreme 
opposites.”422 Jung argues that the alchemists understood hell to be “an internal 
component of the deity, which must indeed be so if God is held to be a coincidentia 
oppositorum. The concept of an all-encompassing God must necessarily include his 
opposite.” Jung cautions however, that “the coincidentia… must not be too radical or 
too extreme, otherwise God would cancel himself out. The principle of the coincidence 
of opposites must therefore be completed by that absolute opposition in order to attain 
full paradoxicality and hence psychological validity.”423 Full paradoxicality and 
psychological validity contribute to what Sells calls apophatic intensity. Jung’s 
statement however that “the principle of coincidence of opposites must therefore be 
completed by that absolute opposition in order to attain full paradoxicality and hence 
psychological validity,” demonstrates that he has not fully grasped Cusa’s notion of the 
coincidence of opposites, because in Cusa coincidence does not abolish absolute 
opposition. 	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In his discussion of a dream in Psychology and Alchemy (1944), Jung states that conflict 
is an essential aspect of the self. “The self is made manifes in the opposites and in the 
conflict between them; it is a coincidentia oppositorum. Hence the way to the self 
begins with conflict.”424 
 
In ‘The psychology of the transference’, published in 1946, Jung describes the 
alchemical procedure of mundificatio (purification) as “an attempt to discriminate the 
mixture, to sort out the coincidentia oppostitorum.”425 Here the coincidence of opposites 
is presented as a pathological situation in which the patient is stuck. After the 
mundificatio the relationship between conscious and unconscious is “depicted in the 
alchemists’ Rebis, the symbol of transcendental unity, as a coincidence of opposites.”426 
In a lengthy paragraph on wholeness at the end of this essay, in which he refers to Cusa 
three times, Jung writes: “The symbol of this is a coincidentia oppositorum which, as 
we know, Nicholas of Cusa identified with God.”427 As we have seen this is an 
oversimplification of Cusa’s view. 
 
In ‘A psychological approach to the trinity’ (1948), a revised and expanded version of a 
talk given at the Eranos Conference in 1942, Jung wonders “with what right Christ is 
presumed to be a symbol of the self, since the self is by definition a complexio 
oppositoum, whereas the Christ figure wholly lacks a dark side?”428 
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In 1951, in Aion, his exploration of the relationship between the image of God and the 
self, Jung asserts: “The coincidence of opposites is the normal thing in a primitive 
conception of God, since God not being an object of reflection, is simply taken for 
granted. At the level of conscious reflection, however, the coincidence of opposites 
becomes a major problem, which we do everything possible to circumvent.”429 To the 
conscious mind the paradoxical nature of the God-image, containing good and evil, can 
be shocking. Further on in a discussion of agnousia Jung observes that for Eckhart the 
Godhead “represents an absolute coincidence of opposites,” which from the stand point 
of human logic “is equivalent to unconsciousness.”430  
 
Mysterium Coniunctionis: An inquiry into the separation and synthesis of psychic 
opposites in alchemy, published in 1955, contains seven references to the coincidence of 
opposites. Early in the text he has a footnote explaining his concept of the self. “The 
concept of the self is essentially intuitive and embraces ego-consciousness, shadow, 
anima, and collective unconscious in indeterminable extension. As a totality, the self is 
a coincidentia oppositorum; it is therefore bright and dark and neither.”431 This 
description of the self as “bright and dark and neither,” echoes Dionysius’ schema of 
kataphatic, apophatic and ecstatic. 
 
One of the many alchemical images Jung comments on is the dog. “The ambiguity of 
this figure is thus stressed: it is at once bright as day and dark as night, a perfect 
coincidentia oppositorum expressing the divine nature of the self.”432  
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The motif of the crossing of the Red Sea is also in image of the coincidence of 
opposites for the Peratic group of gnostics. The creative and destructive powers of the 
unconscious are contained within this image. “This coincidentia oppositorum forms a 
parallel to the Messianic state of fulfilment described in Isaiah… though with one 
important difference: the place of ‘genesis outside of generation’ – presumably an opus 
contra naturam – is clearly not paradise but he eremos, the desert and the wilderness. 
Everyone who becomes conscious of even a fraction of his unconscious gets outside his 
own time and social stratum into a kind of solitude.”433 In other gnostic source the 
crossing of the Red Sea involves “running without running, moving without motion” 
which Jung characterizes as a coincidence of opposites.434 
 
The theme of transformation continues in Jung’s discussion of the alchemical symbol of 
the marriage of the king and queen. “The coronation, apotheosis, and marriage signalize 
the equal status of conscious and unconscious that becomes possible at the highest level 
– a coincidentia oppositorum with redeeming effects.”435 
 
The last reference to the coincidence of opposites in the Collected Works is in the 1958 
essay, ‘Flying saucers: a modern myth.’ Jung observes about the action in a dream he is 
discussing: “This shows that it is a sequence and not a coincidentia oppositorum.” 
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Complexio oppositorum 
 
We have seen that in several places Jung uses the term complexio oppositorum in a way 
that would give the impression that he was quoting Cusa. There are in addition a 
number of occasions when he makes use of the term without reference to Cusa. He uses 
this term almost exclusively from 1950 onwards. The only times the term appears 
before 1950 are in ‘The spirit Mercurius’ (1943), in Psychology and Alchemy (1944), in 
‘On the nature of the psyche’ (1947) and in ‘A psychological approach to the trinity’ 
(1948). “The paradoxical nature of Mercurius reflects an important aspect of the self – 
the fact, namely, that it is essentially a complexio oppositorum, and indeed can be 
nothing else if it is to represent any kind of totality.”436 The unicorn is a common 
symbol in alchemy. “Originally a monstrous and fabulous beast, it harbours in itself an 
inner contradiction, a complexio oppositorum, which makes it a singularly appropriate 
symbol for the monstrum hermaphroditum of alchemy.”437 In discussing the “chaotic 
assortment of images” that appear in fantasies, he observes that: “Triadic formations, 
apart from the complexio oppositorum in a third, were relatively rare and formed 
notable exceptions.”438 
 
In ‘A psychological approach to the trinity’ Jung makes a statement that might be 
characterised as a type of apophatic anthropology. “The unconscious is trying to express 
certain facts for which there are no conceptual categories in the conscious mind. The 
contents in question need not be ‘metaphysical,’ as in the case of the Holy Ghost. Any 
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content that transcends consciousness, and for which the apperceptive apparatus does 
not exist, can call forth the same kind of paradoxical or antinomial symbolism.”439 He 
asserts that “the Holy Spirit is a complexio oppositorum” and supplies a flavour of the 
qualities that the complexio oppositorum symbolises: 
But the spontaneous symbolism of the complexio oppositorum points to the 
exact opposite of annihilation, since it ascribes to the product of their union 
either everlasting duration, that is to say incorruptibility and adamantine 
stability, or supreme and inexhaustible efficacy.440  
 
In the next paragraph he refers to Cusa in the citation noted above (p. 91).  
 
In 1950 in ‘A study in the process of individuation’ Jung gives us what we might take to 
be his clearest definition of the complexio oppositorum: 
 
The ancient formula lithos ou lithos (the stone that is no stone) expresses this 
dilemma: we are dealing with a complexio oppositorum, with something like the 
nature of light, which under some conditions behaves like particles and under 
others like waves, and is obviously in its essence both at once. Something of this 
kind must be conjectured with regard to these paradoxical and hardly explicable 
statements of the unconscious. They are not inventions of a conscious mind, but 
are spontaneous manifestations of a psyche not controlled by consciousness and 
obviously possessing all the freedom it wants to express views that take no 
account of our conscious intentions… One can only conclude that the 
unconscious tends to regard spirit and matter not merely as equivalent but as 
actually identical, and this in flagrant contrast to the intellectual one-sidedness 
of consciousness, which would sometimes like to spiritualize matter and at other 
times to materialize spirit… This duality reminds one of the alchemical duality 
corpus and spiritus, joined together by a third, the anima as the ligamentum 
corpus spiritus.441 
 
In the same year, in ‘Concerning rebirth’ he describes the legend of Khidr. At the end of 
the narrative “the opposites are separated and a timeless state of permanence sets in.” 
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This view of eschatology is “in contrast to the view that sees the end as a complexio 
oppositorum.”442 
 
In Aion, published in 1951, in a discussion of the privatio boni Jung reiterates his 
opposition to metaphysics. “Since psychology is not metaphysics, no metaphysical 
dualism can be derived from, or imputed to, its statements concerning the equivalence 
of opposites.” In a footnote to this sentence he refutes Victor Whites assertion that Jung 
has “a Manichaean streak” and asserts the “my critic should know how very much I 
stress the unity of the self, this central archetype which is a complexio oppositorum par 
excellence, and that my leanings are therefore toward the very reverse of dualism.”443 In 
the conclusion he argues deductively that we can know that “the self is a complexio 
oppositorum precisely because there can be no reality without polarity.”444  
 
In Aion Jung develops the idea that the fish is an image of the self. “Silver and gold, in 
alchemical language, signify feminine and masculine, and the hermaphrodite aspect of 
the fish, indicating that it is a complexio oppositorum.”445 The self is an archetype and 
“all archetypes spontaneously develop favourable and unfavourable, light and dark, 
good and bad effects.” Therefore, “in the end we have to acknowledge that the self is a 
complexio oppositorum precisely because there can be no reality without polarity.”446  
 
In the Prefatory Note to Answer to Job (1952) Jung explains how he came to focus on 
Job:  
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Moreover, the study of medieval natural philosophy – of the greatest importance 
to psychology – made me try to find an answer to the question: what image of 
God did these philosophers have? Or rather: how should the symbols which 
supplement their image of God be understood? All this pointed to a complexio 
oppositorum and thus recalled again the story of Job to my mind: Job who 
expected help from God against God. This most peculiar face presupposes a 
similar conception of the opposites in God.447 
 
In Revelations at the opening of the seventh seal the sun-woman gives birth to a son, “a 
complexio oppositorum, a uniting symbol, a totality of life.”448 Further along in the same 
text Jung observes, “As a totality, the self is by definition always a complexio 
oppositorum, and the more consciousness insists on its own luminous nature and lays 
claim to moral authority, the more the self will appear as something dark and 
menacing.”449 Answer to Job is an extended meditation on light and dark, good and evil 
in the god-image. 
 
In 1954 in a discussion about dogma in letter to Pere Lachat, Jung writes that he prefers 
to maintain the independence of the Holy Spirit. “the Holy Spirit is one, a complexio 
oppositorum, in contrast to YHWH after the separation of the divine opposites 
symbolized by God’s two sons, Christ and Satan.”450 A year later in Mysterium 
coniunctionis he rehearses the arguments of Koepgen, in Die Gnosis des Christentums, 
that because Christ and the church are by nature androgynous there is no need for “the 
marriage of the Lamb at the end of time, for the androgyne ‘has everything it needs’ and 
is already a complexio oppositorum.”451  
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‘Jung and Religious Belief’ consists of extracts from Jung and the Problem of Evil, 
H.L. Philp’s 1958 volume of correspondence between himself and Jung. It also includes 
correspondence with David Cox, the author of Jung and St. Paul. In respose to a 
question from Philp about his concept of the quaternity Jung argues that the quaternity 
is a “natural and spontaneous symbol” while the trinity is an abstraction. He states that 
the Star of David is a complexio oppositorum which contains triangles within a 
quaternity.452 
 
In ‘Two essays on analytical psychology’ Jung had stated, in effect, “that Western 
culture has no name or concept for the ‘union of opposites by the middle path’ which 
could be compared to the concept of Tao.”453 Cox wanted to know whether the doctrine 
of justification by faith might be such a concept. Jung’s response is that “if you 
understand Christ by definition as a complexio oppositorum, the equation is solved. But 
you are confronted with a terrific historical counter-position.”454 The counter-position is 
that Christ is identified exclusively with light and the good and that darkness and evil 
are contained in the devil. 
 
A further question concerns Jung’s objections to the doctrines of the summum bonum 
and privatio boni. Jung dismisses the identification of the good with being and evil with 
not-being. He also implies that the concept of the Good beyond being and nonbeing has 
no psychological meaning. If God is “a complexio oppositorum, i.e. beyond good and 
evil, it is possible that he may appear equally well as the source of evil which you 
believe to be ultimately good for man.”455 Notions of good and evil can only have 	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meaning as a pair of opposites in relation to human experience. Metaphysical concepts 
of the Good are meaningless from the point of view of psychology. In a lengthy replay 
to a letter from Cox, Jung reiterates his view that his own descriptions of Christ and 
God as instances of complexio oppositorum is at odds with traditional Christian 
understanding.456 
 
Again in 1958, in ‘Flying saucers: a modern myth’ Jung draws on alchemical material 
to interpret a painting by Jakoby, The Fire Sower.457 The painting is said to depict “two 
worlds which interpenetrate yet do not touch.” While this is difficult for the modern 
viewer of the painting to comprehend, the alchemists’ concept Mercurius would have 
enabled them to reflect on the image: 
Their Mercurius is hermaphroditus and duplex, a complexio oppositorum, the 
messenger of the gods, the One and the All… He is the panacea itself and the 
elixir of life, but on the other hand he is a deadly danger for the ignorant. For the 
educated person of those days, who studied the philosophy of alchemy as part of 
his general equipment – it was a real religio medici – this figure of the Fire 
Sower would have been full of allusions, and he would have had no difficulty in 
assimilating it to his stock of knowledge.458 
 
In 1960 a definition of the ‘self’ was added to the list of definitions at the end of 
Psychological Types. The original version of the text published in 1920 had included a 
definition of the ‘ego.’ In the new definition Jung wrote that when the image of the self 
“represents a complexio oppositorum, a union of opposites, it can also appear as a 
united duality, in the form, for instance of tao as the interplay of yang and yin…”459 
 
Beyond the Collected Works there are a number of occasions when the term appears in 
Memories, Dreams, Reflections.  They all refer to God as a complexio oppositorum. 	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Through the Holy Spirit, “the complexio oppositorum of the God-image thus enters into 
man, and not as unity, but as conflict.”460 The dark side of God is in conflict with the 
idea that God is light. This places a considerable stress on the individual. In Freud’s 
terms the drive places a demand on the mind for work. 
Room must be made within the system for the philosophical complexio 
oppositorum of Nicholas of Cusa and the moral ambivalence of Jacob Boehme; 
only thus can the One God be granted the wholeness and synthesis of opposites 
which should be His.461 
 
If this conflict, which thrusts itself upon human nature, and in a sense constitutes human 
nature, can be accommodated life is enriched. “The Word happens to us; we suffer it, 
for we are victims of a profound uncertainty: with God as a complexio oppositorum, all 
things are possible, in the fullest meaning of the phrase.”462 There is a limit to the 
capacity of language to encompass or illuminate religious experience. “Whatever the 
learned interpretation may be of the sentence ‘God is love,’ the words affirm the 
complexio oppositorum of the Godhead.”463 As we have seen the concept of the 
complexio oppositorum was used by Jung primarily with reference to God. 
 
Coniunctio oppositorum 
 
The term coniunctio oppositorum (conjunction of opposites) appears in the Collected 
Works exclusively after 1950, except for once in 1944 in Psychology and Alchemy, 
where incest is described as a coniunctio oppositorum464 and there are two illustrations 
that depict the coniunctio.465  	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Aion, published in 1951, has the most references to the term. The coniunctio 
oppositorum is described as necessary for the achievement of wholeness: 
 
Therefore, anyone who wants to achieve the difficult feat of realizing something 
not only intellectually, but also according to its feeling-value, must for better or 
worse come to grips with the anima/animus problem in order to open the way 
for a higher union, a coniunctio oppositorum. This is an indispensable 
prerequisite for wholeness.466 
 
The doctrine of the marriage of Christ and the church is an important image of the union 
of opposites. In alchemical and cabalist texts of the middle ages “the symbolism 
developed… into the alchemical conjuction of opposites, or ‘chymical wedding,’ thus 
giving rise on the one hand to the concept of the lapis philosophorum, signifying 
totality, and on the other hand to the concept of chemical combination.”467 
 
Numinous images of the self appear spontaneously across cultures. These images are 
necessarily paradoxical because of the limits of consciousness: 
 
These naïve and completely uninfluenced pictorial representations of the symbol 
show that it is given central and supreme importance precisely because it stands 
for the conjunction of opposites. Naturally the conjunction can only be 
understood as a paradox, since a union of opposites can be thought of only as 
their annihilation. Paradox is a characteristic of all transcendental situations 
because it alone gives adequate expression to their indescribable nature.468  
 
Jung describes the view within medieval astrology that Judaism, Christianity, Islam and 
the Antichrist are all products of a variety of conjunctions of Jupiter (life) and Saturn 
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(death). “The conjunction of the two therefore signifies the union of extreme 
opposites.”469  
 
Jung discusses the crucial role that self-knowledge plays in the development of the self. 
The alchemist Morienus writes, “This thing is extracted from thee, for thou art its ore; 
in thee they find it, and to speak more plainly, from thee they take it; and when thou has 
experienced this, the love and desire for it will be increase in thee.”470 The alchemical 
lapis which emerges in this process is an image of the self. “The transformation is 
brought about by the coniunctio, which forms the essence of the work.”471  
 
In ‘Answer to Job’ (1952) Jung states that, “As a totality, the self is by definition always 
a complexio oppositorum.”472 The conflicts within the self are compounded by contact 
with God. “The paradoxical nature of God has a like effect on man: it tears him asunder 
into opposites and delivers him over to seemingly insoluble conflict.”473 Consequently, 
“the real subject of Hermetic philosophy is the coniunction oppositorum”474 and in the 
apocalyptic vision of John there is an attempt to resolve this conflict through “a divine 
birth which was characterized by a coniunction oppositorum and which anticipated the 
filius sapientiae, the essence of the individuation process.”475 
 
In ‘Flying saucers: a modern myth’ (1958) Jung describes the squaring of the circle as 
“another coniunctio oppositorum.”476 Orfeo Angelucci left a record of his experiences 
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while in a lengthy somnambulant state which included “a noce celeste… a mystic union 
analogous to the coniunctio oppositorum in alchemy.”477  
 
In ‘Jung and religious belief’ (1958) Jung points again to the idea that coniunctio 
oppositorum is an attempt to resolve internal conflict: 
 
The “Will of God” often contradicts conscious principles however good they 
may seem. Penitence or remorse follows the deviation from the superior will. 
The result is – if not a chronic conflict – a coniunctio oppositorum in the form of 
the symbol (symbolum = two halves of a broken coin), the expression of 
totality.478 
 
In Memories, Dreams, Reflections he comments that the image of Aquarius, a figure 
with personal and collective meaning, “is a coniunctio oppositorum composed of two 
fishes in reverse,”479 and he returns to the theme of the self and the god-image: 
The unavoidable internal contradictions in the image of a Creator-god can be 
reconciled in the unity and wholeness of the self as the coniunctio oppositorum 
of the alchemists or as a unio mystica. In the experience of the self it is no longer 
the opposites “God” and “man” that are reconciled, as it was before, but rather 
the opposites within the God-image itself.480 
 
He is here expressing his view that the conflicts within the god-image, and other 
collective images, should not be placed as burdens on individuals. As we have seen 
Jung’s use of the term encompasses primitive or unconscious states, such as incest, and 
differentiated, highly conscious, processes of individuation.  
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Union of opposites 
 
Jung began to make use of the concept of the union of opposites in Psychological Types 
(CW6) published in 1921. References to the union of opposites in Symbols of 
Transformation (CW5) were not included in that text until its revision in 1952. The 
earlier translation of Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido (1912) by Hinkle published 
in 1916 as Psychology of the Unconscious speaks of a relationship between opposites 
but does not go so far as to single out the union of opposites as a crucial feature of 
psychic processes. In CW5 Jung writes: 
Thus the Mother of Death joins the Mother of Life in lamenting the dying god, 
and, as an outward token of their union, Mary kisses the cross and is reconciled. 
In ancient Egypt this union of opposite tendencies was naively preserved in the 
Isis mother-imago.481 
 
In Hinkle the corresponding passage reads: 
In their lament for the dying god, and as outward token of their union, Mary 
kisses the cross, and is reconciled to it. The naïve Egyptian antiquity has 
preserved for us the union of the contrasting tendencies in the mother idea of 
Isis.482 
 
“Union of contrasting tendencies” has become “union of opposites.” This intensification 
of the relationship of the opposites emerges further in Jung’s description of Christ as 
hero. In 1952 he wrote: 
In the Christ-figure the opposites which are united in the archetype are polarized 
into the “light” son of God on the one hand and the devil on the other. The 
original unity of opposites is still discernible in the original unity of Satan and 
Yahweh. Christ and the dragon of the Anti-Christ lie very close together so far 
as their historical development and cosmic significance are concerned. The 
dragon legend concealed under the myth of the Anti-Christ is an essential part of 
the hero’s life and is therefore immortal. Nowhere in the latter-day myths are the 
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paired opposites so palpably close together as in the figures of Christ and Anti-
Christ.483 
 
In the earlier text he wrote: 
Christ and the dragon of the Antichrist are in the closest contact in the history of 
their appearance and their cosmic meaning… The legend of the dragon 
concealed in the Antichrist myth belongs to the life of the hero, and, therefore, if 
immortal. In none of the newer forms of the myth are the pairs of opposites so 
perceptibly near as in that of Christ and Antichrist.484 
 
By the time of the revision, the role of the archetype had become central to Jung’s 
thought and the dynamic of unity and polarization of opposites has achieved the power 
to explain historical processes.  
 
In his description of the Roman Trivia, which was dedicated to Hecate, Jung’s earlier 
text reads, “And where roads branch off or unite sacrifices of dogs were brought her; 
there the bodies of the executed were thrown; the sacrifice occurs at the point of 
crossing.”485 By 1952 this had become: 
Where the roads branch off or meet, dog-sacrifices were offered to her, and there 
too were thrown the bodies of the executed: the sacrifice occurs at the point of 
union. Where the roads cross and enter into one another, thereby symbolizing 
the union of opposites, there is the “mother,” the object and epitome of all 
union.486 
 
By using the concept of the union of opposites Jung has opened up the meaning of the 
earlier image, “point of crossing.” Finally, in 1952, discussing the Mithraic krater, he 
wrote: 
The combination of the bull’s blood and the snake therefore looks like a union 
of opposites, and the lion and snake fighting for the krater may mean the same 
thing. This is probably the cause of the miraculous fertility that results from the 
sacrifice of the bull… In the act of sacrifice the consciousness gives up its power 
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and possessions in the interests of the unconscious. This makes possible a union 
of opposites resulting in a release of energy.487 
 
In the earlier text he noted “the mutual relationship between serpent and bull,” and 
observed that, “the sacrifice of the bull to the serpent, therefore, signifies a willing 
renunciation of life, in order to win it from death, Therefore, after the sacrifice of the 
bull, wonderful fertility results.”488 The fertility, which is a result of sacrifice, becomes 
in the later version a “release of energy” characteristic of the union of opposites. We 
can see here how by 1952 the union of opposites came to have a central place in Jung’s 
psychology, which is only hinted in his writing in 1912. 
 
Returning to Psychological Types (CW6) we see how the union of opposites begins to 
appear as an organizing principle in Jung’s work. An important aspect of the concept is 
its capacity to contain or point to psychic processes with are beyond reason. “Opposites 
are not to be united rationally: tertium non datur – that is precisely why they are called 
opposites… In practice, opposites can be united only in the form of compromises, or 
irrationally… Such an expression cannot be contrived by reason, it can only be created 
through living.”489 The conscious will cannot supply convincing symbols, but relies on 
“creative fantasy, an irrational, instinctive function which alone has the power to supply 
the will with a content of such a nature that it can unite the opposites.”490 
 
In Indian philosophy the aim is “to free the individual altogether from the opposites 
inherent in human nature… It is an irrational union of opposites, their final 
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overcoming.”491 “Brahman is the union and dissolution of all opposites, and at the same 
time stands outside them as an irrational factor. It is therefore wholly beyond cognition 
and comprehension.”492 
 
Jung compares the concept of tao with Bergson’s duree creatrice: 
Knowledge of tao therefore has the same redeeming and uplifting effect as the 
knowledge of Brahman. Man becomes one with tao, with the unending duree 
creatrice (if we may compare this concept of Bergson’s with its older congener), 
for tao is also the stream of time, It is irrational, inconceivably It is obviously an 
irrational union of opposites, a symbol of what is and is not.493 
 
There is a length discussion of Schiller’s thoughts about opposites. For Schiller the 
union of opposites is an active achievement. “Thus it is not to be a detachment or 
redemption of the inferior function, but an acknowledgement of it, a coming to terms 
with it, that unites the opposites on the path of nature.”494 “The mediating position 
between the opposites can be reached only by the symbol.”495  
 
Jung writes that Synesius “assigns to the spiritus phantasticus practically the same 
psychological role as Schiller to the play instinct and I to creative fantasy… It unites the 
opposites in itself.”496 
 
In 1928 Jung describes how the analyst, in the transference, “becomes both father and a 
kind of lover – in other words, an object of conflict. In him the opposites are united, and 
for this reason he stands for a quasi-ideal solution of the conflict.”497  Another aspect of 
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analysis is the “godlikeness” that can result when “two spheres have been brought 
together which before were kept anxiously apart. After considerable resistances have 
been overcome, the union of opposites is successfully achieved, at least to all 
appearances.”498 The new insight inflates the ego. In his discussion of the mana 
personality he describes what happens when the ego relinquishes its claim to power 
(mana): 
 
In this situation the mana must have fallen to something that is both conscious 
and unconscious, or else neither. This something is the desired “mid-point” of 
the personality, that ineffable something betwixt the opposites, or else that 
which unites them, or the result of conflict, or the product of energetic tension: 
the coming to birth of personality, a profoundly individual step forward, the next 
stage.499 
 
The relationship between the ego and the unconscious consists of a kaleidoscope of 
relations between different sets of opposites. 
 
In the Tavistock Lectures of 1935, Jung asserts that in Wagner’s Parsifal the bowl and 
the dagger represent “the male and female principle which form the union of opposites.” 
In the unconscious the opposites are “utterly indistinguishable…  a complete union of 
opposites… is the primordial condition of things, and at the same time a most ideal 
achievement, because it is the union of elements eternally opposed.”500 The union of 
opposites is an archetypal image. Jung compares the Mitraic god, Aion, who “represents 
the union of opposites,” with the duree creatrice of Bergson.501 
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In the Terry Lectures, published in 1938, Jung argues that “the unconscious produces a 
natural symbol, technically a mandala, which has the functional significance of a union 
of opposites.”502 He cites the image of Shiva in Shakti’s embrace as an example “of the 
male-female opposites united in the centre.”503 The following year in a discussion of 
individuation he states that, “Out of this union emerge new situations and new 
conscious attitudes. I have therefore called the union of opposites the ‘transcendent 
function.’”504 
 
In his 1940 essay on the child archetype, Jung describes the abandoned child as the 
image of “a certain psychic experience of a creative nature, whose object is the 
emergence of a new and as yet unknown content.” Consciousness is only aware of 
irreconcilable opposites, but “out of this collision of opposites the unconscious psyche 
always creates a third thing of an irrational nature, which the conscious mind neither 
expects nor understands.”505 The child is the union of opposites, emerging from the 
unconscious to resolve the clash of opposites in consciousness. The bisexuality or 
hermaphroditism of the child expresses the fact that it is “a union of the strongest and 
most striking opposites.”506 It is a “primordial image… instrumental in uniting 
opposites, even in pathological states.”507 
 
From 1942 Jung began to refer increasingly in his writings to alchemy, which “is 
concerned with the union of opposites.”508 In 1944 he published Psychology and 
Alchemy in which he described alchemy as “a longissima via, not straight but snakelike, 	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a path that unites the opposites.”509 The self is a more complete union of opposites than 
the Christ-symbol since it “represents in every respect thesis and antithesis, and at the 
same time synthesis.”510 Experience of the problem of the opposites is essential to 
gaining a true understanding of religion and the deepest conflict between opposites and 
the most paradoxical union of opposites is found in “the antinomial character of the self, 
which is itself both conflict and unity.”511 For Jung this is more satisfactory than 
“Christian symbolism, which leaves the conflict open.”512 While consciousness is a 
result of the discrimination of opposites, in the unconscious “the opposites seek one 
another… particularly in the archetype of unity, the self. Here as in the deity the 
opposites cancel out.”513 “The self begins with conflict,”514 because it is made manifest 
in the conflict of opposites. 
 
In discussing the image of the world clock in a 16th century alchemical text Jung states 
that “our mandala aspires to the most complete union of opposites that is possible.”515 In 
the alchemical process sometimes an initial differentiation of the opposites is necessary 
as “the separated condition is assumed at the start.” “Then a union of opposites is 
performed under the likeness of a union of male and female (called the coniugium, 
matrimoniu, coniunctio, coitus).”516 The figure of Mercurius is “ symbol uniting all 
opposites” in as much as he “is metallic yet liquid, matter yet spirit, cold yet fiery, 
poison and yet healing draught.”517 The “antithetical nature” of the elements at the 
beginning of the alchemical process is “an almost universal idea.” Jung brings as 	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evidence for this the fact that “in China the opposites are yang and yin, odd and even 
numbers, heaven and earth, etc.; there is also a union of them in the hermaphrodite.”518 
According to the alchemist Melchior Cibinensis, the offertory in the mass is equivalent 
to “the union of opposites – mind and body.”519  
 
According to Jung, “owing to the impersonal, purely objective nature of matter, it was 
the impersonal, collective archetypes that were projected”520 by the alchemist during 
their performance of alchemical procedures. These projections, because they contained 
images of the union of opposites had the power to fascinate: 
 
Since the psychological condition of any unconscious content is one of potential 
reality, characterized by the polar opposites of “being” and “not-being,” it 
follows that the union of opposites must play a decisive role in the alchemical 
process. The result is something in the nature of a “uniting symbol,” and this 
usually has a numinous character.521 
 
The theme of the union of opposites is taken up again in ‘The Psychology of the 
Transference,’ published in 1946. In this essay Jung uses alchemical imagery to reflect 
on the dynamics of the transference. The alchemical concept of the coniunctio 
“expresses the archetype of the union of opposites”522 and in his view accounts for the 
potency of the transference. One of his patients dreams about Noah’s dove and Jung 
identifies this as “the first, anticipatory stage of an as-yet-unfulfilled programme that 
culminates in the union of opposites. This union is analogous to the ‘royal mariage’ in 
alchemy.”523 In his detailed commentary on illustrations in the Rosarium 
Philosophorum, an alchemical text from the 16th century, Jung describes the “coniunctio 	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Solis et Lunae as [a] supreme union of hostile opposites.”524 The union of opposites is 
not just an intrapsychic experience: 
 
Thus the underlying idea of the psyche proves it to be a half bodily, half spiritual 
substance… an hermaphroditic being capable of uniting the opposites, but who 
is never complete in the individual unless related to another individual. The 
unrelated individual being lacks wholeness, for he can achieve wholeness only 
through the soul, and the soul cannot exist without its other side, which is 
always found in a “You.” Wholeness is a combination of I and You, and these 
show themselves to be parts of a transcendent unity whose nature can only be 
grasped symbolically.525 
 
 
Images of the alchemical procedure of coniunctio in the Rosarium, which depict a 
couple engaged in sexual intercourse, provide a means of transforming instinctive 
energy into symbolic activity. “The union of opposites in the royal art [alchemy] is just 
as real as coitus in the common acceptation of the word.”526 In the stage of putrifactio, 
“after the coniuction oppositorum, deathlike stillness reigns. When the opposites unite, 
all energy ceases: there is no more flow.”527 This death of the ego allows for birth of the 
self, which “is ego and non-ego, subjective and objective, individual and collective. It is 
the ‘uniting symbol’ which epitomizes the total union of opposites.”528 When “the union 
of opposites reaches the nadir a change sets in… the ever deeper descent into the 
unconscious suddenly becomes illumination from above.” The union of opposites 
brings light out of darkness and “by this light it will be possible to see what the real 
meaning of that union was.” 529 An important dimension of the meaning of these images 
and experiences only became available when Freud brought a psychological perspective 
to bear on the sexual instinct. “The problem of the union of opposites had been lying 	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there for centuries in its sexual form, yet it had to wait until scientific enlightenment and 
objectivity had advanced far enough for people to mention ‘sexuality’ in scientific 
conversation.”530 Because it became possible to interpret the sexual element in 
alchemical images, “we give ourselves a chance to see that the alluring sexual aspect is 
but one among many – the very one that deludes our judgement.”531 At the end of the 
essay Jung reiterates that these images “point to the self, the container and organizer of 
all opposites,”532 and, in the phrase that we cited earlier, he states that whereas the 
alchemists were “the empiricists of the great problem of the opposites,” Cusa was “its 
philosopher.”533 
 
Over the next three years Jung made scattered references to the union of opposites. In 
‘On the nature of the psyche,’ he observed that “archetype and instinct are the most 
polar opposites imaginable,” yet “they do show a constant propensity to union.”534 In a 
discussion of pre-Christian concepts of the trinity he observes that, “Plato begins by 
representing the union of opposites two-dimensionally, as an intellectual problem to be 
solved by thinking, but then comes to see that its solution does not add up to reality.”535 
The Platonic triad differs from the Christian Trinity because it “is built on opposition, 
whereas the Trinity contains no opposition of any kind.”536 In both cases however Jung 
looks to alchemy to provide the concept of quaternity which he believes is an image of 
wholeness. The uroboros is an image of “the union of opposites accomplished during 
the alchemical process.”537 In a painting by one of his patients Jung sees “ a union of 
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opposites within the irrational life process”538 which reminds him of the I Ching.  
Commenting on a mandala painting by another patient Jung felt that it expressed “the 
painful experience of the union of opposites.”539 
 
In ‘The psychology of the child archetype,’ published in 1951 Jung writes that the child 
“unites the opposites”540 and anticipates the future. The bisexuality of the child 
expressed in images of the hermaphrodite is “a symbol of the creative union of 
opposites, a ‘uniting symbol’ in a literal sense.” The energetic influence of archetypal 
ideas “unites opposites, mediates between the unconscious substratum and the 
conscious mind.”541  
 
In the same year Jung published Aion, his study of the phenomenology of the self. His 
contention is that in the West Christ represents the self. With the development of 
modern psychology the understanding of the Christ image has changed as its one-
sidedness has become clear. It is simultaneously “the apotheosis of individuality” and “a 
transcendent concept.” As such “it can only be described in antinomial terms.”542 It 
bears the apophatic intensity described by Sells. 
 
The phenomenology of the self has been projected into astrology and alchemy. The 
conjunction of Jupiter and Saturn in Iranian astrology “signifies the union of extreme 
opposites.”543 He conjectures that the coming age of Aquarius “will constellate the 
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problem of the union of opposites.”544 The alchemical lapis expresses the self. “The 
union of opposites in the stone is possible only when the adept has become One himself. 
The unity of the stone is the equivalent of individuation, by which man is made one; we 
would say that the stone is a projection of the unified self.”545 
 
One of the characteristics of the “supraordinate ‘third’,” or symbol, in which the 
opposites are united is that it can reconcile “their conceptual polarity through its form 
and their emotional polarity through its numinosity.”546 In psychotherapy it is crucial to 
give due attention to both the conceptual and the emotional elements in the client’s 
personality, while being open to further development. “Similarly, modern 
psychotherapy knows that, though there are many interim solutions, there is, at the 
bottom of every neurosis, a moral problem of opposites that cannot be solved rationally, 
and can be answered only by a suprordinate third, by a symbol which expresses both 
sides.”547 
 
Jung’s discussion of Eckhart’s idea of the godhead includes a psychological 
interpretation of unknowing. Jung equates unknowing with unconsciousness. He argues 
that consciousness is the product of difference and that difference does not exist in the 
coincidence of opposites. “Union of opposites is equivalent to unconsciousness, so far 
as human logic goes, for consciousness presupposes a differentiation into subject and 
object and a relation between them. Where there is no “other,” or it does not yet exist, 
all possibility of consciousness ceases.”548 Psychology cannot comment on the 
metaphysical status of the idea of the godhead but it can confirm that phenomena, such 	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as those discussed by Eckhart, produce symbols of wholeness. “As a rule they are 
‘uniting’ symbols, representing the conjunction of a single or double pair of opposites… 
They arise from the collision between the conscious and the unconscious.”549 
 
Jung provides diagrams to illustrate his discussion of the self. One diagram 
“emphasized the point of greatest tension between the opposites” and demonstated that 
“in the lapis, the counterpart of man, the opposites are so to speak united.”550 A footnote 
to this paragraph provides a succinct summary of Jung’s views on the dynamics of 
suggestion: 
Most people do not have sufficient range of consciousness to become aware of 
the opposites inherent in human nature. The tensions they generate remain for 
the most part unconscious, but can appear in dreams… The greatest danger 
about unconsciousness is proneness to suggestion. The effect of suggestion is 
due to the release of an unconscious dynamic, and the more unconscious this is, 
the more effective it will be. Hence the ever-widening split between conscious 
and unconscious increases the danger of psychic infection and mass psychosis. 
With the loss of symbolic ideas the bridge to the unconscious has broken down. 
Instinct no longer affords protection against unsound ideas and empty slogans. 
Rationality without tradition and without a basis in instinct is proof against no 
absurdity.551 
 
In alchemy the development of consciousness, which is a circular process, is 
represented by the uroboros. It is “a magic circle consisting of the union of 
opposites.”552 The lapis is “born of the alchemical union of opposites… Psychologically 
the self is a union of conscious (masculine) and unconscious (feminine). It stands for 
the psychic totality.”553 In Aion, Jung argues that the alchemists unwittingly describe in 
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their texts and drawings the process by which an individual might attain a “sufficient 
range of consciousness to become aware of the opposites inherent in human nature.”554 
 
In 1952 Jung published Symbols of Transformation, an expanded and revised version of 
Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido published in 1912, which was translated into 
English by Hinkle in 1917 as Psychology of the Unconscious. By analysing the 
revisions to the text made between 1912 and 1952, we get some sense of the 
development of Jung’s ideas about the union of opposites.  
 
In his description of Isis, “the union of contrasting tendencies” 555 had become “this 
union of opposite tendencies.” 556 In 1912 he writes, “In none of the newer forms of 
myth are the pairs of opposites so perceptibly near as in that of Christ and Antichrist.”557 
By 1952 this has become “palpably close together,” but more significant is what has 
been added: 
Christ, as a hero and god-man, signifies psychologically the self; that is, he 
represents the projection of this most important and central of archetypes. The 
archetype of the self has, functionally, the significance of a ruler of the inner 
world, i.e., of the collective unconscious. The self, as a symbol of wholeness, is 
a coincidentia oppositorum, and therefore contains light and darkness 
simultaneously. In the Christ-figure the opposites which are united in the 
archetype are polarized in the “light” son of God on the one hand and the devil 
on the other. The original unity of opposites is still discernible in the original 
unity of Satan and Yahweh, Christ and the dragon of the Anti-Christ lie very 
close together so far as their historical development and cosmic significance are 
concerned.558 
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His concept of the self had become fully developed, including the idea of “the original 
unity of opposites” within the unconscious, which are differentiated, in this case as 
Satan and Yahweh, and then reunited in a more conscious union of opposites. 
 
In an extended passage Jung describes the sacrifice of dogs at a crossroads to the 
goddess, Hecate. In the 1912 text “the sacrifice occurs at the point of crossing.”559 In the 
later text “the sacrifice occurs at the point of union”:  
Where the roads cross and enter into one another, thereby symbolizing the union 
of opposites, there is the “mother,” the object and epitome of all union. Where 
the roads divide, where there is parting, separation, splitting, there we find the 
“division,” the cleft – the symbol of the mother and at the same time the essence 
of what the mother means for us, namely cleavage and farewell.560 
 
The imagery have become enriched and nuanced over the years. In his description of 
Mithraic sacrifice, Jung writes, in the earlier text, “Previously we have pointed out the 
mutual relationship between serpent and bull, and found there that the bull symbolizes 
the living hero, the shining sun, but that the serpent symbolizes the dead, buried or 
chthonic hero, the invisible sun.” The rest of the passage describes the sacrifice in a 
fairly linear fashion. By 1952 the ideas have become more complex. “We have already 
pointed out the reciprocal relationship between bull and snake, and we saw that the bull 
symbolizes the living hero, whereas the snake symbolizes the dead, buried, chthonic 
hero… The combination of the bull’s blood and the snake therefore looks like a union 
of opposites… In the act of sacrifice the consciousness gives up its power and 
possession in the interests of the unconscious. This makes possible a union of opposites 
resulting in a release of energy.”561 The union of opposites has emerged in Jung’s work 
as a dynamic locus of potency. 
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In Answer to Job, Christ is said to occupy a “position midway between the two 
extremes, man and God.” Christ is represented by “totality symbols” because he is able 
“to unite all opposites”562 The effect of the “paradoxical nature of God” on man can be 
that “it tears him asunder into opposites and delivers him over to a seemingly insoluble 
conflict.” In analysis a patient may find a solution to this conflict by having a dream “of 
the child-hero and the squaring of the circle, signifying the union of opposite.”563 It is 
necessary to take cognisance of the confrontation of opposites depicted in dreams, and 
of  “the images of the goal [that] represent their successful reconciliation.”564 Because a 
resolution of conflict between conscious and unconscious “is not possible through logic, 
one is dependent on symbols which make the irrational union of opposites possible.”565 
The relationship between the opposites involves mutual influence. Images of the union 
of opposites are simultaneously expressions and catalysts of that union. The apophatic 
dimension of the individuation process can be seen in the namelessness and ineffability 
of its origin and goal: 
 
The encounter between conscious and unconscious has to ensure that the light 
which shines in the darkness is not only comprehended by the darkness, but 
comprehends it. The filius solis et lunae is the symbol of the union of opposites 
as well as the catalyst of their union. It is the alpha and omega of the process, the 
mediator and intermedius. “It has a thousand names,” say the alchemists, 
meaning that the source from which the individuation process rises and the goal 
toward with it aims is nameless, ineffable.566 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
562 CW11 690 
563 CW11 738 
564 CW11 746 
565 CW11 755 
566 CW11 756 
	   123	  
In 1953 there is a single mention of the union of opposites in Jung’s work567, but in 
1954 Jung returns to the theme across a wide range of essays. In a discussion of the role 
of dogma he observes that along with elements of Christianity and Gnosticism “it was 
undoubtedly alchemy, long brewing the union of opposites in secret that came to… 
[the] aid”568 of Jakob Bohme. Again we can track the development of Jung’s 
dependence on the concept of the union of opposites, because we do not find this 
passage in an earlier version of this essay published in 1934.569 In his clinical work Jung 
observed a “chaotic assortment” of archetypal images including “the union of opposites 
in a third.”570 Among these images is the alchemical symbol of the cosmic tree, “which 
springs from the union of opposites and, by its eternal presence, also makes that union 
possible.”571  
 
In his discussion of the mass Jung makes the interesting observation that “so long as the 
self is unconscious, it corresponds to Freud’s superego and is a sources of perpetual 
moral conflict.” A transformation occurs however if the projection of the self can be 
withdrawn and it “is no longer identical with public opinion.” “The self then functions 
as a union of opposites and thus constitutes the most immediate experience of the 
Divine which it is psychologically possible to imagine.”572 
 
In the same text Jung comments on the Acts of Peter, an apocryphal work from the 2nd 
century. Peter’s speech while hanging upside down on the cross expresses the union of 
opposites: 	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In this passage, too, the symbolical interpretation of the cross is coupled with the 
problem of the opposites, first in the unusual idea that the creation of the first 
man caused everything to be turn upside down, and then in the attempt to unite 
the opposites by identifying them with one another.573 
 
The fact that Peter is crucified upside down is an image of birth. It symbolises the union 
of creation and death. 
 
Jung criticizes the author of the Acts of John, a text from the same period, for losing 
sight of darkness with an over emphasis on the light. “He forgets that light only has a 
meaning when it illuminates something dark and that his enlightenment is no good to 
him unless it helps him to recognize his own darkness.”574 “Opposites unite in new 
energy potential: the ‘third’ that arises out of their union is a figure ‘free from the 
opposites,’ beyond all moral categories. This conclusion would have been too advanced 
for the Gnostics.”575 Jung claims that the “concretism” of the Church balanced the 
“irrealism” of the Gnostics. This conflict festered in the European unconscious until the 
advent of depth psychology. 
 
In ‘Psychological Commentary on “The Tibetan Book of the Great Liberation”’ Jung 
castigates Westerners who immerse themselves in Eastern meditation practices. Their 
efforts have no effect. “For this the union of opposites is necessary, and in particular the 
difficult task of reconciling extraversion and introversion by means of the transcendent 
function.”576 The transcendent function underlies rebirth symbolism which “describes 
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the union of opposites – conscious and unconscious – by means of concretistic 
analogies.”577 
 
In ‘The visions of Zosimos’ Jung discusses stone symbolism in a number of 
mythological stories, including those in which “the anima contains the secret of the 
precious stone… the mediator which is the union of opposites.”578 
 
In the first half of ‘The Philosophical Tree’ Jung comments on a twenty three pictures. 
Several of the paintings express instances of the union of opposites.579 In the second half 
of the essay he explores other aspects of tree symbolism. In the alchemical text, 
“Aquarium sapientum”, there is a connection made between the philosophical stone and 
Christ. The alchemists did not intentionally “exalt their stone into a world saviour”:  
 
They simply found these qualities in their idea of a body composed of the four 
elements and capable of uniting all opposites, and were just as amazed at this 
discovery as anyone would be who had a singularly impressive dream and then 
came across an unknown myth with fitted it exactly.580 
 
 
The philosophical tree requires a particular habitat and it “has a special connection with 
water, salt, and sea-water, thus with the aqua permanens.” The tree is both nourished 
and destroyed by this water: 
 
The water that makes the tree grow but also consumes it is Mercurius, who is 
called “duplex” because he unites the opposites in himself, being both a metal 
and a liquid. Hence he is called both water and fire. As the sap of the tree he is 
therefore also fiery, that is to say the tree is of a watery and a fiery nature.581 
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The tree is a symbol of transformation and transformation involves the suffering 
brought about by the discrimination of opposites out of an original unity to be followed 
by a new union of opposites which expresses a sense of wholeness. “It is still the case 
today that discrimination and differentiation mean more to the rationalistic intellect than 
wholeness through the union of opposites. That is why it is the unconscious which 
produces the symbols of wholeness.”582 The symbolism found in the material of analytic 
patients resonates with the imagery found in alchemy and shamanism. This 
demonstrates the historical persistence of the theme of the union of opposites: 
 
The process usually consists in the union of two pairs of opposites, a lower 
(waster, blackness, animal, snake, etc.) with an upper (bird, light, head, etc.), 
and a left (feminine) with a right (masculine). The union of opposites, which 
plays such a great and indeed decisive role in alchemy, is of equal significance 
in the psychic process initiated by the confrontation with the unconscious, so the 
occurrence of similar or even identical symbols is not surprising.583  
 
Jung returns to the symbol of the tree at the end of ‘Psychological aspects of the mother 
archetype.’ The alchemists recognised “the union of opposites under the symbol of the 
tree… which springs from the union of opposites and, by its eternal presence, also 
makes that union possible.”584 
 
In a letter to William Lachat, a priest, Jung discusses his understanding of the role of the 
holy spirit. Its work is “to reconcile and reunite the opposites in the individual through a 
special development of the human soul… [it] progressively unites the opposite.”585 In 
Jung’s formulation Christ and Satan represent a split of good and evil, light and dark, 
emerging for YHWH. The holy spirit plays a part in overcoming this split, analogous to 
the transcendent function: 	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In the circumstances the Holy Spirit, the third form of God, becomes of extreme 
importance, for it is thanks to him that the man of good will is drawn towards 
the divine drama and mingles in it, and the Spirit is one. In him the opposites are 
separated no longer.586  
 
In 1955 there is a passing reference to the union of opposites in Synchronicity.587 In the 
following year however, in Mysterium coniunctionis, there are more than twenty 
references to the union of opposites, plus a twelve page section entitled, ‘The 
alchemical view of the union opposites.’ After a mention of the union of opposites in 
Dorn,588 Jung discusses the place of paradox in alchemy: 
The tremendous role which the opposites and their union play in alchemy helps 
us to understand why the alchemists were so fond of paradoxes. In order to 
attain this union, they tried not only to visualize the opposites together but to 
express them in the same breath. Characteristically, the paradoxes cluster most 
thickly round the arcane substance, which was believed to contain the opposites 
in uncombined form as the prima material, and to amalgamate them as the lapis 
Philosophorum.589 
 
We see here again the idea that there is an original union of opposites, which undergoes 
a process of differentiation and then reunification. There is an extended footnote at this 
point in the essay with a long list of opposites, from a text by the alchemist Petrus 
Bonus, which demonstrates the paradoxical nature of the lapis. Bonus’ description of 
the lapis has an apophatic intensity. He asserts that  “those things that are and those that 
are not, those which may be spoken of and those which may not be spoken of, all these 
things they are able of say of this worshipful stone.”590 
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After the differentiation of opposites, “the alchemist’s endeavours to unite the opposites 
culminate in the ‘chymical marriage,’ the supreme act of union in which the work 
reaches its consummation.”591  
 
Christianity and alchemy attempt to find a solution to “the conflict between worldliness 
and spirituality” through quite different means. Christianity sees the relationship 
between the sexes as a spiritual allegory:  
 
Alchemy, on the other hand, exalted the most heinous transgression of the law, 
namely incest, into a symbol of the union of opposites, hoping in this way to 
bring back the golden age. For both trends the solution lay in extrapolating the 
union of sexes into another medium: the one projected into the spirit, the other 
into matter. But neither of them located the problem in the place where it arose – 
the soul of man.592 
 
Incest is “a preliminary form of the unio oppositorum.”593 
 
In a further play on the trope of pre-existent opposites that can be differentiated Jung 
identifies the ego and shadow as two halves of the self. “If we hypostatize the self and 
derive from it (as from a kind of pre-existent personality) the ego and the shadow, then 
these would appear as the empirical aspects of the opposites that are preformed in the 
self.”594 In alchemy the dragon’s head represents consciousness. It is “the symbolic 
image of the self, and just as the lapis unites the opposites so the self assimilates 
contents of conscious and the unconscious.”595 
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A feature of intense religious feeling is the image of the royal marriage. An apocryphal 
saying of Jesus, “the two shall be one, and the outside as the inside, and the male with 
the female neither male nor female,” points to the “coniunctio, in which the extreme 
opposites unite” and serves as a “paradigm for the alchemical union of opposites.”596 
Jung insists that he is merely describing the phenomenology of the imagery, because 
“what the union of opposites really ‘mean’ transcends human imagination.”597 This 
imagery has had a quality of revelation for previous generations, however because 
modern man has some psychological insight, “we could set out on the road to the union 
of opposites and… come to the place where the ‘gods of destruction and the god of 
salvation are together.’”598 This might result in the constellation of the transcendent 
function, “the psychic process of assimilation and integration… [which] unites the pairs 
of opposites.”599 
 
The alchemist, Michael Maier, wrote an account of his journey through America, 
Europe and Asia. Each of these was associated with one of the cardinal directions. 
When he journeyed south, to Africa, he discovered a statue of Mercury “made of silver 
with a golden head,” which he took to be a good omen. The astrological conjunction of 
the sun in Leo and the moon in Cancer, when he reached Africa, indicated “a coniunctio 
Solis et Lunae, the union of supreme opposites, and this is the crowning of the opus and 
the goal of the perigrination.”600 Jung associates Maier’s success in reaching Africa with 
attaining access to the fourth, or the inferior function. Maier’s description of his journey 
into Africa follows the alchemical pattern of ascent followed by descent, rather than the 
Gnostic and Christian pattern of descent followed by ascent. “The arcane substance… 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
596 CW14 200 
597 CW14 201 
598 CW14 258 
599 CW14 261 
600 CW14 276 
	   130	  
rises from the earth, unites the opposites, and then returns to earth, thereby achieving its 
own transformation into the elixir… Here the union of opposites consists in an ascent to 
heaven and a descent to earth in the bath of the tincture.”601 This can be taken as an 
example of how alchemy acted as a compensation to the conscious Christian imagery. 
 
Jung was insistent in his assertion that his work was an empirical description of psychic 
processes as depicted in alchemical texts:  
 
The psychological union of opposites is an intuitive idea which covers the 
phenomenology of this process. It is not an “explanatory” hypothesis for 
something that, by definition, transcends our powers of conception. For, when 
we say that conscious and unconscious unite, we are saying in effect that this 
process is inconceivable. The unconscious is unconscious and therefore can 
neither be grasped not conceived. The union of opposites is a transconscious 
process and, in principle, not amenable to scientific explanation.602 
 
This inconceivable process is depicted in the book of Job in a verse that resonates with 
the alchemists’ image of the union of earth and fire. “As for the earth, out of it cometh 
bread: and under it is turned up as it were fire.”603 Jung calls this “an image of the 
supreme opposites.”604 
 
At this point in the text there is a section entitled “The Alchemical View of the Union of 
Opposites.” According to Jung, the “union of the substances” described in alchemical 
texts was more than a primitive form of chemistry. “The union of the ‘natures’ which 
‘embrace one another’ was not physical and concrete, for they were ‘celestial natures’ 
which multiplied ‘by the command of God’… the conjunction they strove for was a 
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philosophical operation, namely the union of form and matter.”605 These ‘natures’ had a 
numinous quality because they were unknown. This numinosity generated a seeming 
endless stream of images of pairs of opposites.  
 
The initial stage of alchemy is the recognition that the four elements, and the opposites 
which arise from them, coexist in an undifferentiated state in the original state or prima 
material:  
The alchemical description of the beginning corresponds psychologically to a 
primitive consciousness which is constantly liable to break up into individual 
affective processes – to fall apart, as it were, in four directions. As the four 
elements represent the whole physical world, their falling apart means 
dissolution into the constituents of the world, that is, into a purely inorganic and 
hence unconscious state. Conversely, the combination of the elements and the 
final synthesis of male and female is an achievement of the art and a product of 
conscious endeavour. The result of the synthesis was consequently conceived by 
the adept as self-knowledge, which, like the knowledge of God, is need for the 
preparation of the Philosphers’ Stone. Piety is needed for the work, and this is 
nothing but knowledge of oneself.606  
 
The differentiation of the opposites brings “the ‘one’ world out of the state of 
potentiality into reality. Reality consists of a multiplicity of things.”607 The subsequent 
reunion of opposites is not usually a “direct union.” It normally requires a medium, 
often symbolised in alchemy as Mercurius, “the spiritual water… [which] mitigates and 
unites the opposites.”608 Mercurius has the paradoxical quality of being “not just the 
medium of conjunction but also that which is to be united.”609 Jung identifies Mercurius 
with “the original, non-differentiated unity of the world or of Being”610 and the 
collective unconscious.  
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According to the alchemist Dorn, “a mental union was not the culminating point but 
merely the first stage of the procedure. The second stage is reached when the mental 
union, that is, the unity of spirit and soul, is conjoined with the body. But a 
consummation of the mysterium coniunctionis can be expected only when the unity of 
spirit, soul, and body is made one with the original unus mundus.”611 Jung sees the 
Assumption of Mary, where Mary represents the body, as a Christian version of this 
cosmic reunion. It is an instance of the motif of incest, where “the supreme union of 
opposites expressed a combination of things which are related but of unlike nature.”612 
 
Through their successive procedures of separation and reunification, the alchemists 
“strove for a total union of opposites in symbolic form… Hence they sought to produce 
that substance in which all opposites were united… It had to be created by man, and at 
the same time, since it was an “increatum,” by God himself.”613 The gulf between 
opposites cannot be bridged by logic. Therefore the alchemists sought to follow nature, 
which “consists entirely of such ‘thirds,’ since she is represented by effects which 
resolve an opposition – just as a waterfall mediates between ‘above’ and ‘below.’”614 
This reconciliation of opposites was only possible with the assistance of “a certain 
heavenly substance hidden in the human body.” This “truth” was “the imago Dei 
imprinted in man.”615 
 
Jung finds the procedures of the alchemists echoed in the analytic process: 
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This is a method which is used spontaneously by nature herself or can be taught 
to the patient by the analyst. As a rule it occurs when the analysis has 
constellated the opposites so powerfully that union or synthesis of the 
personality becomes an imperative necessity… It requires a real solution and 
necessitates a third thing in which the opposites unite. Here the logic of the 
intellect usually fails, for in a logical antithesis there is no third. The “solvent” 
can only be of an irrational nature. In nature the resolution of opposites is always 
an energic process: she acts symbolically in the truest sense of the word, doing 
something that expresses both sides, just as a waterfall visibly mediates between 
above and below. The waterfall itself is then the incommensurable third. In an 
open and unresolved conflict dreams and fantasies occur which, like the 
waterfall, illustrate the tension and nature of the opposites, and thus prepare the 
synthesis.616    
 
The uroboros as a “symbol of the union of opposites”617 is an image of the goal of the 
process, not of its beginning in which the elements are in conflict. The union “between 
opposites like spirit and matter, conscious and unconscious… will happen in a third 
thing, which represents not a compromise but something new… a transcendental entity 
that could be described only in paradoxes.”618 The archetype of the self provides a 
unifying structure for the contents of the psyche, which revolve around a numinous 
centre. “Co-ordinated with this are all kinds of secondary symbols, most of them 
expressing the nature of opposites to be united.”619 
 
As we have seen this text, Mysterium coniunctionis contains Jung’s most sustained use 
of the concept of the union of opposites. The book ends with Jung’s negative 
anthropology and reflections on the boundaries of knowledge: 
 
… if a union is to take place between opposites like spirit and matter, conscious 
and unconscious, bright and dark, and so on, it will happen in a third thing, 
which represents not a compromise but something new, just as for the 
alchemists the cosmic strife of the elements was composed by the lithos ou 
lithos (stone that is no stone), by a transcendental entity that could be described 	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only in paradoxes… For the psychologist it the self – man as he is, and the 
indescribable and super-empirical totality of that same man. This totality is a 
mere postulate, but a necessary one, because no one can assert that he has 
complete knowledge of man as he is. Not only in the psychic man is there 
something unknown, but also in the physical… he too is a lithos ou lithos.620 
 
In the same year Jung commented on the union of opposites in two letters. In response 
to a question from H.L. Philp about enantiodromia, Jung states that, “Of course it does 
not lead to the union of opposites.”621 In reply to D. Cox, he writes that the necessity of 
“symbolic death”:  
 
Through his further incarnation God becomes a fearful task for man, who must 
now find ways and means to unite the divine opposites in himself… Christ has 
shown how everybody will be crucified upon his destiny, i.e., upon his self, as 
he was… If God incarnates in the empirical man, man is confronted with the 
divine problem… Christ is the model for the human answers and his symbol is 
the cross, the union of opposites.622 
 
This is of a piece with his explanation of alchemy in Mysterium coniunctionis. In the 
following year there are two references to the union of opposites. The transcendent 
function is described as “conjoined opposites”623 and, in the ‘Commentary on “The 
Secret of the Golden Flower,”’ Jung states that “the union of opposites on a higher level 
of consciousness is not a rational thing… [but] a process of psychic development that 
expresses itself in symbols.”624 
 
The 1958 essay in which Jung argues that flying saucers are a modern myth contains a 
number of references to the union of opposites. Flying saucers are images of “totality 
whose simple, round form portrays the archetype of the self,” which unites “apparently 	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irreconcilable opposites”625 and is “a combination of opposites.”626 In his analysis of a 
woman’s dream, he suggests that “the festive white robes of the crew suggest the idea 
of a marital union of opposites.”627 In his discussion of a print from a broadsheet of 
1561, which depicts a “very frightful spectacle,” Jung identifies crosses in the sky with 
signify the “union of opposites… a crossing.”628 In the summary of the essay Jung 
enumerates a series of antitheses which might represent and which give rise to “the 
mediating or ‘uniting’ symbol which necessarily proceeds from a sufficiently great 
tension of opposites.”629 One aspect of the meaning of ufo’s which he offers “with all 
due reserve” is that there might be some actual physical objects in the sky, but that, “the 
meaningful connection is the product on the one hand of projection and on the other of 
round and cylindrical forms which embody the projected meaning and have always 
symbolize the union of opposite.”630 In an aside he observes that the aircraft of the 
Soviet Union have red stars and those of the United States have white stars, and that the 
alchemists considered that the copulation of the servus rubeus (red slave) and the 
femina candida (white woman) “produced the supreme union of opposites.”631 
 
The final reference to the union of opposites in the Collected Works is in the essay, 
‘Symbols and the interpretation of dreams,’ which was written in English, in 1961, and 
included, in a slightly revised version, as ‘Approaching the Unconscious’, in Man and 
His Symbols. It refers to the paradoxical nature of symbols, which hold together unity 
and difference. The sentence demonstrates Jung’s attempt to hold together the practice 
of psychotherapy and the theory of the unconscious, as well as finding the proper 	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balance between nature and interpretation. “In this part of the individuation process the 
interpretation of symbols plays an important practical role; for the symbols are natural 
attempts to reconcile and reunite often widely separated opposites, as is apparent from 
the contradictory nature of many symbols.”632 
 
The theme of opposites is integral to the theory and practice of analytical psychology. 
The hermeneutic utility of what we might call Jung’s discourse on opposites emerges 
more and more clearly in his writings over time. As this chapter demonstrates the 
problem of opposites constitutes a site within Jung’s work which is saturated with 
apophatic intensity. 
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Chapter Six 
 
The Transcendent Function 
 
In 1916 Jung wrote a manuscript entitled 'Die Transzendente Funktion' which lay in his 
files until 1953. It was translated into English by A.R.Pope and published by the student 
association of the C.G. Jung Institute in Zurich in 1957. Jung's revised version of the 
original German paper was published in 1958. 'The Transcendent Function', in CW8, is 
based on the revised German essay and the Pope translation. In a short 'Prefatory Note" 
Jung states: 
 
After forty-two years, the problem has lost nothing of its topicality… The essay 
may therefore stand, with all its imperfections, as an historical document… (the) 
problem is identical with the universal question: How does one come to terms in 
practice with the unconscious?… For the unconscious is not this thing or that; it 
is the Unknown as it immediately affects us.633 
 
The relationship between the conscious and the unconscious, the known and the 
unknown, can only be resolved by an irrational factor: 
 
In practice, opposites can be united only in the form of a compromise, or 
irrationally, some new thing arising between them which, although different 
from both, yet has the power to take up their energies in equal measure as an 
expression of both and of neither. Such an expression cannot be contrived by 
reason, it can only be created through living.634 
 
Jung states with regard to the transcendent function that "there is nothing mysterious or 
metaphysical about the term… it means a psychological function comparable in its way 
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to a mathematical function of the same name, which is a function of real and imaginary 
numbers."635 A 'transcendental function' in mathematics is:   
 
A function which is not an algebraic function, i.e., a function whose action on its 
argument(s) cannot be represented by the arithmetic and algebraic operations: 
addition and subtraction, multiplication and division, raising to a power, or 
extraction of roots. The exponential function, the logarithm function, and the 
trigonometric functions are all transcendental.636 
 
Jung does not go further in developing this analogy with mathematics. Perhaps there 
would have been scope for him to expand the comparison by drawing on Cantor’s 
concepts of transcendental function, infinite sets and infinite (or transfinite) numbers.637 
  
The 1916 manuscript was written during that crucial point in Jung's personal and 
intellectual development referred to as “the confrontation with the unconscious.” This 
period included the pivotal instance on December 12, 1913 when he let himself "drop" 
and experienced a series of emotionally charged images. The Septem Sermones ad 
Mortuos was written in 1916 and he was working on the essays that would become Two 
Essays in Analytical Psychology. It is argued by Homans638 and Chodorow639 that the 
concept of the transcendent function articulated here is the precursor to his concepts of 
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the self, individuation and synchronicity. A link can also be made retrospectively with 
his earlier work on spiritualism.640 
 
The transcendent function makes "the transition from one attitude to another organically 
possible, without loss of the unconscious." One could argue that the act of writing the 
essay was a way for Jung to make the transition to a future independent of Freud and 
psychoanalysis. A strong element in the piece is his defence of "constructive treatment." 
“Constructive treatment of the unconscious, that is, the question of meaning and 
purpose, paves the way for the patient's insight into that process which I call the 
transcendent function.”641 
 
The transference is an expression of the transcendent function at work in the 
relationship between analyst and patient: 
 
The suitably trained analyst mediates the transcendent function for the patient, 
i.e., helps him to bring conscious and unconscious together and so arrive at a 
new attitude. In this function of the analyst lies one of the many important 
meanings of the transference. The patient clings by means of the transference to 
the person who seems to promise him a renewal of attitude; through it he seeks 
this change, which is vital to him, even though he may not be conscious of doing 
so.642  
 
This state of dependency can lead to "bitter hatred", "monotony", and "poverty of ideas" 
if the analyst understands the fantasies of the patient "merely in a concretistic-reductive 
sense". Jung maintains that his own approach is not "suggestion": 
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The method is based, rather on evaluating the symbol (i.e., dream-image or 
fantasy) not semiotically, as a sign for elementary instinctual processes, but 
symbolically in the true sense, the word "symbol" being taken to mean the best 
possible expression for a complex fact not yet clearly apprehended by 
consciousness.643 
 
Active imagination is described here as a new and valuable method for "synthesizing 
the conscious and unconscious." It a development of his experience of December 1913 
and has roots in his own childhood visions and studies of mediums. The patient allows 
affect laden images into consciousness and enters into a form of dialogue with the 
images while maintaining a secure conscious position. According to Jung this gap 
between conscious attitude and unconscious affect mediated by an image allowed for 
emergence of the transcendent function. 
  
In the 1916 paper he presents a woman's dream and offers "Associations", "Analytical 
Interpretations" and "Constructive Interpretations". Since dream imagery can be 
"unsuitable or difficult to make use", he recommends "spontaneous fantasies" as 
material for active imagination to "produce the transcendent function". He maintains 
that: 
 
The transcendent function not only forms a valuable addition to 
psychotherapeutic treatment, but gives the patient the inestimable advantage of 
assisting the analyst on his own resources and of breaking a dependence which 
is often felt as humiliating. It is a way of attaining liberation by one's own effort 
and of finding the courage to be oneself.644 
 
Aside from the 1916 essay, that we have been considering, there a very few instances of 
Jung's use of the term. According to Dehing: 
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Jung's use of the expression "transcendent function" is surprisingly infrequent… 
Curiously enough, in spite of its obvious relevance to the analytic process, no 
explicit mention of the concept is to found in Jung's main writings on 
psychotherapeutic practice (CW16), although we find it in seven articles or 
books, three of the published seminars and four letters.645 
 
Dehing observes that Jung used the term to refer to a function, a method, a process or 
the outcome of these dynamics.646 Despite its sparse and varied use by Jung (or perhaps 
because of this fact) the notion, variously conceived, has become an important part of 
the Jungian and post-Jungian lexicon and a political marker within analytical 
psychology. 
 
In 1992 the Twelfth International Congress for Analytical Psychology was held in 
Chicago on the theme 'The Transcendent Function: Individual and Collective Aspects'. 
In his presentation, 'The Transcendent Function: A Critical Re-Evaluation', which I 
have already quoted from above, Dehing uses Winnicott's description of Jung's 
"madness" and "divided self" to illuminate the issues that Jung was grappling with when 
he was writing the 1916 paper: 
 
Clearly Jung found no solace in classical psychoanalysis; his problem was not 
one of repressed personal material, but overcoming a dissociation – a divided 
self. We are not faced with a horizontal division here, such as Freud presented 
between conscious and personal unconscious; the split is vertical and leaves no 
room for Freud's unconscious…. Jung found himself forced to devise a new 
approach which was remarkable in more than one respect. It took intuition and 
an uncommon courage to bring this attempt to a favorable conclusion.647 
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For Dehing this period "most certainly had a psychotic structure". This position draws a 
sharp reply from Sandner: 
 
I do not for a moment agree with Winnicott's (1964) diagnosis of Jung as a case 
of recovered childhood schizophrenia… I think that Jung, like many other 
people – some of them Jungians – was not schizophrenic, psychotic or mad, but 
suffered a childhood wound which resulted in an initiatory illness… The content 
of the psyche in initiatory illness is much better organized, with coherent 
imagery and overall conscious purpose, than in any sort of psychotic state.648 
 
The situation is paradoxical. You would expect Dehing, a developmental Jungian, to be 
sceptical about the efficacy of active imagination, as portrayed in 'The Transcendent 
Function', to address psychotic states. And you would expect Sandler, a classical 
Jungian, to be eager to embrace the notion that active imagination can heal psychosis. 
The fight is about which image of Jung will prevail as much as it is about the concept of 
the transcendent function.  
 
One debate about the transcendent function is the question as to whether the 
transcendent function is a clinical concept or a spiritual concept. There is also a question 
about whether the transcendent function operates only between conscious and 
unconscious. This would limit the concept unnecessarily and would contradict Jung’s 
own observation that, "In normal people, the transcendent function works only in the 
unconscious, which is continually tending to maintain the psychic balance."649 
 
Solomon claims that, "Jung's concept of the transcendent function derives its 
philosophical basis from the notion of dialectical change, first expounded by the 	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German Romantic philosopher, Friedrich Hegel."650 It is difficult to assess the merits of 
this claim. She says that while references to Hegel in the Collected Works are "quite 
scathing", there was one instance when Jung called Hegel "that great psychologist in 
philosopher's garb."651 She also says that, "We know, however from the libraries of 
each, that both Freud and Jung read and carefully annotated Hegel's work… My 
contention is that the dialectical vision can be seen as the essence of Jung's concept of 
the transcendent function."652 
 
She goes on to compare diagramatically the transcendent function, the dialectical model 
and Fordham’s description of the self process. In each case she identifies two terms that 
stand in tension and that give rise to a third. With the transcendent function the dynamic 
opposition between conscious and unconscious produces a creative synthesis; in the 
dialectical model the dynamic opposition between thesis and antithesis also produces a 
creative synthesis; and, in Fordham’s model, deintegration breaches the gap between the 
primary self and the not-self and the process of integration produces the integrate. 
 
In explaining the motivation for her comparison of Jung and Hegel, Solomon writes: 
 
Although I am concentrating on the relationship between Jung's model of the 
transcendent function and Hegel's dialectical model, there is a deeper 
implication. An understanding of the dialectical model contributes to a broader 
recognition of the philosophical bedrock which underpins the ways of thinking 
about human nature and development that we call analytic and psychoanalytic 
theory. It is able to contribute to an understanding of the differential roles of 
inner and outer influences in the development of personality. Thus it contributes 
conceptually to a central debate in current depth psychology: whether a primary 	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self or a primary instinct for relatedness forms the basis of personality 
structure.653 
 
Here we can see Solomon using the concept of the transcendent function to support an 
object-relations, and possibly biological, view of analytical psychology. Salman takes 
issue with Solomon by pointing out that: 
 
Although the transcendent function has a dialectical motion, it is an "opus contra 
naturam" (work against nature), involving qualities of ego participation that 
separate it from instinctual developmental and dialectical processes… the 
transcendent function goes beyond dialectics into conscious dialogue by 
introducing creativity, suffering and ethical integrity to the interaction of 
opposites. These additions act as the alchemical ferment which transforms the 
dialectical process.654 
 
For Salman the transcendent function is a gnostic process. "By this I mean a 
psychological process which has as its goal immediate, direct, and personal 
understanding of one's experience."655 
 
Solomon, a developmental Jungian, is espousing a fairly impersonal, archetypal 
perspective of the transcendent function to support her object-relations position and 
Salman, a classical Jungian, is taking an existential position to support an archetypal 
reading of the transcendent function. 
 
Hillman's concept of soul-making could be seen as his version of the transcendent 
function. For Hillman images are to be met as wholly other. He objects to a view that 
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sees images as a 'part of myself'. He advocates an encounter with the image, not in 
expectation for a third or synthetic position, but because the meeting is a good in itself: 
 
By soul I mean, first of all a perspective rather than a substance, a viewpoint 
toward things rather than a thing itself. This perspective is reflective; it mediates 
events and makes differences between ourselves and everything that happens. 
Between us and events, between the doer and the deed, there is a reflective 
moment - and soul-making means differentiating this middle ground… In 
another attempt upon the idea of soul I suggested that the word refers to that 
unknown component which makes meaning possible, turns events into 
experiences, is communicated in love, and has a religious concern. These four 
qualifications I had already put forth some years ago. I had begun to use the term 
freely, usually interchangeably with psyche (from Greek) and anima (from 
Latin). Now I am adding three necessary modifications. First, soul refers to the 
deepening of events into experiences; second, the significance soul makes 
possible, whether in love or in religious concern, derives from its special 
relation with death. And third, by soul I mean the imaginative possibility in our 
natures, the experiencing through reflective speculation, dream, image and 
fantasy - that mode which recognizes all realities as primarily symbolic or 
metaphorical.656 
 
It might be said that Hillman starts from the transcendent function, the soul, and 
imagines the opposites afterward, so to speak; like Plotinus who starts with the One 
which overflows to produce the nous, which contains opposites. He wants to describe 
the emanation of the soul, rather than the contemplative return to the soul: 
 
Here I am working toward a psychology of soul that is based in a psychology of 
image. Here I am suggesting both a poetic basis of mind and a psychology that 
starts neither in the physiology of the brain, the structure of language, the 
organization of society, nor the analysis of behavior, but in the processes of 
imagination.657 
 
Jung’s essay is comparatively short and somewhat thin from a scholarly point of view, 
without his usual armoury of references. Considering the fact that it was unknown until 
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close to the end of his life it is surprising how much currency the idea has had. Miller, 
who has identified the career of the concept in Jung’s essays, letters and seminars 
between 1916 and 1958, argues that, “the transcendent function is linked with virtually 
all the concepts that are at the core of Jung’s psychology.”658 He makes the further claim 
that the transcendent function is the heart of Jung’s method: 
… beyond its stated role in uniting the opposites, the transcendent function is 
Jung’s root metaphor for psyche itself or for becoming psychological and is the 
well spring from whence flowed much of the rest of Jung’s imaginal, depth 
psychology. Put another way, the transcendent function is Jung’s attempt to 
describe the most fundamental depth psychological activity, the interchange of 
information and images between consciousness and the unconscious, and 
everything else that Jung proposed represented merely a refinement or 
differentiation of that phenomenon. Enunciated immediately after Jung emerged 
from his own confrontation with the unconscious, the writing of the transcendent 
function in 1916 was an attempt to give voice to his own indescribable 
experience of coming to terms with the unknown in the unconscious.659  
 
Following on from Miller’s view, we could understand the transcendent function as an 
apophatic methodology at the core of Jung’s theory and practice. It is a very precise 
discipline of unknowing. It is predicted on an apophatic anthropology, which accepts 
that I do not understand myself:  
 
The secret participation of the unconscious is everywhere present without our 
having to search for it, but as it remains unconscious we never really know what 
is going on or what to expect. What we are searching for is a way to make 
conscious those contents which are about to influence our actions, so that the 
secret interference of the unconscious and its unpleasant consequences can be 
avoided.660  
 
The first stage of the discipline involves alert receptivity to the contents of the 
unconscious. These contents are recorded in writing, drawing, sculpting or movement. 	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“In giving the content form, the lead must be left as far as possible to the chance ideas 
and associations thrown up by the unconscious.”661 The second stage involves the ego’s 
engagement with the material from the unconscious. Humbert identifies three typical 
activities of the ego in Jung’s work as geschehenlassen (to let happen), betrachten (to 
consider, to impregnate) and sich auseinandersetzen (to confront oneself with). They 
“together define conscious activity in its confrontation with the unconscious.”662 They 
are verbs that emphasize openness and relationship. In the transcendent function 
reciprocity is established between conscious and unconscious: 
 
The shuttling to and fro of arguments and affects represents the transcendent 
function of opposites. The confrontation of the two positions generates a tension 
charged with energy and creates a living, third thing – not a logical stillbirth in 
accordance with the principle tertium non datur but a movement out of the 
suspension between opposites, a living birth that leads to a new level of being, a 
new situation. The transcendent function manifests itself as a quality of 
conjoined opposites.663 
 
We can hear echoes here of Dionysius’ kataphasis, apophasis, exstasis. Kataphasis 
corresponds to the given unconscious contents and conscious attitudes. Apophasis 
corresponds to the suspension of judgement and the stance of openness on the part of 
the ego. Exstasis corresponds to appearance of a new symbol or attitude, which is not 
merely a compromise or combination of the original opposites.  
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Chapter Seven 
 
Jung and contemporary theories of apophasis 
 
 
In this chapter I use the work of contemporary writers to explore further apophatic 
themes in Jung. As I noted in the introduction, the question of the nature and role of 
apophasis has been a lively topic in philosophy, theology and cultural studies in the past 
two decades. Of particular interest here is the attention given to the work of Dionysius.  
 
Jung’s thought is saturated with apophatic resonance. He is often characterised as 
having regressed to premodern preoccupations and perspectives. By bringing some of 
these contemporary writers into contact with him we can see that this is not entirely the 
case. His attempts to conceptualise the presence and effects of the unknown and 
unknowable within the psyche can have a very contemporary feel about them. 
 
The writers I am citing fall into three groups. The first are analysing and theorising the 
apophatic tradition.  Much of their work involves reframing and contextualising 
apophatic texts. The writers in this group that I will be considering here are Sells, 
Milem and Rorem.664 They have each contributed a distinctive perspective on apophasis 
and negative theology. The second set of writers I will be considering are of interest 	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because their views on negation resonate in some way with Jung’s work. Deleuze 
engaged with Jung in his own work and Derrida has been made use of by a number of 
post-Jungians. Finally, I look at the work of Tacey and Dourley, two post-Jungians who 
have commented on aspects of negative theology in relation to Jung’s work. 
 
One way this theme is often taken up in psychoanalytic writing is through the use of 
Keats’ concept of ‘negative capability.’ ‘Negative capability’ made a sudden 
appearance in the analytic literature in 1969, in papers in three different journals and has 
been in regular use since then.665 While Jung himself makes no reference to Keats or to 
‘negative capability’, the term begins to appear in the Journal of Analytical Psychology 
from 1972, in reviews by Lambert and Plaut.666  In the 38 papers in the journal that 
mention ‘negative capability’ between 1972 and 2007 the overwhelming number are in 
book reviews and literature reviews. Mentions in articles are often linked with Bion. On 
this evidence in Jungian circles the term did not have as much currency as in other 
psychoanalytic publications during that period. Does this reflect more acceptance of 
unknowing and the existence of a broader palette of language and images for the 
discussion of the paradoxical or ineffable within analytical psychology? 
 
However one might answer this question, the frequency with which Keats’s phrase is 
used within the wider psychoanalytic literature demonstrates the need for ways to think 
about not knowing. It also demonstrates the scarcity of ways of thinking about not 	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knowing within psychoanalytic discourse. There clearly is an interest in finding 
language from outside of psychoanalytic discourse to think about not-knowing, but the 
net has not been cast very widely.  
 
Sells 
 
The work of Sells is among the most significant contemporary attempts to understand 
the language of apophasis. A chapter of his book, Mystical Languages of Unsaying, is 
devoted to Eriugena, an early commentator on Dionysius and a key conduit for his 
influence in Western Europe. Sells claims that: 
 
Classical Western apophasis shares three key features: (1) the metaphor of 
overflowing or “emanation” which is often in creative tension with the language 
of intentional, demiurgic creation; (2) dis-ontological discursive effort to avoid 
reifying the transcendent as an “entity” or “being” or “thing”; (3) a distinctive 
dialectic of transcendence and immanence in which the utterly transcendent is 
revealed as the utterly immanent.667 
 
It is possible to identify elements of Jung’s work that reflect the features described by 
Sells. 
 
One of the main ways in which Jung distinguishes his own theory of the unconscious 
from that of Freud is to question the ubiquity of repression. He states repeatedly that 
there are contents of the unconscious that appear, as it were, spontaneously. They are 
not repressed and have no antecedents in consciousness. This can be observed most 
clearly in psychosis, but the principle applies to all psychic life: 
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Since it is highly probable that we are still a long way from the summit of 
absolute consciousness, presumably everyone is capable of wider consciousness, 
and we may assume accordingly that the unconscious processes are constantly 
supplying us with contents which, if consciously recognized, would extend the 
range of consciousness. Looked at in this way, the unconscious appears as a 
field of experience of unlimited extent. If it were merely reactive to the 
conscious mind, we might aptly call it a psychic mirror-world. In that case, the 
real source of all contents and activities would lie in the conscious mind, and 
there would be absolutely nothing in the unconscious except the distorted 
reflections of conscious contents. The creative process would be shut up in the 
conscious mind, and anything new would be nothing but conscious invention or 
cleverness. The empirical facts give lie to this. Every creative man knows that 
spontaneity is the every essence of creative thought. Because the unconscious is 
not just a reactive mirror-reflection, but an independent, productive activity, its 
realm of experience is a self-contained world, having its own reality – precisely 
what we say about our experience of the outer world. And just as material 
objects are the constituent elements of the world, so psychic factors constitute 
the objects of that other world.668 
 
Sells argues that within apophatic discourse emanation leads to paradox. “The dualisms 
upon which the language of ‘flowing out’ is based, such as the distinction between the 
vessel that receives the flow and the content it receives, are ultimately fused into 
paradoxes (the vessel is the content) as the apophasis unravels its initial premise about 
the source of emanation.”669 Within Jung’s work the theme of paradox is ubiquitous, in 
particular in his discussion of opposites. “Naturally the conjunction can only be 
understood as a paradox, since a union of opposites can be thought of only as their 
annihilation. Paradox is a characteristic of all transcendental situations because it alone 
give adequate expression to their indescribable nature.”670  
 
Another analogy to the metaphor of overflowing in Jung’s work is in his discussion of 
spirit. For Jung “spirit is the dynamic principle:”671 
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The hallmarks of spirit are, firstly, the principle of spontaneous movement and 
activity; secondly, the spontaneous capacity to produce images independently of 
sense perception; and thirdly, the autonomous and sovereign manipulation of 
these images.672 
 
For Jung the action of spirit “consists not only of uprushes of life but of formal products 
too.”673  
 
In a discussion of a patient’s material Jung argues that the fantasy “is surely a 
compensatory or complementary formation… [and yet] It is a spontaneous 
manifestation of the unconscious, based on contents which are not to be found in 
consciousness.”674 The unconscious phenomenon “overflows” the limits of conscious 
understanding. 
 
Sells’ second sign of apophasis consists in the “dis-ontological discursive effort to avoid 
reifying the transcendent as an ‘entity’ or ‘being’ or ‘thing.’” One could understand the 
whole of Jung’s method to consist of a type of “dis-ontological discursive effort.” His 
emphasis on dialectic ensures that no content of the psyche can be understood on its 
own – in its own right. Everything must be viewed through its relationship with an other 
or a difference. Consciousness must be experienced as dependent on the unconscious, 
the unknown. Complexes and archetypes are illuminated by their relationships with 
other complexes and archetypes.  
 
This method is at play in the dialect between psychological and historical knowledge. 
Jung asserts that, “just as psychological knowledge furthers our understanding of the 
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historical material, so, conversely the historical material can throw new light on 
individual problems.”675 It is also a feature of dream interpretation. “I have developed a 
procedure which I call ‘taking up the context’… although the taking up of the context 
resulted in an ‘unthinkable’ meaning and hence in an apparently nonsensical 
interpretation, it proved correct in the light of facts which were subsequently 
disclosed.”676 Taking up the context of psychic phenomena insures that they are not 
approached too concretely. 
 
Jung wished to maintain a dialectic between past and present. Freud writes about 
primordial images and the effects of the murder of the father by the primal horde, but he 
relies on tacit Lamarkian assumptions to bridge the gap between the primordial and the 
present or the depth and the surface. He does not attempt to develop a theory about the 
relationship between the primordial images and the present beyond stating as a fact that 
the guilt of the first murderers is active in our own individual oedipal guilts. We can 
understand Jung’s theory of archetypes as an attempt to make good this lacuna in 
Freud’s thought. He tried to think through or imagine the relationship between the 
archaic and the contemporary. While he may not have been successful or convincing in 
the detail of his theory, his efforts support my contention that within some areas of his 
theory he was attempting to clarify our relationship with the unthinkable. 
 
Sells’ third feature of apophatic discourse is “a distinctive dialectic of transcendence 
and immanence in which the utterly transcendent is revealed as the utterly immanent.” 
As we saw earlier this is a theme in Jung’s discussion of opposites, such as the 
statement that the self is bigger than big and smaller than small. In the discussion at the 	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end of Answer to Job, Jung argues that the archetype of the self and the God-image are 
indistinguishable empirically. It is possible to “arbitrarily postulate a difference,” but 
this has risks:  
 
On the contrary, it only helps us to separate man from God, and prevents God 
from becoming man. Faith is certainly right when it impresses on man’s mind 
and heart how infinitely far away and inaccessible God is; but it also teaches his 
nearness which has to be empirically real if it is not to lose all significance. Only 
that which acts upon me do I recognize as real and actual… The religious need 
longs for wholeness, and therefore lays hold of the images of wholeness offered 
by the unconscious, which independently of the conscious mind, rise up from 
the depths of our psychic nature.677 
 
It is necessary for there to be a simultaneous experience which is personal and a 
meaning that is given from beyond the individual. The pleroma is a notion that carries 
this sort of apophatic intensity: 
 
… the identity of a nontemporal, eternal event with a unique historical 
occurrence is something that is extremely difficult to conceive… “time” is a 
relative concept and needs to be complemented by that of the “simultaneous” 
existence, in Bardo or pleroma, of all historical processes.678  
 
We have seen that the three manoeuvres of apophatic discourse described by Sells can 
be found in Jung’s writings. 
 
Milem 
 
I am using the framework provided by Bruce Milem in his paper, ‘Four Theories of 
Negative Theology,’679 as a lens to look at the work of Jung. Milem classifies the 
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negative theologies under four headings: metaphysical, desire, experience and 
renunciation.  The metaphysical theory of negative theology, “identifies God as the first 
cause of the existence of all things and argues that negative theology offers the most 
appropriate way to talk about this cause.”680 The desire theory “describes a desire that 
only the infinite God can satisfy.”681 The experience theory understands negative 
theology as “an attempt to do justice to a particular experience.”682 And finally the 
renunciation theory states that negative theology is based on an “ethical imperative to 
give up positive concepts of God.”683 
 
The metaphysical account of negative theology posits the unknowable origin of life. 
According to a metaphysical perspective: 
 
… although…  we cannot help but say that God made or created the world, we 
also have to admit that we do not understand how. In this way, when it comes to 
two major theistic beliefs, that God exists and that God created everything, 
believers have to confess that they do not understand what these beliefs mean.684 
 
We see this mirrored in a number of ways in Jung. He acknowledges an unfathomable 
source: 
 
We call the unconscious “nothing,” and yet it is a reality in potentia. The 
thought we shall think, the deed we shall do, even the fate we shall lament 
tomorrow, all lie unconscious in our today. The unknown in us which the affect 
uncovers was always there and sooner or later would have presented itself to 
consciousness. Hence we must always reckon with the presence of things not yet 
discovered.685 
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Jung describes a psychoid dimension, which is an incomprehensible unity of psyche and 
matter. The archetypes, with their psychoid foundations , are unknowable in themselves 
although we can apprehend constellations of archetypal images. Jung argues that only 
symbols are adequate containers for the multiplicity of meanings and energies which are 
at play in the psyche, but he is in agreement with the negative theologian in accepting 
that not only is there an excess that the symbol cannot contain, but that symbols die. 
The language of symbols breaks down. The life cycle of the symbol is completed in its 
return to the pleroma.  
 
Jung shares with the metaphysical negative theologian a sensibility that acknowledges 
the contingency of human nature and language in the face of an incomprehensible origin 
and destiny. 
 
Milem’s second theory of negative theology is based on desire.  His describes this 
approach in the following ways: 
 
… human beings have some desires that no experience, phenomenon, or thing in 
this world can satisfy.686 
 
… negative theology expresses the fact that our deepest desires go unsatisfied in 
this world.687 
 
What we notice in the things around us and in ourselves is God’s absence.688 
 
Negative theology is the natural expression of insatiable desire.689 
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For Jung there is no end to individuation. The drive of the self to achieve its own 
purposes places a continuous pressure on the ego, which must adapt one way or another. 
The desire of the archetype is endless.  In his essay on psychic energy Jung writes: 
 
The unconscious continues to produce symbols which one could obviously go 
on reducing to their elements ad infinitum. But man can never rest content with 
the natural course of things because he always has an excess of libido that can be 
offered a more favourable gradient than the merely natural one. For this reason 
he will inevitably seek it, no matter how often he may be forced back by 
reduction to the natural gradient.690 
 
Jung agrees with the negative theologian that there is something in human nature that 
cannot be satisfied. 
 
According to Milem the experience theory of negative theology is concerned with 
trying to articulate a particular experience. “Instead of delivering knowledge about God, 
it carrries the mind in God’s direction and produces reverence and wonder.”691 Milem 
uses Jean-Luc Marion as an example of this type of theologian. Marion is interest in 
“the saturated phenomenon:”  
 
The mind tries to apply a multitude of concepts to the phenomenon, but none of 
them is sufficient… This excess is unknowable by means of any concept and 
cannot be put into words. Someone encountering this phenomenon does not 
have an experience of any object. She primarily perceives her own bedazzlement 
in the face of something that shows itself unconditionally without 
accommodating itself to the structure of human understanding.692 
 
The obvious link here with Jung is in terms of his ideas about the numinous. Numinous 
experience has a transformative effect. “This numinous transformation is not the result 
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of conscious intention or intellectual conviction, but is brought about by the impact of 
overwhelming archetypal impressions.”693 This impact can be positive or negative. Like 
a negative theologian the person who is subject to a numinous experience is obliged to 
make repeated attempts to articulate the content and significance of the experience 
while acknowledging that in certain important respects it is ineffable. Jung confronts the 
saturated phenomena brought to him by his patients and pushes language to its limits in 
his attempts to articulate his own and his patients experiences in the consulting room. 
 
Finally, in the renunciation theory “negative theology can be interpreted as a project of 
renunciation motivated by an ethical concern about the possibility of selfishness tainting 
one’s devotion to God.” Milem uses Eckhart as his exemplar for this type of theology. 
 
For Jung the withdrawal of projections is crucial in analysis. As we noted earlier 
Humbert highlighted three elements of Jung’s practice that contain aspects of 
renunciation: geschelenlassen (to let happen), betrachten (to consider, to impregnate), 
and sich auseinanderseyzen (to confront oneself with). In the period after his break with 
Freud, Jung “gave himself the task of experiencing and learning from his own psyche 
without relying on any preconceived ideas.”694 The images that Jung encountered 
presented an ethical challenge. As Humbert puts it, “the images that well up from the 
unconscious call the subject into question.”695 The ethic of renunciation and sacrifice is 
a leitmotif in Jung.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
693 CW10 720 
694 Humbert, p. 9 
695 Humbert, p. 13 
	   159	  
Rorem 
 
Rorem identifies three types of negative theologies: progressive apophatic, complete 
apophatic and incarnational apophatic.696 It is possible to identify examples of ways in 
which these three styles resonate in Jung’s work.  
 
The progressive apophatic is exemplified by Gregory of Nyssa’s Contemplation on the 
Life of Moses. According to Gregory, Moses will never see the face of God – only his 
back. This is because Moses is following God: 
Gregory charts the Mosaic ascent and ceaseless desire to continue to ascend, 
culminating in this bold request to behold God… As high as Moses may climb, 
“he is still unsatisfied in his desire for more.”… “So Moses, who eagerly seeks 
to behold God, is now taught how to behold Him; to follow God wherever he 
might lead is to behold God.”697 
 
This gradual ascent called epektasis, or stretching forward, is a continuous reaching 
beyond what one has grasped or seen. Rorem points out the connection with Paul’s 
exhortation, “forgetting what lies behind and straining forward to what lies ahead.” 
(Philippians 3.13) This type of apophasis consists in “endless desire rather than endless 
knowledge.”698 It is a form of apophatic thought that was appreciated by the early 
Cistercians. In the words of William of St. Thierry, “Always to advance in this way is to 
arrive.”699 
 
Jung describes an analogous process when he argues that the numinous power of the 
archetype draws libido out of regression: 	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When therefore a distressing situation arises, the corresponding archetype will 
be constellated in the unconscious. Since this archetype is numinous, i.e., 
possesses a specific energy, it will attract to itself the contents of consciousness 
– conscious ideas that render it perceptible and hence capable of conscious 
realization. Its passing over into consciousness if felt as an illumination, a 
revelation or a “saving idea.”700 
 
Through this dynamic the individual is drawn toward the next step of the individuation 
process by successive realisations. By following the call of the numinous the patient 
makes the journey of individuation. “There is little hope of our ever being able to reach 
even approximate consciousness of the self, since however much we may make 
conscious there will always exist an indeterminate and indeterminable amount of 
unconscious material which belongs to the totality of the self.”701 
 
Rorem’s exemplars for a complete apophatic are Dionysius, Albert the Great, Aquinas 
and Eckhart. “The Dionysian apophatic is not perpetual but completed, in that Moses 
does arrive, and it is absolute in that by negating and surpassing everything that is not 
God, Moses ends in God, united with God.”702 Dionysius describes Moses as “united to 
the wholly Unknown:” 
 
[Moses] plunges into the truly mysterious darkness of unknowing. Here, 
renouncing all that the mind may conceive, wrapped entirely in the intangible 
and the invisible, he belongs completely to him who is beyond everything. Here, 
being neither oneself nor someone else, one is supremely united to the wholly 
Unknown by an inactivity of all knowledge, and knows beyond the mind by 
knowing nothing.703 
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Dourley doubts that experiences such as this can be accommodated within Jung’s 
theory. 
 
Eckhart’s work seems to point to an experience of so complete a divestiture of 
individuality in those realms of interiority where humanity and divinity merge, 
that one is forced to wonder if he did not go deeper into the psyche than its 
archetypal base, where Jung, at least in his writings, felt he had struck bottom…  
one cannot avoid the feeling that Eckhart experienced some void beyond even 
the archetypal world in that experience he calls breakthrough. Obviously Jung 
could appreciate and was manifestly aware of this dimension of reality in his 
linking Eckhart with Zen… But the experience of so radical a self-loss is only 
questionably a component of Jung’s model of the psyche and its working.704 
 
On could argue that Jung’s description of the unity of psyche and matter resonates with 
the type of apophasis that Rorem is defining here: 
 
The deeper “layers” of the psyche lose their individual uniqueness as they retreat 
farther and farther into darkness. “Lower down,” that is to say as they approach 
the autonomous functional systems, they become increasingly collective until 
they are universalized and extinguished in the body’s materiality, i.e., in 
chemical substances. The body’s carbon is simply carbon. Hence “at bottom” 
the psyche is simply “world.”705 
 
Shelburne argues that Jung took the kinds of experiences that Rorem includes in his 
category of absolute apophatic seriously, but that he disagreed with any interpretation of 
the experience that implied that personal identity is extinguished in the union: 
 
However, in spite of the fact that Jung disputes some of the claims that the 
mystic makes for his experience on psychological grounds, he nonetheless 
considers the mystic experience as one of considerable value and significance. 
This is not really surprising since Jung understands mysticism as an experience 
of the unconscious. Consequently the value of the mystical experience is due to 
the positive effects of the expansion of consciousness that a direct insight into 
the unconscious makes possible. The experience affords an opportunity to 
realize the limitation of the perspective of ego consciousness and thus helps to 	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bring about the process of individuation, the goal of which is an integration of 
the conscious and unconscious aspects of the personality.706  
 
Shelburne states that on the basis of a study of Jung’s writings, “we might feel justified 
in concluding that Jung had no genuine mystical experiences.”707 Perhaps Jung comes 
closest to a notion of the complete apophatic in concepts such as wholeness, 
synchronicity, the coniunctio and the coincidence of opposites, but it is a problem 
within his thought that is not settled.708 
 
Incarnational apophatic is seen by Rorem in the work of Maximus the Confessor and 
Luther. “Where Gregory features epektasis or endless progress, and Dionysius 
emphasized apophasis or absolute negation, Maximus repeatedly turns to kenosis, the 
idea that the divine Word emptied itself into human likeness to the point of death.”709 
 
Luther was dismissive of Dionysius: 
Therefore Dionysius, who wrote about “negative theology” and “affirmative 
theology,” deserves to be ridiculed… he defines “affirmative theology” as “God 
is being.” “Negative theology” he defines as “God is nonbeing.” But, if we wish 
to give a true definition of “negative theology,” we should say that is the holy 
cross and the afflictions [attending it].710 
 
Jung understood the centrality of the cross in the Christian imagination as both a kenotic 
movement by God and a response by humanity: 
God’s offering of himself is a voluntary act of love, but the actual sacrifice was 
an agonizing and bloody death brought about by men… The terrors of death on 	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the cross are an indispensable condition for the transformation. This is in the 
first place a bringing to life of substances which are in themselves lifeless, and, 
in the second, a substantial alteration of them, a spiritualization.711 
  
 
The response in the form of the imitation of Christ is problematic as it can easily 
become a substitute for living one’s own myth. An authentic imitation of Christ 
involves enduring the cruciform experience of the tension of opposites. “It is no easy 
matter to live a life that is modelled on Christ’s, but it is unspeakably harder to live 
one’s own life as truly as Christ lived his.”712  
 
Jung was mindful of what we could call the incarnational aspect of individuation with 
his view that, “Individuation does not shut one out from the world, but gathers the 
world to oneself.”713 The destiny of the individual is intimately connected to the destiny 
of the collective: 
The way of the transcendent function is an individual destiny. But on no account 
should one imagine that this way is equivalent to the life of a psychic anchorite, 
to alienation from the world. Quite the contrary, for such a way is possible and 
profitable only when the specific worldly tasks which these individuals set 
themselves are carried out in reality. Fantasies are no substitute for living; they 
are fruits of the spirit which fall to him who pays his tribute to life.714 
 
Jung’s thought touches on each of the three types of apophatic discourse described by 
Rorem. 
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Deleuze 
 
The uncanny experience of being reminded of Jung when one is reading Deleuze is 
expressed by Zizek in characteristically pithy fashion: “No wonder, then, that an 
admiration of Jung is Deleuze’s corpse in the closet; the fact that Deleuze borrowed a 
key term (rhizome) from Jung is not a mere insignificant accident – rather, it points 
toward a deeper link.”715 This deeper link has been more sympathetically explored by 
Kerslake716 and Semetsky.717 Hallward observes, “If there is an analogue within the 
psychoanalytic tradition to Deleuze’s conception of the cosmos-brain it is not Lacan’s 
unconscious, but Jung’s cosmic consciousness.”718 
 
Davis719 links Deleuze explicitly with the tradition of negative theology, but little has 
been made of this kind of connection in the secondary literature. For the purposes of 
this chapter I suggest that it is possible to understand two of Deleuze’s key concepts – 
Body without Organs (BwO) and becoming – as carriers of apophatic intensity. 
According to de Gaynesford, “the BwO is defined apophatically, in relation to that 
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which it is not. The same tendency informs the attempts by various theologians to 
define Christ’s incarnation.”720 
 
Deleuze borrows the notion of the Body without Organs (BwO) from the writer Antonin 
Artaud.  The BwO stands in relation to the organism. An organism exists as such 
because its shape has been externally imposed by God or another powerful agency. “We 
come to the gradual realization that the BwO is not at all the opposite of the organs. The 
organs are not its enemies. The enemy is the organism. The BwO is opposed not to the 
organs but that organization of the organs called the organism.”721 
 
The BwO shares many characteristics of the collective unconscious. In Land’s phrase it 
is a “swarm.” We might think of it as an archetypal maelstrom: 
 
The unconscious is not an aspirational unity but an operative swarm, a 
population of ‘preindividual and prepersonal singularities, a pure dispersed and 
anarchic multiplicity, without unity or totality… This absence of primordial or 
privileged relations is the body without organs… Social organization blocks-off 
the body without organs, substituting a territorial, despotic, or capitalistic socius 
as an apparent principle of production, separating desire from what it can do.722 
 
Deleuze asserts the importance of becoming free from imposed strictures of Oedipal 
forms. He asks, “How do you make yourself a Body without Organs?”723 In some 
respects it is reminiscent of Jung’s pleroma and Bergson’s virtual: 
 
At any rate, you have one (or several). It’s not so much that it preexists or comes 
ready-made, although in certain respects it is pre-existent. At any rate, you make 	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one, you can’t desire without making one. And it awaits you; it is an inevitable 
exercise or experimentation, already accomplished the moment you undertake it, 
unaccomplished as long as you don’t. This is not reassuring, because you can 
botch it. Or it can be terrifying, and lead you to your death. It is nondesire as 
well as desire. It is not at all a notion or a concept but a practice, a set of 
practices. You never reach the Body without Organs, you can’t reach it, you are 
forever attaining it, it is a limit.724 
 
 
Deleuze, like Jung, is interested in the relationship with the impersonal flows of energy. 
Seem suggests that Laing is involved in a similar project: 
Like Laing, they [Deleuze and Guattari] encourage mankind to take a journey, 
the journey through ego-loss. They go much further than Laing on this point, 
however. They urge mankind to strip itself of all anthropomorphic and 
anthropological armouring, all myth and tragedy, and all existentialism, in order 
to perceive what is nonhuman in man, his will and his forces, his 
transformations and mutations. The human and social sciences have accustomed 
us to see the figure of Man behind every social event, just as Christianity taught 
us to see the Eye of the Lord looking down upon us. Such forms of knowledge 
project an image of reality, at the expense of reality itself. They talk figures and 
icons and signs, but fail to perceive forces and flows. They blind us to other 
realities, and especially the reality of power as it subjugates us. Their function is 
to tame, and the result is the fabrication of docile and obedient subjects.725 
 
One view of analysis is that it undermines “the fabrication of docile and obedient 
subjects.” In the archetypal psychology variant of analytical psychology the process of 
“seeing through” brings one to some sort of knowledge or relationship with the 
otherness of images and fantasies: 
Where psychoanalysis says, “Stop, find your self again,” we should say instead, 
“Let’s go further still, we haven’t found our BwO yet, we haven’t sufficiently 
dismantled our self.” Substitute forgetting for anamnesis, experimentation for 
interpretation. Find your body without organs. Find out how to make it. It’s a 
question of life and death, youth and old age, sadness and joy. It is where 
everything is played out.726 
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The practice of creating the BwO is, like analysis, fraught with dangers. One of the 
dangers discussed by Deleuze is addiction, when the addict uses drugs to try to create a 
false BwO. He mentions the hypochondriac body, the paranoid body, the schizo body, 
the drugged body and the masochist body.727 In analysis there are dangers of suicide, 
psychosis, delusional transferences and despair. Deleuze asks, “What does it mean to 
disarticulate?” Apophasis means unsaying. What does it mean to unsay something; or to 
disconnect psychic and social structures? 
 
What does it mean to disarticulate to cease to be an organism? How can we 
convey how easy it is, and the extent to which we do it every day? And how 
necessary caution is, the art of dosages, since overdose is a danger. You don’t do 
it with a sledgehammer, you use a very fine file. You invent self-destructions 
that have nothing to do with the death drive. Dismantling the organism has never 
meant killing yourself, but rather opening the body to connections that 
presuppose an entire assemblage, circuits, conjunctions, levels and thresholds, 
passages and distribution of intensity, and territories and deterritorializations 
measured with the craft of a surveyor… And how can we unhook ourselves 
from the points of subjectification that secure us, nail us down to a dominant 
reality?728 
 
There are some parallels between the dismantling of the organism to uncover or create 
the BwO and the process of analysis. Seem compared Deleuze’s recommendation to 
make a BwO to Laing’s encouragement to “mankind to take a journey, the journey 
through ego-loss.”729 Jung observed that, ”The self, in its efforts at self-realization, 
reaches out beyond the ego-personality on all sides; because of its all-encompassing 
nature it is brighter and darker than the ego, and accordingly confronts it with problems 
which it would like to avoid… For this reason the experience of the self is always a 
defeat for the ego.”730  
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There are resonances between Deleuze’s concept of organism and Jung’s concept of 
possession. The image of possession is used throughout Jung’s work to think about the 
relationship between aspects of the psyche.731 One can be overwhelmed by any number 
of psychic forces. Patients are said to suffer from possession by complexes and 
archetypes, or to be under the influence of ideologies, fantasies, scripts and projections. 
The psyche is a field with contenting forces.  
 
Possession in Jung’s sense could be understood in some circumstances as failed 
attempts at the creation of a BwO. Jung observes that when a new content emerges from 
the unconscious it tends to possess the ego. The ego becomes inflated.  According to 
Dionysius, “the possessed, that is, those who have turned away from a life conforming 
to divine example and have adopted instead the ideas and character of abominable 
demons, are exposed to the very worst power. In their extreme folly, so destructive to 
themselves, they turn away from the truly real.”732  
 
Jung notes that the alchemists were alert to the dangers that their operations could hold 
for adepts.  “The difficulties of the art play no small role in alchemy. Generally they are 
explained as technical difficulties, but often enough… there are remarks about the 
psychic nature of the dangers and obstacles that complicate the work.”733 
 
The creation of the BwO is a practice of unknowing which opens the practitioner to 
more unrestricted flows of life. Apophatic discourse can move in the direction of origins 
or in the direction of the future. The emphasis can be on an unknowable beginning or on 	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an unknowable destination. The BwO could be seen as an example of a return to an 
incomprehensible origin. Becoming, one of the key concepts in Deleuze’s work, is 
concerned to create and accomplish an incomprehensible destiny. “Deleuze’s pragmatic 
and future-oriented epistemology is oriented toward the creation of concepts ‘for 
unknown lands,’ as well as meanings and values ‘that are yet to come.’”734 
 
Deleuze distinguishes between representation and presentation. Stagoll observes that 
“becoming is critical, for if the primacy of identity is what defines a world of re-
presentation (presenting the same world once again), then becoming (by which Deleuze 
means ‘becoming different’) defines a world of presentation anew.”735 The parallels 
with Jung’s concepts of individuation and the transcendent function are immediately 
evident. 
 
Becoming is a rhizome, not a classificatory or genealogical tree. Becoming is 
certainly not imitating, or identifying with something; neither is it regressing-
progressing; neither is it corresponding, establishing corresponding relations; 
neither is it producing, producing a filiation or producing through filiation. 
Becoming is a verb with a consistency all its own; it does not reduce to, or lead 
back to, “appearing,” “being,” “equaling,” or “producing.”736 
 
Here becoming is being defined apophatically by what it is not. Jung describes the 
necessity for the analyst to follow the lead of the patient; to not intervene with 
preconceived attitudes and assumptions in the unfolding of the patient’s self-discovery 
or self-creation, “which sometimes drives him into complete isolation… It is, moreover, 
only in the state of complete abandonment and loneliness that we experience the helpful 
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powers of our own natures.”737 The patient is compelled to pursue a perilous course of 
action: 
And though this desire opens the door to the most dangerous possibilities, we 
cannot help seeing it as a courageous enterprise and giving it some measure of 
sympathy. It is no reckless adventure, but an effort inspired by deep spiritual 
distress to bring meaning once more into life on the basis of fresh and 
unprejudiced experience. Caution has its place, no doubt, but we cannot refuse 
our support to a serious venture which challenges the whole of the personality. If 
we oppose it, we are trying to suppress what is best in man – his daring and his 
aspirations. And should we succeed, we should only have stood in the way of 
that invaluable experience which might have given a meaning to life.738 
 
Deleuze echoes Jung’s call to experience: 
… one steps outside what’s been thought before, once one ventures outside 
what’s familiar and reassuring, once one has to invent new concepts for 
unknown lands, then methods and moral systems break down and thinking 
becomes… a “perilous act,” a violence, whose first victim is oneself… Thinking 
is always experiencing, experimenting… and what we experience, experiment 
with, is… what’s coming into being, what’s new, what’s taking shape.739 
 
The transcendent function, which I earlier characterised as an apophatic method at the 
heart of Jung’s work, like becoming, occurs in the between. It is not a repetition but a 
becoming-other than oneself. The transcendent function produces difference. 
Differentiation is the engine of individuation: 
 
The subject-in-process, that is, as becoming, is always placed between two 
multiplicities, yet one term does not become the other; the becoming is 
something between the two, this something called by Deleuze a pure affect. 
Therefore becoming does not mean becoming the other, but becoming-other… 
The non-place-in-between acts as a gap, or differentiator, introducing an element 
of discontinuity in the otherwise continuous process of becoming and allowing 
the difference to actively intervene.740 
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The BwO and becoming operate as sites of apophasis with the work of Deleuze, who 
might be read as the philosopher for analytical psychology. We have seen that the 
apophatic dynamics of the BwO and becoming have analogies in Jung’s thought and 
practice. 
 
Derrida 
 
Derrida’s engagement with apophatic discourse, and in particular with Dionysius, has 
been widely discussed in continental philosophy of religion. Rayment-Pickard has 
graphically characterised Derrida’s work in this area: 
 
It is out of his interaction with Husserl and Heidegger that Derrida will step 
forward beyond negative theology to a new non-real theological understanding 
in which the old theological concepts and structures are at once negatively 
deconstructed and yet still glowing with a positive afterlife. This theology is 
able, in Derrida’s phrase, ‘to put the old names to work’ in a non-theological 
space ‘between God and God.’741 
 
In the notion of putting “old names to work” in an unfamiliar context we can recognise 
Jung’s method of putting images and concepts from mythology, alchemy, theology and 
philosophy to use in a new way in his psychology. His writing is littered with the glow 
of names which many would consider dead and buried. 
 
In Derrida’s early work there were occasional mentions of negative theology, without 
any discussion of particular writers. In the essay ‘Differance’ (1967) he acknowledges 
the resemblance between differance and negative theology: 
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So much so that the detours, locutions, and syntax in which I will have to take 
recourse will resemble those of negative theology, occasionally even to the point 
of being indistinguishable from negative theology… And yet those aspects of 
differance which are thereby delineated are not theological, not even in the order 
of the most negative of negative theologies, which as one knows are always 
concerned with disengaging a superessentiality beyond the finite categories of 
essence and existence, that is, of presence, and always hastening to recall that 
God is refused the predicate of existence, only in order to acknowledge his 
superior, inconceivable, and ineffable mode of being.742 
 
Twenty years later Derrida returns to the problem of the relationship between 
deconstruction and negative theology in his essay, ‘How to Avoid Speaking: 
Denegations.’ Rubenstein characterized this essay as his “most thorough  
(non-)discussion of his own work in relation to Dionysius’.”743 While there is an 
extensive secondary literature on Derrida, deconstruction and apophasis, I am limiting 
myself here to his direct references to Dionysius.744 
 
In this essay he uses the theme of ‘place’ to organize his thoughts. “Figuration and the 
so-called places (topoi) of rhetoric constitute the very concern of apophatic 
procedures.”745 He develops this thesis in relation to Plato, Dionysius and Heidegger. He 
does not present these as steps in a dialectic, because “we are involved in a thinking that 
is essentially alien to dialectic,”746 but as “paradigms” or “ signs.” He describes these 
paradigms in architectural terms as a mode that “will surround a resonant space of 
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which nothing, almost nothing, will ever be said.”747 Jung’s theory is often described in 
terms of architectonics. The theme of place also has echoes of Jung’s discussion of 
mandalas. The mandala defines a space – psychic, imaginal, ritual – that provides an 
orientation toward an ultimately unknowable content: 
 
All that can be ascertained at present about the symbolism of the mandala is that 
it portrays an autonomous psychic fact… It seems to be a sort of atomic nucleus 
about whose innermost structure and ultimate meaning we know nothing.748 
 
The mandala has an apophatic intensity because it performs the coincidence of many 
archetypes in a single point: 
 
The mandala symbolizes, by its central point, the ultimate unity of all the 
archetypes as well as the multiplicity of the phenomenal world, and is therefore 
the empirical equivalent of the metaphysical concept of a unus mundus.749 
  
Derrida tells us that there is “in everything I will say, a certain void, the place of an 
internal desert.”750 This also resonates with Dionysius’ notion of hierarchy, a word that 
he coined. “We have a venerable sacred tradition with asserts that every hierarchy is the 
complete expression of the sacred elements comprised within it. It is the perfect total of 
all its sacred constituents.”751 The hierarchy is a structure – imaginal, linguistic, social, 
cosmic – which provides access to “something mysterious or secretly revealed.”752 
 
In relation to Plato Derrida discusses the Good beyond Being from the Republic and the 
khora from the Timaeus. After a discussion of Dionysius, he reflects on Heidegger’s 	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statement to students in Zurich in 1951: “If I were yet to write a theology, as I am 
sometimes tempted to do, the word ‘being’ ought not appear there.”  
 
With regard to Dionysius’ apophasis he claims that it is characterized by the fact that it 
begins with prayer. In the Divine Names Dionysius writes: 
 
Wherefore, before everything and especially before a discourse about God, it is 
necessary to begin with a prayer – not so the power present both everywhere and 
nowhere shall come to us but so that by our divine remembrance and invocations 
we ourselves shall be guided to it and be united with it.753 
 
The prayer functions as an orientation toward the unknown. Derrida observes that the 
prayer at the beginning of the Mystical Theology is addressed simultaneously to God, to 
Dionysius’ disciple Timothy and to the reader: 
 
The identity of this place, and hence of this text, and of its reader, comes from 
the future of what is promised by the promise… the apophasis is brought into 
motion – it is initiated, in the sense of initiative and initiation –by the event of a 
revelation which is also a promise… the place that is thus revealed remains the 
place of waiting, awaiting the realization of the promise. Then it will take place 
fully. It will be fully a place.754 
 
This sense of the revelation that is full of promise can be seen in Jung’s attitude toward 
psychic phenomena. The symbol contains promise of an as yet undisclosed meaning. 
Jung insisted on the importance of maintaining an open and expectant attitude toward 
the unconscious – waiting on the images. His texts can be read as addressed 
simultaneously to the unconscious and to the reader with an expectation of an unknown 
future. 
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According to Jung prayer or invocation directs the libido within: 
 
… the invocation expresses this introversion, and the explicit expectation that 
God will speak empties the conscious mind of activity and transfers it to the 
divine being constellated by the invocation, who, from the empirical point of 
view, must be regarded as a primordial image. It is a fact of experience that all 
archetypal contents have a certain autonomy, since they appear spontaneously 
and can often exercise an overwhelming compulsion. There is, therefore, 
nothing intrinsically absurd about the expectation that “God” will take over the 
activity and spontaneity of the conscious mind, for the primordial images are 
quite capable of doing precisely this.755 
 
Jung recommends a similar attitude of surrender to the unknown in the case of dreams 
and of individuation. He reminds himself when he hears a dream, “I have no idea what 
this dream means:”756  
 
Even if one has great experience in these matters, one is again and again 
obliged, before each dream, to admit one’s ignorance and renouncing all 
preconceived ideas, to prepare for something entirely unexpected.757 
 
This is similar to Dionysius stance of orienting himself in such a way that he is drawn 
toward the One. The analyst by accepting his own ignorance is willing to be moved or 
illuminated by the dream. The dream provides perspective on the personal unconscious 
and life circumstances, but because personal complexes have roots in archetypal images 
dreams are also windows into the collective unconscious. Derrida, reflecting on 
Eckhart, asserts that apophatic discourse discloses the relationship between Being and 
beyond-being: 
 
The place is only a place of passage, and more precisely, a threshold. But a 
threshold, this time, to give access to what is no longer a place. A subordination, 	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a relativization of the place, and an extraordinary consequence; the place is 
Being. Being is the place. Solely a threshold, a sacred place, the outer sanctuary 
of the temple.758 
 
In analysis Jung finds that with some people there comes a time when they have 
exhausted an exploration of material that is dominated by repetition or family dynamics 
and the patient is challenged to discover their own individuality in a more radical way. 
In this situation the analyst must adopt a stance of absolute openness in relation to the 
patient’s individuation:   
 
A collective attitude enables the individual to fit into society without friction… 
But the patient’s difficulty consists precisely in the fact that his individual 
problem cannot be fitted without friction into a collective norm; it requires a 
solution of an individual conflict if the whole of his personality is to remain 
viable. No rational solution can do justice to this task, and there is absolutely no 
collective norm that could replace an individual solution without loss.759 
 
Derrida’s goal is to penetrate the impossible, rather than pointless repetition of a 
programme: 
 
Going where it is possible to go would not be a displacement or a decision, it 
would be the irresponsible unfolding of a program. The sole decision possible 
passes through the madness of the undecidable and the impossible: to go where 
it is impossible to go.760 
 
The analytic space is a space set apart. The entrance and exit from the space receives a 
great deal of attention in psychoanalytic technique, as the integrity of the frame of 
analysis is considered vital in creating the possibility for the kind of openness that Jung 
is describing. Derrida asserts that in the work of Dionysius, “It is necessary to stand or 
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step aside, to find the place proper to the experience of the secret.”761 According to 
Derrida, the practitioners of both deconstruction and negative theology appear suspect 
to outsiders because they seem to belong to secret societies: 
 
“Negative theologies” and everything that resembles a form of esoteric sociality 
have always been infortuitously associated with phenomena of secret society, as 
if access to the most rigorous apophatic discourse demanded the sharing of a 
“secret”… It is as if divulgence imperilled a revelation promised to apophasis.762 
 
Mustikos in the Mystical Theology is translated by Luibheid as mystic or mysterious. 
The stain of the secret, real or imagined, casts its aura over the analytic relationship and 
analytic institutions. The seal of confidentiality breeds both confidence and suspicion. 
The popular susceptibility to and scepticism of psychobabble seem connected with this 
point. Beyond this generic analogy with psychoanalysis, we can find some resonances 
within Jung’s work on alchemy. The alchemical vessel must be well sealed. The 
philosopher’s stone is a secret. “The substance that harbours the divine secret is 
everywhere, including the human body.”763 
 
In this essay Derrida claims that all the forms of negation that he describes “are always 
also affirmative, either echoing or presupposing the positivities they seek to describe by 
denials.”764 When he writes about the trace, it is possible to hear echoes with a possible 
interpretation of Jung’s concept of archetype. “The most negative discourse, even 
beyond all nihilisms and negative dialectics, preserves the trace: The trace of an event 
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older than it or of a ‘taking-place’ to come, the one and the other: there is here neither 
an alternative nor a contradiction.”765 
 
We could read this as a suggestion that one aspect of the apophatic dynamic at play 
between the ego and the archetype is that for the ego the archetype can represent 
simultaneously a trace of a primordial event and a trace of an unknown future. This is 
one way in which the archetype acts as a coincidence of opposites. 
 
The essay, ‘Sauf le nom,’ published in 1995 is a longer version of a post-script that 
Derrida wrote for the collection of papers from which the essay we have been 
discussing was taken. ‘Sauf le nom’ is written as a discussion amongst a collection of 
voices, which question, challenge and interrupt each other. Consequently it is difficult 
to state exactly what the author’s argument is. Gersh claims that in this essay Derrida is 
describing “negative theology not only as the intersection of two traditions but also 
through the interaction of two speakers.”766 On my reading it is not a dialogue but a 
group discussion. 
 
The point that Derrida is making is that there is not one negative theology, but that there 
are many. His post-script mirrors the conference in having many voices and points of 
view. “Are there sure criteria available to decide the belonging, virtual or actual, of a 
discourse to negative theology?” 767 He maintains that negative theology is not a literary 
art and that there is no “classic” negative theology. How can there be? “If the 
consequent unfolding of so many discourses (logical, onto-logical, theo-logical or not) 
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inevitably leads to conclusion whose form and content is similar to negative theology, 
where are the ‘classic’ frontiers of negative theology?”768 
 
This question could be asked of psychoanalysis as well. What criteria are there for 
determining “true analysis”? This reflects one of the questions raised here: Do all the 
forms of analysis “inevitably lead to a conclusion similar to negative theology.” One 
way Derrida reflects on the nature of negative theology is to observe that the discourse 
moves in several directions: 
 
To whom is this discourse addressed? Who is its addressee? Does it exist before 
this interlocutor, before the discourse, before its actualization [so passage a 
l’acte], before its performative accomplishment? Dionysius the Areopagite, for 
example, articulates a certain prayer, turned toward God; he links it with an 
address to the disciple, more precisely to the becoming-disciple of him who is 
thus call to hear… The hymn and the didactic become allied… This conversion 
turns (itself) toward the other in order to turn (it) toward God, without there 
being an order to these two movements that are in truth the same.769 
 
One can apply this knot of questions to analysis. Does analysis exist in any meaningful 
sense before it is performed by the analyst, the patient, the unconscious and the analytic 
community – all of whom are actors, agents and addressees in the analytic encounter. 
Much as Dionysius is creating his disciple, the analyst is creating a patient. The disciple 
and the patient are being created within the context of a larger community that 
authorises and forms the process through its dogma, theory, institutions and over-sight 
of the encounter. Within a Jungian context the God-image, the self, is invoked in the 
encounter with the other, in the other and through the other. “The hymn and the didactic 
become allied.” The invocation of the self and the educative aspect of analysis are “two 
movements that are in truth the same.” Apophasis and analysis are performances that 	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create new relationships and meaning. They are performances that consist in the endless 
negation of their own languages. 
 
“God ‘is’ the name of this bottomless collapse, of this endless desertification of 
language.”770 The god-image for Jung is also endless. “Likewise the self; as the essence 
of individuality it is unitemporal and unique; as an archetypal symbol it is a God-image 
and therefore universal and eternal.”771 
 
When Derrida highlights the place of prayer in Dionysius’ apophasis it is possible to see 
parallels with repetition compulsion and individuation.  It also resonates with the 
notions of Deo consedente in alchemy772 and the motto above Jung’s front door:  
 
In a moment I will try to show how negative theology at least claims not to be 
assimilable to a technique that I subject to simulation or parody, to mechanical 
repetition. It would escape from this by means of the prayer that precedes 
apophatic utterances, and by the address to the other, to you, in a moment that is 
not only the preamble or the methodological threshold of the experience. 
Naturally, the prayer, invocation, and apostrophe can also be mimicked, and 
even give way, as if despite themselves, to repetitive technique.773  
 
It is also possible to ask whether Dionysius’ prayer, address to the other, can be seen as 
a form of transference, a transference of the “originary aporia or trace:” 
 
… the originary aporia or trace that simultaneously makes identity claims 
possible whilst at the same time ensuring that they can never be complete… 
Derrida’s philosophy seeks to articulate an originary point of aporia that 
precedes and determines the opposition between the transcendental and 
empirical upon which the metaphysics of presences seeks to institute itself… 
For Derrida, this (entirely correct) insistence upon the irreducibility of this 	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aporia to either the empirical or the transcendental means that deconstruction 
often turns into a kind of  via negativa.774 
 
Derrida identifies three objections to taking negative theology seriously. One is the 
accusation of nihilism or obsurantism. The second is that negative theology is a “simple 
technique… It comes back to speaking for nothing.” The third objection is of particular 
interest in this discussion because he touches fleetingly on psychoanalysis: 
Here the suspicion takes a form that can reverse the process of the accusation: 
once the apophatic discourse is analyzed in its logical-grammatical form, if it is 
not merely sterile, repetitive, obscurantist, mechanical, it perhaps leads us to 
consider the becoming-theological of all discourse. From the moment a 
proposition takes a negative form, the negativity that manifests itself need only 
be pushed to the limit, and it at least resembles an apophatic theology… “God” 
would name that without which one would not know how to account for any 
negativity: grammatical or logical negation, illness, evil, and finally neurosis 
which, far from permitting psychoanalysis to reduce religion to a symptom, 
would obligate it to recognize in the symptom the negative manifestation of 
God.775 
 
 
“In itself interminable, the apophatic movement cannot contain within itself the 
principle of its interruption. It can only indefinitely defer the encounter with its own 
limit.”776 
 
Bradley describes Derrida’s method as a questioning of binary oppositions. “The binary 
differences that constitute Western metaphysics are shown to be preceded by a third 
position that belongs to neither and that allows those differences to appear as 
oppositional. This unthought space between the transcendental and the empirical is the 
aporia that – however impossibly – deconstruction attempts to think. “777 	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This “unthought space” is the ground on which deconstruction meets the discourse of 
negative theology. This potential space between the transcendental and the empirical 
was also the space that Jung was exploring. His description of the work of the 
alchemists serves as a description of his own work. In it we can hear echoes of 
Derrida’s discussion of negative theology - “It situates itself beyond all position:”778 
  
The imaginatio, as the alchemists understand it, is in truth a key that opens the 
door to the secret of the opus. We now know that it is a question of representing 
and realizing those “greater” things which the soul, on God’s behalf, imagines 
creatively and extra naturam – or, to put it in modern language, a question of 
actualizing those contents of the unconscious which are outside nature, i.e., not a 
datum of our empirical world, and therefore an a priori of archetypal character. 
The place or the medium of realization in neither mind nor matter, but that 
intermediate realm of subtle reality which can be adequately only expressed by 
the symbol. The symbol is neither abstract nor concrete, neither rational nor 
irrational, neither real nor unreal. It is always both: it is non vulgi, the 
aristocratic preoccupation of one who is set apart (cuislibet sequestrati), chosen 
and predestined by God from the very beginning.779 
 
Derrida and Jung are making and unmaking language in order to think about and 
imagine the space of individuation. 
 
Tacey 
 
We turn now to the work of the post-Jungian writers Tacey and Dourley. Tacey has 
argued that recent postmodern philosophy and deconstructive critique are suitable 
partners for Jungian thought. “But a link with Jung’s vision has been established, a 
bridge has been created between the deconstructionists and Jung’s Gnostic spirit. That 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
778 Derrida, p. 91 
779 CW8 400 
	   183	  
link is clearly through the via negativa.”780 Tacey is also sensitive to the accusation that 
Jung is anachronistic: 
 
Jung’s non-modernist project seemed backward and out of date in his time, but 
today it can be regarded as offering ground and inspiration for a postmodern 
recovery of our relationship with the sacred after the collapse of positivistic 
science and after loss of belief in theistic religion and absolute truth… there is a 
real possibility of finding common ground between Jung’s analytical 
psychology and postmodern deconstructive philosophy.781 
 
Tacey’s concern is to rescue transcendence. His argument is broad-brush and has a 
prophetic urgency.  He represents a particular strain of post-Jungian writing that seeks 
to establish post-modern credentials for Jungian work. It seems to me that apophasis 
offers a greater range of interpretive possibilities than transcendence.  
 
Tacey also privileges experience over interpretation. He claims that Derrida’s late work 
shows that “he entered a state of mind that could be described as mystical, or at least 
poetic-lyrical and receptive to mystery.”782  He claims that deconstruction “seems to be 
the ‘royal road’ to the recovery of transcendence in our time.”783 It is difficult to avoid 
the conclusion that Tacey has committed the common mistake of misquoting Freud. 
Freud claimed that “the interpretation of dreams is the royal road to a knowledge of 
unconscious activities,”784 but most references to the royal road state implicitly or 
explicitly that dreams are the royal road to the unconscious. It is the interpretation of 
dreams, not the dreams themselves that open the way to understanding the unconscious.  
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Tacey’s concern to recover transcendence has quite a concrete, ‘substantial’ character – 
more return of the repressed than openness to the unknown.  “Why does the 
transcendent keep returning in this way? I believe the answer is because it exists and it 
is real.”785 This of course echoes the disputes about Dionysius’ work. Is it mystical 
experience or is it philosophy? Tacey sees a preoccupation with the Unknown as the site 
for the meeting of Freudian and Jungian thought. He claims that psychoanalysts have 
strayed into “Jungian territory.”786  
 
Dourley 
 
Dourley’s work engages in greater depth and specificity than does Tacey’s with the 
place of the apophatic in Jung’s psychology. He has written about a variety of themes in 
Jung’s work on religion and mysticism.787 According to Dourley, “Jung, in his choice of 
mystics, would appear to have anticipated the current scholarly renewal of interest in 
the apophatic.”788 
 
Dourley is passionate in his argument that the current condition of human kind requires 
the emergence of a form of religion based on immanence rather than transcendence. By 
immanence Dourley means psyche. He opposes any view that there may be something 
outside of or beyond psyche. Nevertheless even within this immanent frame there is a 	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drive toward transcendence. As he describes it the process is reminiscent of Gregory of 
Nyssa’s epektasis, a stretching forth beyond what one has grasped or seen. We have 
seen this type of apophasis described by Milem as a negative theology based on desire 
and by Rorem as progressive apophasis: 
 
Rather in the spirituality emerging in contemporary culture transcendence 
becomes a function or consequence of a sense of an immanent power native to 
humanity… Transcendence becomes a function of immanence in so much as the 
power native to the human always transcends its realization at any given 
moment in the individual’s development. There is always more to be 
assimilated… modern spirituality shares a discernible affinity with Jung’s 
understanding that the self can be only approximated never exhaustively 
realized.789 
 
Dourley places the emphasis on a force from within which propels the mind toward 
transcendence, rather than on a force from without that draws the mind toward itself. 
My use of the word ‘mind’ here is problematic as Dourley discussion moves, at times 
seamlessly, between the individual, social, collective and archetypal. “The process is 
wholly internal to the psyche as productive of personal unification and universal 
relatedness. It is one that never ends.”790 
 
Dourley argues that apophatic mystics experience a form of passivity that goes “beyond 
archetypal urgency.” This decompression, as it were, of the archetypal allows for the 
assimilation into consciousness of new contents and potentials:  
 
In fact the Christian mystics to whom Jung turns in his corpus undergo such a 
loss of distinction in a nothingness in which their personal identity is fused with 
the divine in an abyss beyond all separation… the nothingness they undergo 
carries with it a certain passivity or resignation that moderate the drive of the 
archetypes to become conscious in human consciousness the unconscious 	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creates for that purpose. Penetration into an area of psyche beyond archetypal 
urgency, though best described in religious and mystical terms, could be a 
valuable asset in ushering the archetypes into consciousness, individual and 
collective, in such a way as to preserve and enhance consciousness in the 
process. 791  
 
Dourley contends that Jung’s thought opens the way toward a recognition among 
religions, cultures and political movements “of their common origin in a psyche 
preceding their differences whose further reach is a stillness of the nothing prior to all 
form and drive.”792 This has strong resonances with Milem’s metaphysical theory of 
negative theology,793 which “identifies God as the first cause of the existence of all 
things and argues that negative theology offers the most appropriate way to talk about 
this cause.” Dourley’s “stillness of the nothing” echoes as well with Franke’s statement 
that, “We begin to perceive the ubiquitous presence of the unsayable in all our saying. 
All that is said, at least indirectly and implicitly, testifies to something else that is not 
said and perhaps cannot be said.”794 In Dourley’s formulation however there is no 
apophatic movement that can exceed psyche. So psyche is, in effect, the first and the 
last word: 
 
The only legitimate sense of the word “transcendence” in Jungian parlance rests 
on the fecundity of the archetypal which will always transcend its valuable but 
ever partial incarnation in historical consciousness… This is the only legitimate 
understanding of transcendent divinity in a Jungian universe and its referent is to 
the commerce between the conscious and unconscious moments of the psychic 
life in which the latter will always transcend the former.795 
 
Dourley cites Jung to the effect that, “everything of a divine or daemonic character 
outside us must return to the psyche, to the inside of the unknown man, whence it 	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apparently originated.”796 This appeal to the “unknown man” resonates with discussions 
of apophatic anthropology by Saward, Bernauer, Carlson and Otten, cited in the 
introduction of this study. The “unknown man” is an instance of the God-image. 
Carlson, in a more recent work develops a genealogy of apophatic anthropology that 
embraces Origin, Gregory of Nyssa, Dionysius, Eriugena and Cusa, among others:  
 
Eriugena’s apophatic anthropology complements his apophatic theology: neither 
God nor the human subject created in his image can comprehend what they 
themselves are – even as they achieve, through their own self-creative self-
expression, an awareness that they are.797 
 
Carlson also observes that Cusa, “marks a crucial link between medieval mysticism and 
modern conceptions of human creativity.”798 This is interesting in view of the important 
use Jung makes of Cusa’s coincidence of opposites. However, I suspect that Dourley’s 
thorough-going psychic immanence would not sit easily with these earlier writers. 
 
Dourley also constructs a genealogy of mystics that were of interest to Jung. These 
include Mechthild of Magdeburg, Eckhart and Boehme: 
 
Historically the mystics to whom he is most drawn are mystics whose 
experience was characterized by an apophatic moment, that is, an immersion in 
divinity in which all distinction between themselves and the divine was 
annihilated in a moment of an all consuming nothingness.799 
 
He reminds us that for Jung, “Mystics are people who have a particularly vivid 
experience of the processes of the collective unconscious. Mystical experience is 
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experience of archetypes.”800 Dourley discusses the relationship between the “apophatic 
moment” and the strengthening of ego consciousness: 
 
What Eckhart and the mystics of the apophatic moment are describing as an 
immersion in the divine nothingness is a moment of the ego’s dissolution in 
what Jung terms the “Great Mother” or “Goddess”, who precedes all form and 
creation and from whom all form and creation derive. In so doing they would 
seem to go to a moment of total rest or resignation in the source of their being 
ever present to them in the depths of their personal participation in the universal 
ground of the psyche… These mystic travellers would seem to go beyond the 
compulsive creativity of the archetypal to the moment of rest in a fourth, the 
God beyond the God of Trinity and beyond the Gods of biblical theism, namely, 
in the Goddess herself.801 
 
Hood questions psychoanalytic interpretations of mysticism that rely on the concept of 
regression, including Jungian formulations. He criticises Owens’ suggestion that “the 
mystic is returning to a ‘pre-infantile’ level of existence that is obviously 
conceptualized in terms of Jung’s notion of the collective unconscious.”802 He argues 
that it is wrong to characterise mystical experience in terms of states of consciousness. 
These experiences have to be understood as processes. One crucial element of the 
process is the awareness of the ego of its own dissolution. This is a capacity which is 
beyond the scope of infantile consciousness: 
 
Now what is important about this state of consciousness is not simply the state 
per se but rather that the state itself reflects a process of ego loss that is 
experienced as such. It is this experience as a process, not as a state, that must be 
adequately grasped before any psychological analysis can be attempted. Not 
only is the mystical state itself logically one in which the ego is not 
distinguished from that which it experiences, but mystics themselves affirm the 
experiential nature of this loss as a process… not only must the mystical 
experience of unity logically imply the dissolution of individuality but that 
mystics in fact directly experience this dissolution.803 	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Hood’s criticism of Jung, while it is correct in that Jung’s view is regressive, is 
incorrect in overlooking Jung’s argument that it is precisely the role of the ego that 
distinguishes Western from Eastern mysticism. He wishes to safe-guard the 
achievement of the ego and not to lose the dialectical relationship between conscious 
and unconscious. Jung maintains that, “The relation of a psychic content to the ego 
forms the criterion of its consciousness, for no content can be conscious unless it is 
represented to a subject.”804 This is different from the view in the East that 
consciousness is not dependent on objects or representations. Dourley appears to place 
greater emphasis on the dissolution of the ego than does Jung. “Jung understood the 
process of individuation to entail not only a return to the unconscious as the origin of 
consciousness but also an immersion of the ego into the unconscious beyond all 
difference and differentiation.”805  
 
Dourley does not explain how this process tallies with the transcendent function, which 
requires a maintaining rather than a release of tension. In his 2008 book, Paul Tillich, 
Carl Jung and the Recovery of Religion, the transcendent function does not appear in 
the index. In his 2010 book, On Behalf of the Mystical Fool: Jung on the Religious 
Situation, there are five references to the transcendent function in the index. Only one of 
those references deals directly with Jung’s use of the phrase “complete abolition” of the 
ego in the transcendent function and this from a letter to White, not a published essay. 
This is very thin evidence for Dourley’s argument that the abolition of the ego is central 
to Jung’s thought: 
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Jung’s reference to the complete abolition of the ego points to the apophatic 
dimension of his understanding of the psyche. It aligns his psychology with that 
strain of mysticism which experiences momentary identity with God in a return 
to a divine nothingness in which ego consciousness undergoes a moment of 
obliteration in a state beyond any distinction between itself and the divine.806 
 
Dourley repeatedly uses the image of being rooted or becoming rerooted in the maternal 
nothingness as the agenda of a Jungian spirituality and he uses Jung’s description of 
modern man to validate this agenda: 
 
Indeed, he is completely modern only when he has come to the very edge of the 
world, leaving behind him all that has been discarded and outgrown, and 
acknowledging that he stands before the Nothing out of which All may grow.807 
 
It seems to me that “stand[ing] before the Nothing” is different from being rooted in the 
Nothing and that this difference illustrates the flavour of Dourley’s particular take on 
Jung’s work on the mystics.  
 
The whole of Dourley’s description of mysticism is framed in terms of a return to the 
Mother. Dourley wants to go beyond Jung’s position that, “Mysticism is experience of 
the archetypes.” He appears impatient with what he describes a Jung’s fear when 
confronted by Eckhart’s experience of breakthrough. “The experience of so radical a 
self-loss is only questionably a component of Jung’s model of the psyche and its 
working.”808 Dourley suggests that the mystics experience a pre-archetypal level of the 
psyche, “beyond archetypal urgency.”809 “Such consciousness would be prior to and so 
transcend any form of archetypal concretion and so stand always in relation to them as 
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the source of their iconoclastic dissolution.”810 There is here an apophatic dynamic in 
relation to “archetypal concretion, ” however having flirted with something beyond the 
archetypes, Dourley reaffirms his faith in the all-embracing nature of psyche: 
 
The divine nothingness into which the mystics merge is not a power extrinsic to 
the psyche. It is the primordial level of the psyche itself from which all 
consciousness, form and culture derive… Transcendence becomes a wholly 
intrapsychic reality.811 
 
Dourley advances a relentless polemic again monotheism. There is an apophatic twist in 
his work in that it is human consciousness that transcends God. The human puts God in 
his/her/its place. He cites Jung’s dream in which both Jung and his father are kneeling 
before the figure of Uriah: 
 
In the dream Uriah personifies a faith betrayed… Jung’s father kissed the floor 
before Uriah in submission to Uriah and to his God. Jung bowed to within a 
millimetre of the floor but did not kiss it. Had he done so he would have 
capitulated to the pathology of his father’s faith… The millimetre that separated 
Jung’s forehead from the floor before Uriah is the “small but decisive factor” by 
which the consciousness of the creature surpasses that of the creator.812 
 
The millimetre of difference is a small apophatic move that has cosmic consequences 
for Dourley. While Dourley explores Jung’s attraction to and use of a number of 
apophatic mystics, in this instance, Dourley himself is unconsciously performing a 
rhetorical move of considerable apophatic intensity. Dourley is excoriating about the 
“one and Only gods” of the monotheisms, but there is a risk that his own commitment 
to a Jungian model of the psyche could be read as being itself a type of monotheism. 
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In this chapter I have used the work of contemporary writers to explore apophatic 
elements in Jung’s work. This discussion brings to light additional facets of Jung’s 
apophasis. Furthermore it demonstrates that the apophatic problematic in Jung’s 
thought is not regressive but that it is in tune with important currents in contemporary 
philosophy and theology. 	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Chapter Eight 
 
 
The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy and the Psychotherapeutic Process 
 
Dionysius’ Ecclesiastical Hierarchy (EH) describes the worshipping community, 
gathered to grow into conformity with the providential dynamic of the One. There are 
striking parallels between the metaphors and images used in the EH and descriptions of 
the process of psychoanalytic psychotherapy. Jung describes the Mass as “the rite of the 
individuation process.”813 Hotz argues that, “Denys recognized that the religious 
subjectivity of Christians is formed in communities through devotional and public 
worship practices precisely because these practices remap the patterns that make person 
who they are.”814  
 
In this chapter I will weave a tapestry of texts from the EH with descriptions of 
psychoanalytic psychotherapy. In this impressionistic fashion I hope to illuminate the 
analogies between the symbolic world of Dionysius and contemporary psychoanalytic 
theory and practice. The liturgy includes the reading of scripture, the chanting of 
psalmody and the singing of hymns. Dionysius comments that, “If one considers these 
texts with a reverent eye one will see something that both brings about unity and 
manifests a single empathy.”815 This chapter aims to inspire in the reader an 
appreciation of an empathy at work between the imagery and language of the EH and 
the language and practice of psychoanalytic psychotherapy. 	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This approach differs from the detailed explication of texts and the definition of words 
and concepts used in previous chapters. While this may result in a loss of conceptual 
clarity it is intended to highlight the element of process and flow within the EH and 
psychoanalytic psychotherapy. The sources of the quotations and ideas cited in this 
tapestry are not always identified, perhaps contributing to a sense of a “harmonious 
interpenetrating mix-up.”816 Much of the description of psychoanalytic psychotherapy in 
this chapter relies on my own experience of the analytic process and can be 
characterised as common knowledge among psychoanalytic practitioners. It is hoped 
that this experiential style will illuminate additional facets of the apophatic strain in 
psychoanalysis. 
 
Chapter one of EH is an introduction to the meaning of the hierarchy. Subsequent 
chapters deal with different aspects of the liturgy. First there is a description of the rite 
and this is followed in each case by a “contemplation”, an interpretation of the meaning 
of the ritual. This structure reflects the theme of emanation and return, the descent into 
matter and the ascent to mind. Psychoanalytic interpretation is similarly contemplative 
in its retrospective focus. Events occur within the therapeutic relationship and their 
meanings are then analysed. Jung observed that “the alchemical opus consisted of two 
parts: the work in the laboratory with all its emotional and daemonic hazards, and the 
scientia or theoria, the guiding principle of the opus by which its results were 
interpreted and given their proper place.”817 
  
Dionysius refers to the EH as “our human hierarchy”, in contrast to the angelic 	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hierarchy described in the Celestial Hierarchy. “A hierarchy is always, simultaneously 
order, understanding, and activity.”818 In the EH he sets out to show that “it is by way of 
the perceptible images that we are uplifted as far as can be to the contemplation of what 
is divine.”819  In an analogous manner the psychotherapist witnesses the gradual 
revelation of the client’s individuality/identity as the transferences and complexes 
which are constellated in the therapy are gradually analysed and worked through.  
 
The EH is “the arrangement of all the sacred realities.”820 The analytic frame and 
relationship are understood to be the “space” within which the client’s whole 
personality, history and potential can become manifest. Each session contains the full 
constellation of the client’s psychic situation at that moment. The whole inner world is 
at play in the transference/countertransference enactment of the session:  
 
The common goal of every hierarchy consists of the continuous love of God and 
things divine, a love which is sacredly worked out in an inspired and unique 
way, and before this, the complete and unswerving avoidance of everything 
contrary to it. It consists of a knowledge of beings as they really are. It consists 
of both the seeing and the understanding of sacred truth. It consists of an 
inspired participation in the one-like perfection and in the one itself, as far as 
possible. It consists of a feast upon that sacred vision which nourishes the 
intellect and which divinizes everything rising up to it.821  
 
According to Freud, in psychoanalysis, “Essentially, one might say, the cure is effected 
by love.”822 He felt that the capacity to work and to love were the goals of analysis. For 
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Jung the aim of analysis was individuation, which he characterised as the realisation of 
the self. Images of the self appear within the psyche as images of God. In Jung’s terms 
“divinization” would consist in attaining wholeness, the appropriate balance between 
conscious and unconscious aspects of the personality. For Dionysius, Freud and Jung 
eros plays a crucial role in motivating and energizing the “human hierarchy”. “Denys 
rooted the capacity of the sacramental life of the church to prompt our return to unity in 
his erotic theological anthropology, sympathetic cosmology and translation of 
Iamblichan theurgy in to a Christian Incarnational theology.”823 The process is 
nourishing for the mind: 
 
The first leaders of our hierarchy received their fill of the sacred gift from the 
transcendent Deity. Then divine goodness sent them to lead others to this same 
gift. Like gods, they had a burning and generous urge to secure uplifting and 
divinization for their subordinates.824  
 
The therapist must first have undertaken their own therapy. The fruits of one’s own 
analysis are available to one’s clients. Gratitude to one’s analyst enables you to survive 
the privations of analytic practice. According to Jung, you can only take your clients as 
far as you have been yourself. A great deal of zeal is required to undertake 
psychotherapy training and persevere in the development of a psychotherapy practice:  
 
… using images derived from the senses they spoke of the transcendent… Of 
necessity they made human what was divine. They put material on what was 
immaterial. In their written and unwritten initiations, they brought the 
transcendent down to our level… In the divine fashion it needs perceptible 
things to lift us up into the domain of conceptions.825  
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The fashioning and communication of interpretations is a core activity for the 
psychotherapist. Images from the client’s speech are analysed for conceptual content, 
therefore being “uplifted” to an intellectual level. The unconscious communication of 
the client which the therapist experiences in the countertransference is transformed into 
everyday language. Unconscious meanings are “materialised” in conscious meaning. 
 
Some clients use abstract language as a defense and need to be encouraged to be more 
concrete, in Dionysius’ terms, to describe the “perceptible things”. Only if they first of 
all talk about the detail of their experience can the “uplifting” action of interpretation be 
meaningful: 
 
I am giving you this gift of God, together with other things pertaining to the 
hierarchs. I do so because of the solemn promises you made, of which I am now 
reminding you, promises never to pass to anyone except sacred-initiators of your 
own order the hierarch’s superior sacred words.826  
 
Psychotherapy occurs within a “solemn” contract of confidentiality. In Jungian terms, 
using alchemical imagery, the vessel of the analysis must be well sealed. Clients are 
encouraged not to allow the intensity of the therapeutic process to lead to leakage. 
Acting-out is seen by some psychoanalysts as an attack of the therapeutic container. 
Breaking of confidentiality by the therapist can be a serious ethical breach, which may 
be grounds for a formal complaint by the client. The imposition of limits on the 
confidentiality of the therapeutic relationship by the state, is a cause of serious concern 
for some therapists. 
 
One element of the assessment process and of the early stages of psychotherapy is a 	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determination of the client’s commitment to the undertaking. Do they have some 
intuition of the nature of the “gift” of analysis? Can they tolerate receiving something 
good; will they feel the urge to reject it or destroy it? Are they frightened or suspicious 
of the intimacy of the analytic relationship? Is the therapist prepared to be open to this 
new person; to allow the therapeutic process to evolve and deepen without too much 
resistance on his/her part? Are both parties respectful of the “sacred” trust that will arise 
between them as their relationship grows. 
 
In chapter two, Dionysius asks, “What, then, is the starting point for the sacred 
enactment of the most revered commandments?”827  The starting point is baptism, which 
is described as a “divine birth” and as “illumination”. Its purpose is: 
 
…  to dispose our souls to hear the sacred words as receptively as possible, to be 
open to the divine workings of God, to clear an uplifting path toward that 
inheritance which awaits us in heaven, and to accept our most divine and sacred 
regeneration.828 
 
How does the therapeutic process begin? What stages need to occur to insure solid 
foundations for its subsequent development? How is the therapeutic alliance formed? 
First the client will approach the therapist with a desire to move out of his/her present 
condition of suffering, confusion or contradiction. The approach may be through an 
intermediary – a G.P., a counselling or psychotherapy organisation, a friend – or 
directly to the prospective therapist: 
Someone fired by love of transcendent reality and longing for a sacred share of 
it comes first to an initiate, asks to be brought to the hierarch, and promises 
complete obedience to whatever is laid upon him. He asks him to take charge of 
his training and of everything connected with his future life.829 	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In the initial session or in the assessment the ground rules of therapy are discussed. 
Agreement is reached about fees, cancelled sessions and session times and frequency. 
There may be discussion of how to manage any unexpected meetings on the street, in 
the supermarket or at social events. Etiquette on use of the phone and holiday dates may 
be discussed. Some therapists suggest that dreams should be recorded. Freud instructed 
patients in the basic rule of analysis - free association - and advised them not to make 
any major life decisions during the course of the analysis: 
 
When should we start communicating to the analysand? When is the right time 
to reveal the secret meaning of his associations, to initiate him in to the theory 
and technical procedures of analysis? The only possible answer is: not until the 
patient has established a usable transference, a proper rapport. The first objective 
of the treatment remains to attach him to the therapy and the person of the 
doctor.830  
 
Dionysius’ picture of the initiate’s anxieties about undertaking the care of the supplicant 
are similar to a therapist’s when beginning an analysis. “The other is moved by the 
desire for the man’s salvation but when he compares the human situation with the 
heights confronting the enterprise, fright and uncertainty lay hold of him.”831 According 
to Jung: 
 
It is inevitable that the doctor should be influenced to a certain extent and even 
that his nervous health should suffer. He quite literally “takes over” the 
sufferings of his patient and shares them with him. For this reason he runs a risk 
– and must run it in the nature of things.832 
 
Nevertheless having overcome these anxieties the sponsor presents the supplicant to the 	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hierarch and through him to the community. When a therapist takes on a new client 
there is a process of introducing the client to a supervisor, as well as, the gradual 
incorporation of the client into the analytic community and tradition as they exist within 
the inner world of the therapist. The client becomes aware that “he must give himself 
totally”833 to this new environment.  
 
After his sandals and garments are removed and he has repeated the proscribed 
declarations and prayers he is covered with oil and immersed three times. This powerful 
enactment contains elements of conception, life in the womb and birth, all of which can 
be part of the transference or appear in dreams during early phases of psychotherapy. If 
someone was an unwanted baby this usually becomes clear very early. It is hard to 
conceive of the fact that the therapist might want him/her as a client. Some clients treat 
the consulting room or the couch as a womb. It might be a poisoning womb or the 
longed-for safe womb. If the mother had tried to abort the child the room is usually 
experienced initially as dangerous. Difficulties during the birth are symbolised in the 
relationship with the therapist. If the client was premature and spent time an incubator 
this will inevitably appear in the transference/countertransference. Feelings of intense 
vulnerability and nakedness are often part of the beginning of therapy. The sense of a 
new beginning or rebirth can be very palpable.  
 
Baptism “differentiates… what belongs to the common crowd from the things that bind 
and unify a hierarchy, and it apportions to each order its due and fitting measure of 
uplifting.”834  The sense of relief and excitement at the beginning of therapy can lead to 
inflation or a flight to health. “It can happen too that these beings push beyond the 	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reasonable limits set to their vision and that they have the gall to imagine that they can 
actually gaze upon those beams which transcend their power of sight.”835  However the 
therapist maintains a non-judgemental, even-handed attitude, and “displays neither a 
grudge nor profane anger over previous apostasy and transgressions”836:  
 
But since God is the source of this sacred arrangement in accordance with which 
the intelligence of sacred beings acquires self-awareness, anyone proceeding to 
examine his own nature will at the start discover his own identity and he will 
acquire this first sacred gift as a consequence of his looking up toward the light. 
Having duly examined with unbiased gaze what he himself is he will avoid the 
dark pits of ignorance. He will not yet be sufficiently initiated into complete 
union with and participation in God nor will his longing for this come from 
within himself. Only gradually will he be uplifted to a higher state and this 
because of the mediation of people more advanced than he.837 
 
The client begins to trust that the therapist is reliable and may be of help. A rapport or 
therapeutic alliance is established. “For the one truly yearns for the life-giving journey 
toward the truth… and the other unerringly guides his follower along the ways handed 
down by God.”838 Indeed, the new client will “quite gladly hurl himself into what he 
knows to be divine contests and he will follow and scrupulously observe the wise rules 
of the game.”839 There is a danger however of acting-out. “One must fearlessly confront 
any disastrous backsliding.”840  
 
Baptism is a participation in death, as well as a birth. “Now because of this it is quite 
appropriate to hide the initiate completely in the water as an image of this death and this 
burial where form is dissolved.”841  Images of death abound at the beginning of 
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psychotherapy. Many people start by grieving the deaths of parents, children or other 
loved ones. Others are very conscious of the death of certain aspects of themselves. 
There is grief at stillborn aspects of the self, unfulfilled potential. There is anxiety about 
whether the therapist will survive. Psychic deadness, past and present, threatens the 
clients sense of coherence and potency. The consulting room and the couch can become 
a tomb, a coffin or a clostrum. Decay and breakdown threaten. “To us death is not, as 
others imagine, a complete dissolution of being. It is rather, the separation of two parts 
which had been linked together. It brings the soul into what for us is an invisible realm 
where it, in the loss of the body, becomes formless.”842 In psychotherapy psychological 
mindedness, the capacity to symbolize, and awareness of the unconscious emerge when 
familiar structures of living and imagining the self dissolve. “Order descends upon 
disorder within him. Form takes over from formlessness. Light shines through all his 
life.”843  
 
In chapter three, Dionysius describes the initiate’s participation in the synaxis 
(gathering) or communion. “Every sacredly initiating operation draws our fragmented 
lives together into a one-like divinization. It forges a unity out of the divisions within 
us… the perfection of the other hierarchical symbols is only achieved by way of the 
divine and perfecting gifts of Communion.”844  In psychoanalysis the proper 
engagement with the images of the internal parents and of the mother’s breast and the 
father’s penis are considered foundational to the proper development of subsequent 
psychological capacities. The “gathering” applies to both internal aspects of the 
personality and the ordering of interpersonal relationships. Images of feeding and 
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incorporation are ubiquitous in psychoanalysis. 
 
“We, however, when we think of the sacred synaxis must move in from effects to 
causes… to glimpse the contemplation of the conceptual things.”845 The concern of the 
client moves gradually from a recitation of events to a reflection on motives. The 
therapist allows this process to unfold at its own pace. According to Freud we start at 
the surface and then move to depth. While listening to the ins and outs of the client’s 
story the therapist holds in mind a sense of the person’s potential for wholeness. “In his 
mind he journeys toward the One. With a clear eye he looks upon the basic unity of 
those realities underlying the sacred rites. He makes the divine return to the primary 
things the goal of his procession toward secondary things, which he had undertaken out 
of love for humanity.”846  
 
“The sacred tablets have a lesson for those capable of being divinized… They teach that 
God himself thus gives substance and arrangement to everything that exists… They lay 
down the divisions by lot, the distribution and the sharing that have to do with God’s 
people.”847  The therapist’s interventions and interpretations are informed by the 
collective wisdom of the analytic community. The client begins to sense that there is a 
logic to what might at first appear to be bizarre, irrational or offensive questions or 
statements by the therapist. The client comes to see that his/her problems which seemed 
painful, alienating secrets are part of the human pattern, because “these sacred hymns, 
with their summaries of holy truth, have prepared our spirits to be at one with what we 
shall shortly celebrate, when they have attuned us to the divine harmony and have 
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brought us into accord not only with divine realities but with our individual selves and 
with others.”848 In spite of the plethora of seemingly incompatible schools of 
psychoanalysis “if one considers these texts with a reverent eye one will see something 
that both brings about unity and manifests a single empathy.”849  
 
Nevertheless some people are unable to appreciate a psychological perspective. “Those 
who are stone deaf to what the sacred sacraments teach also have no eye for 
imagery.”850  Their sense of reality is very concrete. Unless the therapist has the 
capacity to establish a relationship with them on their own terms they will end the 
therapy. “Shamelessly they have rejected the saving initiation which brings about the 
divine birth, and ruinously they have echoed the scriptural text, ‘I do not wish to know 
your ways.’”851 
 
The catechumens, the possessed and the penitents may listen to the readings and join in 
the singing of hymns, but they will not be able to participate in the eucharist. The 
catechumens are compared to pre-mature babies who are “have not received an inspired 
existence in the divine birth, but are yet being incubated by the paternal scriptures.”852 
Many clients will spend an extended time within the containment of the analytic setting 
without being aware of what is being provided for them by the frame and the therapist. 
Later they may be able to enter into a more conscious relationship with the therapist and 
with themselves. “It gives them the introductory food of scripture which shapes them 
and brings them toward life…  it withholds the perfect things from them since it wishes 
both to safeguard the harmony of these sacred things and to watch over the incubation 	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and life of the catechumens, and it does so in accordance with the divine order laid 
down by the hierarchy.”853 The therapist allows for the client’s regression or lack of 
development and avoids premature interpretations or confrontation. The therapist’s 
understanding of the client’s needs during this phase is informed by the theory of the 
particular school of therapy that he/she espouses. 
 
The possessed are at a higher level than the catechumens because they have “taken part 
in some of the sacred rites but [are] held fast by opposing charms or by confusion.”854 
They are possessed by “the illusions and terrors of the adversary” and “the ideas and 
character of abominable demons… In their extreme folly, so destructive to themselves, 
they turn away from the truly real.”855 As time goes by the client’s resistances, defences, 
splits and delusions emerge. His/her investment in psychopathology blocks the 
development of the capacity to symbolise, awareness, insight, or more mature object 
relations. Jung describes psychosis as possession of the ego by a content from the 
collective unconscious. Freud’s negative therapeutic reaction is like a demonic 
possession. An hysterical symptom is the result of an inability to be truthful with 
oneself. For Klein the baby’s envy prevents a satisfactory feed. “It is wrong for them to 
be present at any part of the rite other than that scriptural teaching aimed at their return 
to better things.”856 The therapist must stay faithful to the frame until the client can 
participate in the analytic relationship in a more creative manner. He/she tries to avoid 
being drawn into a pathological collusion with a mad, sadistic or destructive aspect of 
the client. The client may attack the therapist’s sanity and sense of reality. “Hence, I 
believe – or, rather, I know for a fact – that the members of the hierarchy, being very 	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wise in their judgement, understand that the possessed, that is, those who have turned 
away from a life conforming to divine example and have adopted instead the ideas and 
character of abominable demons, are exposed to the very worst power.”857 Freud came 
to feel that many psychological problems are the result of the death instinct. Jung wrote 
about the power of the collective shadow and considered evil to be an entity.  
 
Also barred from communion are the penitents, who had previously taken part, but 
“who are not yet purified of empty imaginings because they have not yet acquired as 
something permanent the undiluted yearning for God.”858 Some clients lack ego-
strength, object-constancy or self-esteem and they find it difficult to take responsibility 
for the awareness or insight that they have gained in therapy. As a result they may act-
out or their behaviour may be quite erratic. While there may be glimmers of a new sense 
of identity or direction it lacks potency and definition. The therapist’s holding and 
containment in the countertransference supports the client during periods of lack of 
integration. “Then it reminds us that when we had lost the divine gifts because of our 
own folly, God took the trouble to recall us to our original condition through 
adventitious gifts, that he gave us a most perfect share of his nature by completely 
taking on our own.”859 By his/her capacity to contain the projected anxiety and 
destructiveness the therapist holds the way open for the client to return to him/herself. 
 
This is a very intimate experience and provides the matter to be digested in future 
analysis. There is a sense of recognition between client and therapist and a feeling that 
one is being nourished by real experience. “The love of the Diety for humanity having 
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been thus reverently celebrated, the covered divine bread is brought forward, together 
with the cup of blessing. The divine kiss of peace is exchanged.”860 These experiences 
of acceptance and recognition become good objects in the client’s inner world and 
contribute to the formation of the ego-ideal. They constellate positive archetypal 
images. “The names are announced of those who have lived holy lives and whose 
consistent efforts earned for them the perfection of a virtuous life. In this way we are 
enticed and encouraged to follow their example… For this proclamation announces 
them as alive, as those who have not died but… who have passed from death to a more 
perfectly divine life.”861 
 
The psyche becomes a living reality for the client, who becomes aware of the 
transference, dreams, projections and the autonomy of unconscious contents. There is 
the realisation that much of what we experience and of what motivates us is determined 
by forces outside of consciousness. “Christ knows all our thoughts, even the most secret 
of them… I must now try as best I can to describe those divine workings of which we 
are the objective.”862 The client reworks the narrative of his/her life to accommodate the 
insights gained in therapy. This often involves a journey during which bad choices were 
made and destructive patterns were established. “From the very beginning human nature 
has stupidly glided away from those good things bestowed on it by God… and came at 
the end to the catastrophe of death. There followed the destructive rejection of what was 
really good… down to the deplorable peril of destruction and dissolution of being.”863 
The client’s narrative describes how through good fortune and hard work a change 
occurred. It might be attributed to God, the individual’s innate potential or the help of 	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the therapist. “Beneficently it wrought a complete change in our nature. It filled our 
shadowed and unshaped minds with a kindly, divine light… It saved our nature from 
almost complete wreckage and delivered the dwelling place of our soul from the most 
accursed passion and from destructive defilement.”864  
 
By working through (Freud) or living one’s own myth (Jung) the new psychological 
situation is established. The client’s psychopathology is transformed by being 
repeatedly constellated, contained and analysed. What was opaque, dense and heavy 
gradually becomes something that can be thought about and discussed. The client learns 
that his/her somatic symptoms are symbols of psychological states. “This imitation of 
God, how else are we to achieve it if not by endlessly reminding ourselves of God’s 
sacred works.”865 It is the holding of the tension between past and present (Jung) or 
recovering the repressed memory (Freud) which opens the possibility for reordering the 
elements of the psyche. Whether it is the memory of human nature as in Jung’s 
collective unconscious, or the memory of the individual as in Freud’s unconscious, 
finding the appropriate relationship with the past is the key to living the present and 
future. “Do this in remembrance of me.”  
 
The client now “beholds with the eyes of the mind this spectacle for conceptual 
contemplation.”866 The client can now operate from a new centre. “Where id was, there 
ego shall be.” (Freud) For Jung the appearance of the self reorients and energizes the 
personality. The elements of the client’s life, which previously appeared inert or in 
opposition to his/her intentions, now carry meaning. “The bread which had been 
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covered and undivided is now uncovered and divided into many parts. Similarly, he 
shares the one cup with all, symbolically multiplying and distributing the one in 
symbolic fashion.”867 For Jung differentiation of psychic contents leads to individuation 
of the personality. The unity of the personality is a result of the clarification of the 
differences within the psyche and between the individual and others. This is an example 
of the creative function of negation or apophasis. Disparate aspects of the personality 
find places within a whole. In Transformation Symbolism in the Mass, Jung writes:  
 
Without this “dichotomy of God,” if I may use such a term, the whole act of 
sacrifice would be inconceivable and would lack actuality…  God in his 
humanity is presumably so far from himself that he has to seek himself through 
absolute self-surrender. And where would God’s wholeness be if he could not be 
the ‘wholly other’?…  The dichotomy of God into divinity and humanity and his 
return to himself in the sacrificial act hold out the comforting doctrine that in 
man’s own darkness there is hidden a light that shall once again return to its 
source, and that this light actually wanted to descend into the darkness in order 
to deliver the Enchained One who languishes there and lead him to light 
everlasting.868 
 
 
The symptom having been analysed (divided into many parts) releases the energy and 
meaning which had been bound into its form. For Freud the repressed wish (desire/eros) 
is disguised by processes of condensation, displacement, etc. which produce a symptom 
or dream.  For Jung the symptom is a symbol, which has “an objective and a subjective 
– or psychic – origin, so that it can be interpreted on the “objective level” as well as on 
the “subjective level.”869  
 
Psychoanalysis is concerned with both the negative and the positive aspects of 
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communion and “gathering”. For Freud, symptoms and dreams are products of the 
fusion of psychic elements in order to disguise the repressed desire. The persistence of 
the symptom or dream bears witness to the insistence of the desire. The crisis of the 
Oedipus complex is about whether or not an appropriate communion can be negotiated 
between parent and child. An inappropriate Oedipal communion undermines all future 
development. The creative intercourse of the internal parents involves the capacity to 
join and separate. Fused internal parents or internal parents who do not connect 
contribute to a sense of barrenness and hopelessness in the personality. For Jung, 
individuation consists of the progressive differentiation of one’s self from internal and 
external collectives. Psychosis is the fusion of the ego with contents of the collective 
unconscious. A psychotic personality exhibits a combination of inflexibility and 
disintegration.  Neurosis occurs when an inappropriate balance between conscious and 
unconscious becomes fixed. The capacity of the psyche to adapt in a fluid fashion to 
changing circumstances is inhibited.  
 
The concept of projective identification, in Kleinian theory, can be seen as a way of 
understanding the vicissitudes of communion and “gathering”. Normal projective 
identification is the ground for relationship. Excessive projective identification destroys 
the structures of relationship and failure to engage in projective identification leads to 
isolation. Unconscious phantasies employed in projective identification are the elements 
of communication.   
 
Jung’s concept of unconscious identity performs similar tasks to those done by the 
concept of projective identification: 
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The act of making a sacrifice consists in the first place in giving something 
which belongs to me. Everything which belongs to me bears the stamp of 
“mineness,” that is, it has a subtle identity with my ego… The affinity which all 
the things bearing the stamp of “mineness” have with my personality is aptly 
characterized by Levy-Bruhl as participation mystique. It is an irrational, 
unconscious identity, arising from the fact that anything which comes into 
contact with me is not only itself, but also a symbol. This symbolization comes 
about firstly because every human being has unconscious contents, and secondly 
because every object has an unknown side… But where two unknowns come 
together, it is impossible to distinguish between them. The unknown in man and 
the unknown in the thing fall together in one. Thus there arises an unconscious 
identity which sometimes border on the grotesque.870 
 
For Jung the theurgy can be a sacrifice or a magical act. The distinction between the two 
is determined by the level of consciousness:  
 
When, therefore, I give away something that is “mine,” what I am giving is 
essentially a symbol, a thing of many meanings; but, owing to my 
unconsciousness of its symbolic character, it adheres to my ego, because it is 
part of my personality… Consequently the gift always carries with it a personal 
intention, for the mere giving of it is not a sacrifice. It only becomes a sacrifice 
if I give up the implied intention of receiving something in return… Were the 
bread and wine simply given without any consciousness of an egoistic claim, the 
fact that it was unconscious would be no excuse, but would on the contrary be 
sure proof of the existence of a secret claim. Because of its egoistic nature, the 
offering would then inevitably have the character of a magical act of 
propitiation, with the unavowed purpose and tacit expectation of purchasing the 
good will of the Deity. That is an ethically worthless simulacrum of sacrifice.871  
 
There is a quantum leap when the focus of an analysis shifts from symptom relief and 
acquisition of psychic payoffs to service of the psyche – psychotherapy. The sessions 
are at the service of the expansion and intensification of being rather than the pursuit of 
discrete measurable objectives that can be innumerated beforehand. “The Mass tries to 
effect a participation mystique – or identity – of priest and congregation with Christ, so 
that on the one hand the soul is assimilated to Christ and on the other hand the Christ-
figure is recollected in the soul. It is a transformation of God and man alike, since the 	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Mass is, at least by implication, a repetition of the whole drama of Incarnation”872:  
 
Both Dionysius and Jung are often characterized as being excessively concerned with 
the individual. Psychoanalytic psychotherapy is criticized as self-centred and selfish. On 
the contrary individual psychotherapy and apophatic discourse can be understood as 
deeply social activities. 
For Denys human beings are ontologically precluded from experiences of 
intense interiority, the like of which are often identified with mysticism: we are 
not, that is, put together in such a way that appeals to an “inner self” make any 
sense. In fact, the most basic religious experience that arises from the self-as-
yearning, ecstasy, is an experience of being called beyond the narrow confines 
of the self toward the all-surpassing divine beauty… Denys’s theurgical self, 
moreover, is not only a related self, but also necessarily an embodied self. 
Religious subjectivity is deeply connected with sense experience, for it is 
through the sensible that God attracts us to the intelligible.873 
 
Jung observes, “If we now recall to what a degree the soul has humanized and realized 
itself, we can judge how very much it today expresses the body also, with which it is 
coexistent.”874 The individuation of the individual is of value not only to the one 
concerned but contributes to the life of the collective: 
  
So too the self is our life’s goal, for it is the completest expression of that fateful 
combination we call individuality, and full flowering not only of the single 
individual, but of the group, in which each adds his portion to the whole.875 
 
The EH continues with chapters on the rite of ointment, the clerical orders, the orders of 
those being initiated (including the “therapeutae”), the consecration of a monk, and the 
rite for the dead, which will not be examined in detail here. However, the themes of 
those chapters add weight to the importance of the EH for a consideration of the 	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apophatic elements of psychoanalysis, because it brings to light the social dimension of 
apophasis. We can describe Jung’s project of cultural transformation as a kind of 
cultural apophasis.  He is concerned to read contemporary history as humanity’s halting 
efforts to wrestle with unknown futures.  
 
There is a considerable literature on the relationship between psychoanalysis and ritual. 
I suggest that it may also be worthwhile to think about the liturgical dimension of 
psychoanalysis. I would characterize a ritual as linear and liturgy as circular. 
Commenting on Dionysius’ account of the eucharist in the EH, Golitzin notes: 
 
Just as this sacrament brings an illumination at once revealing and making 
Christ present, so the action or ‘spiritual motion’ to be associated with it is that 
of the spiral. We begin at the altar and follow the bishop out as he moves to 
include the whole of the Church in his censing, and then as he returns to the 
altar… Dionysius’ theoria of the sacrament is at once a turning around and a 
gathering into that unique point, precisely a spiral. It is therefore also an image 
of the sanctified human intelligence both circling about, and increasingly drawn 
into, the mystery of God – as into the “still point” of the poet. In as much as it is 
an image, so it is as well a reality.876 
 
The therapist and client circle around the potency of emerging psychic contents and in 
the process develop a unique form of kinship. Jung describes the importance of 
circumambulation in the mass as follows: 
 
Anyone who does not join in the dance, who does not make the 
circumambulation of the centre (Christ and Anthropos), is smitten with 
blindness and sees nothing. What is described here as an outward event is really 
a symbol for the inward turning of man, towards the self – for the dance can 
hardly be understood as an historical event. It should be understood, rather as a 
sort of paraphrase of the Eucharist, an amplifying symbol that renders the 
mystery more assimilable to consciousness, and it must therefore be interpreted 
as a psychic phenomenon. It is an act of conscious realization on a higher level, 
establishing a connection between the consciousness of the individual and the 	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supraordinate symbol of totality.877 
 
Pickstock’s description of medieval liturgy resonates with another aspect of 
psychoanalysis – its repetitiveness and its meandering quality. She argues that “the 
many repetitions and recommencements” in the liturgy are a result of the blending of 
oral tradition and “an apophatic reserve which betokens our constitutive, positive, and 
analogical distance from God, rather than our sinfulness and humiliation. According to 
such a perspective, the haphazard structure of the Rite can be seen as predicated upon a 
need for a constant re-beginning of liturgy because the true eschatological liturgy is in 
time endlessly postponed.”878 Similarly each analytic session is a re-beginning. There is 
a recognition that wholeness is “endlessly postponed.” There is no solution, cure or 
definitive interpretation that can be grasped with certainty in the present. 
 
Furthermore the on-going process of analysis undermines presuppositions about 
identity. Pickstock observes that, “For liturgy is at once a gift from God and a sacrifice 
to God, a reciprocal exchange which shatters all ordinary positions of agency and 
reception.”879 Is the speech of the client, the symptom, the image, or the transference 
directed from the unconscious to the conscious, or from the conscious to the 
unconscious? Who within the psyche is speaking to whom? Who is acting on or 
reacting to whom? The therapist is listening to a choir of complexes. According to Jung, 
“we are unable to distinguish whether these actions emanate from God or from the 
unconscious. We cannot tell whether God and the unconscious are two different 
entities.”880 And “the question as to whether the process is initiated by consciousness or 	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by the archetype can never be answered.”881 
 
A ritual has a greater sense of intentionality than liturgy. Some rituals, such as initiation 
rituals, aim to transform the status of the participant. For example, Turner contends that, 
“If our basic model of society is that of a ‘structure of positions,’ we must regard the 
period of margin or ‘liminality’ as an interstructural situation.”882 Psychotherapists have 
drawn heavily on this notion of liminality as the space between to describe 
psychotherapy, midlife, and analytic training. In this theory liminality only has meaning 
in relation to structure. 
 
In a sense a liturgy is an end in itself. It is the taking part that matters. Worship is not 
measured by outcomes. Torevell describes it as “an endless and unsatiated encounter 
with the Unknown.”883 There is an aspect of psychoanalysis that shares this quality. The 
sessions become an end in themselves. Indeed this is an aspect of psychoanalysis that is 
much lampooned and criticized. There is an anxiety that it can become a self-indulgent 
exercise. The dwelling together of the therapist and client in a long-term therapy, like 
the mass, is a participation in a special register of existence – the analytic process. At its 
heart it is an experience that transcends the objectives of evidence-based practice. 
Sullivan tries to capture the mystery of the analytic relationship:  
 
Simply making something intellectually conscious is not a meaningful 
activity… the patient will become more alive, increasingly aware of the way in 
which so much more than we know is always happening, and increasingly able 
to take the terrifying step of investigating what that “more” might consist of… 	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The therapist, working to ground herself in unknowing and to open herself to the 
fullness of the immediate moment, will experience that same shift… The truth 
cannot be known, and this truth – the fundamental mystery of life – is bearable 
only briefly and only in the context of a loving relationship.884 
 
Torevell states that, “the liturgical soul’s ascent is an endless, dramatic journey into 
difference, a constant traversing of the distance towards mystery.”885 During this 
journey the certainties, assumptions and expectations of both the analyst and the patient 
undergo profound change. Knowledge based on theory becomes transformed into 
knowledge based on experience. Lossky describes that the movement of apophaticism 
in words that resonate with the experience of the psychotherapist:  
It is a tendency towards an ever-greater plenitude, in which knowledge is 
transformed into ignorance, the theology of concepts into contemplation, 
dogmas into experience of ineffable mysteries. It is, moreover, an existential 
theology involving man’s entire being, which sets him upon the way of union, 
which obliges him to be changed.886 
 
We are reminded of Jung’s discussion of the demands made on the analyst by the 
transference: 
But life cannot be mastered with theories, and just as the cure of neurosis is not, 
ultimately, a mere question of therapeutic skill, but is a moral achievement, so 
too is the solution to problems thrown up by the transference. No theory can 
give us any information about the ultimate requirements of individuation, nor 
are there any recipes that can be applied in a routine manner. The treatment of 
the transference reveals in a pitiless light what the healing agent really is: it is 
the degree to which the analyst himself can cope with his own psychic problems. 
The higher levels of therapy involve his own reality and are the acid test of his 
superiority.887 
 
The analyst and the patient are subject to the apophatic logic of the analytic process. In 
this chapter I have explored some of the resonances between Dionysius’ discussion of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
884 Sullivan, Barbara Steven (2010), The Mystery of Analytical Work: Weavings from Jung and Bion, 
London: Routledge, pp. 257-8 
885 Torevell, p. 6 
886  Lossky, Vladimir (1957), The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, Crestwood, NY: SVS Press, 
p. 238 
887 CW18 1172 
	   217	  
liturgy and sacraments in Ecclesiastical Hierarchy and the theory and practice of 
psychoanalytic psychotherapy and highlighted the social dimension of apophasis. 
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Chapter Nine 
Conclusion 
 
This thesis has sought to identify apophatic elements in the theory and practice of C.G 
Jung. It demonstrates that Jung’s work is saturated with apophatic concepts, images and 
dynamics. Apophasis is broadly conceived to include a range of theories, linguistic 
practices and behaviours. It is a lens with many facets.  Just as there is no single 
conception of the via negativa, there is no need to identify one single occasion for 
apophatic thought or practice in psychoanalysis. Apophatic intensity can be found in 
many different elements of the analytic encounter.  
 
The thesis began with a thorough philological exposition of concepts within the Corpus 
Dionysiacum, which are integral to Dionysius’ apophatic discourse: kataphasis 
(affirmation); anagou and anagoge (uplifting); aphairesis (abstraction); apophasis 
(unsaying, denial, negation); hoion (as it were); hyper- (above, beyond, super-); 
exaireou (to be removed from, transcend); epekeina (transcend, beyond); exaiphnes 
(sudden, suddenly); ekstasis (ecstatic, ecstasy); apeiria and apeiron (infinite, infinity, 
unlimited, unbound); agnousia, agnoustos, agnoustous and hyperagnoustos 
(unknowing, unknowable, lack of knowledge, ignorance); henousis (unity, union); 
theosis, theousis and theôsis (deification, divinization, becoming godlike). Such a 
detailed taxonomy of the language of apophasis in the CD has not been undertaken 
before. It provides scholars with ready access to essential references.  
 
Jung’s reception of Dionysius and Cusa have been examined in detail, as has his 
engagement with neoplatonism. The thesis analyses Jung’s uses of the concept of 
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opposites: coincidence of opposites (coincidentia oppositorum), complexio 
oppositorum, conjunction of opposites (coniunctio oppositorum) and union of 
opposites. The problem of opposites constitutes a major site for apophasis in Jung’s 
work. It was acknowledged that claims to this effect have been made by others, but this 
is the first time that it has been conclusively proven by an exhaustive analysis of the 
references to opposites in the Collected Works. It was suggested that the transcendent 
function acts as an apophatic methodology at the heart of Jung’s theory.  
 
Jung’s work was looked at in relation to contemporary writers. Sells, Milem and Rorem 
are scholars of religion who have suggested novel frameworks for understanding 
apophasis. It is possible to find resonances with these structures in Jung’s thought. 
Deleuze and Derrida are thinkers who have had an impact on post-Jungian theory. 
Apophatic features in their thought were compared with themes in Jung’s work. The 
writings of two Jungian writers, Tacey and Dourley, who have discussed Jung and 
apophasis were examined. These explorations demonstrate that Jung’s engagement with 
apophatic themes is in sympathy with contemporary discussions in philosophy and 
theology and is not anachronistic. 
 
An impressionistic weaving of the practices described in the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy 
(EH) and aspects of the psychoanalytic psychotherapy process displayed the hidden 
sympathy between the two. It also raised the question of the social and cultural features 
of apophatic discourse. While psychotherapy has often been described as a ritual 
process, it was proposed that in significant respects psychoanalysis might be viewed as 
a liturgical practice.  
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There are important aspects of Jung’s work that could have been usefully explored to 
further our understanding of the apophatic character of his thought. These include his 
writings on individuation, the self, the imago dei, the Gnostics, alchemy, Eckhart, Zen, 
the Secrets of the Golden Flower, synchronicity, amplification, and the dynamics of the 
relationship between the ego and the unconscious.   
 
Beyond analytical psychology this research can also provide a platform for identifying 
apophatic elements in the theory and practice of other schools of psychoanalysis. 
Theories that might benefit from being read through an apophatic lens include Freud’s 
unrepressed unconscious, castration, resolution of the oepidus complex and primordial 
images, Bion’s O, Lacan’s Real and lack, Winnicott’s true self and going on being, and 
Klein’s projective identification and depressive position. Aspects of clinical practice 
that may be usefully considered as part of a contemplative, apophatic tradition include, 
evenly hovering attention, free association, approaching the session without memory or 
desire, boundaries of the session, therapeutic neutrality, working through and 
withdrawal of projections. 
 
Further research may support the hypothesis that the concepts of apophasis and the via 
negativa provide a key to illuminating the family resemblance among the various 
schools of psychoanalysis. It may be that when one reads a piece of theory or a clinical 
vignette, what makes it identifiable as analysis is the apophatic element; that we 
experience the Freudian, Jungian, Lacanian, Kleinian, etc. versions of psychoanalysis as 
psychoanalysis, because they all embody or enact apophasis each in their own particular 
ways. As Mortley observes,  “at the hands of the divine Denys the negative way also 
has an ecumenical function. More clearly than in any other thinker, the negative method 
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of the Areopagite dissolves the differences between the dogmas of various schools.”888 
An interest in apophasis is emerging in psychoanalytic writing.889 It is possible that a 
recognition of the apophatic, comtemplative nature of psychoanalysis could provide a 
way through some of the current theoretical, institutional, cultural and clinical impasses 
in the field of psychoanalysis.  
 
In 1960 Jung wrote to Herbert Read: 
 
The great problem of our time is the fact that we don’t understand what is 
happening in the world. We are confronted with the darkness of our soul, the 
unconscious. It sends up its dark and unrecognizable urges. It hollows out and 
hacks up the shapes of our culture and its historical dominants. We have no 
dominants any more, they are in the future. Our values are shifting, everything 
loses its certainty.890  
 
We might describe the current state of the world of psychoanalysis as one in which 
there are “no dominants” and all of the schools have lost their certainties. In this 
situation it is not surprising that analysts and therapists are looking to apophatic 
traditions for guidance in how to think about unknowing. Jung looked to Eckhart for 
instruction. “The art of letting things happen, action through non-action, letting go of 
oneself as taught by Meister Eckhart, became for me the key that opens the door to the 
way. We must be able to let things happen in the psyche.”891 The psychotherapist sitting 
in his/her consulting room listening to a patient is often forced to recognise that he/she 
does not understand the analytic process, the patient or him/her self. Dionysius 
experienced a similar aporia: 	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If God cannot be grasped by mind or sense-perception, if he is not a particular 
being, how do we know him? This is something we must inquire into.892 
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